14TH INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE

" Security, Stability and National Development in the New Normal "

09TH - 10TH SEPTEMBER 2021

DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

PROCEEDINGS

GENERAL SIR JOHN KOTELAWALA DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

14ᵀᴴ INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE

SECURITY, STABILITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW NORMAL

Defence and Strategic Studies

PROCEEDINGS

General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

Ratmalana, Sri Lanka

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Major General Milinda Peiris RWP RSP USP ndc psc

Vice Chancellor, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

Keynote Speaker, Mr. Lalith Weeratunga Principal Advisor to H.E. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, General (Retd.) Kamal Gunaratne, DVC Administration and Defense, Brigadier Wipula Chandrasiri, DVC Academic, Prof Sanath Dhammika, Deans of the respective faculties, Centre Directors, Academics, Senior Military Officers, Administrative Staff, Students and all distinguished guests who are connected with us in the cyber space.
Good Morning to you all!

It is indeed with a great sense of responsibility that I deliver the welcome address at this 14th consecutive international research conference of General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University held on the timely theme, 'Security, Stability and National Development in the New Normal", at one of the most crucial times of our history.

To begin with, let me very warmly welcome our chief guest and keynote speaker, Mr. Lalith Weeratunga, the principal advisor to HE the President Gotabhaya Rajapakse. Of course, Mr. Lalith Weeratunga is not at all a stranger to KDU. He is one of the great personalities who clearly understands the role played by KDU for the betterment of the nation and who has long been assisting us in numerous ways to develop this institution to what it is today. As I remember Mr. Lalith Weeratunga was the keynote speaker of our 6th research conference in 2013. Sir, your keynote on our theme, "Sri Lanka as a Hub in Asia: the Way Foreword" still reverberate in our minds even after 8 long years.

And it is a remarkable coincidence that I welcome you once again to deliver the keynote address on our current theme, 'Security,

Stability and National Development in the New Normal", which highlights the importance of stability created by the development and security nexus in the context of emerging new threats to national, human, and global security. Sir, we are looking forward to listening to your words of wisdom today as well.

Mr Weeratunga, it is also remarkable that eight years ago, you were accompanied by the Secretary Defence during that time, who has been destined to be President of our country today, H.E. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and today you are accompanied by the present Secretary Defence and the Chairman of our Board of Management, General (Retd.) Kamal Gunarathne, and I am indeed honoured to welcome General Kamal to this conference as the Guest of Honour because he has been a tower of strength for KDU at this crucial time of its history.

Let me also welcome all distinguished invitees including the Tri-Service Commanders and other BOM members including the Chairman of the UGC, distinguished members of the diplomatic corps, Vice Chancellors and academics from other universities, senior tri-service and police officers, and national and international participants joining this event on line.

Ladies and gentlemen, this year's conference is significant to us at KDU on several accounts. First, 2021 is the year in which we mark the 40th year of KDU's existence in the higher education landscape of Sri Lanka, and we are proud of the role we have been playing therein, whilst continuously growing in its stature as a national university doing its call of

duty towards the nation with fullest commitment and dedication.

Secondly, this year's conference is the one that we hold under the most trying circumstances in our history. Last year too, we conducted our research conference in a hybrid mode due to the first wave of the COVID 19 pandemic that took us all by surprise.

But we hoped that we would be able to conduct the 2021 conference freely and in the usual glamour. But this year, it turned out to be even a worse scenario with the third wave of the pandemic hitting us harder. So we consider that this is a more challenging test of our resilience as the nation's defence university.

Ladies and gentlemen, we always believe in the dictum that a quitter never wins and a winner never quits. So we were determined to challenge the challenges, how hard they may be. And we ensure the continuity of the conference adjusting and amending the circumstances, while taking the highest precautions against the pandemic scenario. We were able to slowly but steadily accept the prevailing danger, assess the situation realistically, and to see the best options for the best interest of our University. Therefore, we finally decided that this year's conference will a hybrid one with a major virtual orientation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the reason why we conduct this conference somehow or the other is because of our belief that we need to set an example for the nation to stand on its feet at times of crises. We as a nation cannot afford to continue to play the waiting game for ever. As our theme highlights, we need to find ways to ensure security and national development in the new normal adjusting ourselves to the new normal conditions sooner than later.

And thirdly, we believe that this is the time in which a nation's intellectual community must come forward to engage in serious and meaningful research to help overcome innumerable issues and problems that crop up in diverse fields such as defence and security, economics, science, technology and engineering, medicine and health services, management, social sciences and humanities, law and so on and so forth. It is the responsibility of a university to create the necessary environment and enabling grounds for important research outcomes, which the nation yearns for.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are glad that the intellectual community of the country has very positively responded to our initiative. Despite some adverse comments and criticisms of KDU and its role in higher education in Sri Lanka from certain quarters in recent times, the large majority of fair thinking academics, professionals and ordinary people are with us fully, and that is evident from the large number of research papers submitted by researchers from all over the country representing various higher educational institutions.

Despite the difficulties in adjusting to the online mode, the organizers of the KDU international research conference have done their best to maintain the quality of the conference in the highest level. They intend to set the tone to initiate more collaborative research to face new global challenges. As I always point out these types of research conferences are ideal platforms to make connections nationally and internationally for mutual benefit.

I hope that authors of KDU and various other local and international universities will take the opportunity to interact and develop friendly relationships, establish networks, and explore opportunities to embark on productive research collaborations.

While assuring our commitment to providing best opportunities for research collaborations, I wish all the very best for the presenters and hope you will enjoy every moment of this academic fusion. Thank you.

Keynote Address

Mr Lalith Weeratunga

Principal Advisor to His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka

Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Chief of Defence Staff and Commander of the Army, Commander of the Air Force, Vice Chancellor of the KDU, Distinguished academics, Honoured guests, Friends, *Ayubowan!*

Once again, I am delighted to be with you this morning at this research conference. It gives me much pleasure to be at the KDU because it is one of the best universities we have in Sri Lanka. Since of late, there have been much attack on and criticism of the KDU. That's because the KDU is doing well and has brooked no nonsense. With a village background, my mind goes back to a famous Sinhala saying, which means "only those mango trees that have sweet fruits are attacked."

The entire world is undergoing a massive reorganization with the COVID-19 pandemic, and the traditional themes and arguments in security seems rather irrelevant in the present context. "Security, Stability, National Development in the New Normal" is a timely theme, giving us much food for thought in terms of the advancement of a country like Sri Lanka. If you take the first component, security, the bottom line of security is survival. *Survival,* is based on a number of factors. Barry Buzan, the veteran in international security rejected the practice of restricting security to just one sector and defined it as "a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues."

As eminent representatives of the security sector, you are aware that the concept of security can somewhat vary from one country to another. When Mexico's major national security threat has remained to be organized crime for quite some time, Afghanistan's has been religious extremism. For a country like Somalia, it is the inbuilt corruption into their governance. For some countries, it might change abruptly. A few days ago, we all saw corruption and mismanagement which was the major security

threat of the African nation Guinea, getting substituted by another – an armed unrest. In spite of these differences, almost all countries in the world have developed a commonality during the past year, where the health insecurity assumed a major role over and above all others.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused the entire world to assume a 'new normal' to fight this common insecurity that is caused by a tiny, microscopic virus. Even during the new normal, however, certain fundamental features of the modern-day security have not changed. Security in the 21st Century was, to a great extent, focused on internal factors of a country, rather than external ones. The organization of the threat factor has changed from state militaries to terrorist organizations to even pirates. The underlying motivation for creating insecurities has shifted from being political to one that is economic.

Targets have shifted from soldiers to civilians. The distinction between 'high profiles' of national security and 'low profiles' of economic and social interactions have softened. This has given rise to new sources of global insecurity in the 21st Century which are essentially 'soft' in nature.

The 21st Century has continued to witness these new sources throughout its first two decades. Donald Rumsfeld, the onetime Defence Secretary of the United States said at a key decision-making point in the history of his country, "there are known knowns; the things we know we know, we also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know." Although stated in relation to a completely different scenario, when recalling this statement, I see that it resonates with the pandemic that we are facing now. In 'security

terms', COVID-19 is a 'wild card', an 'unknown unknown'. It is a security threat without a passport. It caused the 'health security' to assume the prime position in the security landscape of the modern day, surpassing the food security, water security and all other soft securities.

When we view the modern-day threats, we see that none of these is of a purely military nature, as those perhaps were, during the cold-war period. As a result, they also cannot be tackled by purely military means. There is another factor that contributes to the restriction of military means as a response to insecurities. In today's security landscape, States do not have the monopoly that they used to enjoy. Human beings have assumed that role. When the individual is considered as the central point in security rather than the 'State' as before, it gives a new insight into all our security related concerns. This helps us to understand the present-day global vulnerabilities with a new eye.

When the centre of focus in security becomes the individual, it changes the state-centric understanding of national, regional as well as global security. When a pandemic, which cannot be controlled by military means is plaguing the world, the human-centric understanding of security becomes vital to address it in order to ensure development of any country. This is why the 'soft component' of security, or the 'human security' gains more prominence over the 'hard component' of security during this new normal, created by the worst health pandemic in the recent history of the world.

The pandemic has given rise to a number of human security threats. To mention a few, the threat to economic security through unemployment, to health security through the deadly infectious virus and to environmental security through the mass accumulation of the waste generated in the health sector. It has also given a signal on food security as well, which is precisely when the Government declared essential services and appointed an authority to manage the situation in Sri Lanka. So you see, security in the new normal is connected with the

stability of a country, but in a different way from how it did with conventional security under the normal conditions.

National development, as we all know, is an all-encompassing term. It includes both the individual and the nation. Therefore, national development can be considered as the process of development and reconstruction of all dimensions of the nation, along with the development of the individual. This concept is essentially linked with both the growth and the change where *change* can be socio-cultural or economic, tangible or intangible. National development involves activities through a planned national economy, application of modern technology in agriculture to enhance production, application of science and technology in the production sector, improving the human resource and providing education for all among many others.

During a disaster such as the COVID pandemic, it also includes providing facilities and assistance to the poorest segments of the society. In theory, addressing the security needs, especially those of soft security and implementing broad array of the previously mentioned key activities in national development ensures the stability of the country during the new normal. This theory is in practice in Sri Lanka today, in different sectors to different degrees.

Let us consider the vaccination drive for example. Two months ago, Sri Lanka was struggling with the inadequate human resource in the civilian component of the health sector to conduct the vaccination programme at its full length. Health sector employees were getting exhausted with the enhancing demand for services. At this point, the Government employed its military health professionals to assist their civilian component. That accelerated our vaccination drive to such an extent that Sri Lanka became the first country in the world to have the fastest vaccination drive to its population.

H.E. the President had first-hand supervision of this process, at times acting as a 'vaccination planner', which contributed to the success of the

whole programme. This measure addresses our health security, and at the same time contributes to our national development by making the workforce resistant to the pandemic. Together, the two outcomes contribute to enhancing the stability of the country during this new normal.

Now let us consider a few of the numerous initiatives that the Government has introduced to ensure food security. The Government recently decided to take a transition from inorganic agriculture to organic agriculture, in keeping with pledge given to our people by the President, H.E Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in his policy document, 'Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour." The primary aim was to safeguard the public, and especially the future generations from non-communicable diseases including renal diseases, again ensuring the health security. This also gave an added advantage where the imports of chemical fertilizers became minimal and that saved a considerable amount of money to our Treasury. This also resulted in enhancing organic and bio fertilizer production within the country, opening up new employment opportunities.

Linked with these two activities, the Government also launched 'Wari Saubhagya', a programme to rehabilitate 1000 small tanks across the country. This was to provide water for both irrigation and drinking purposes. These projects ensured irrigation water to a greater area of paddy and other field crop cultivations and also created additional employment opportunities within the country. Overall, those made a noteworthy contribution to the national development as well as to the soft security of the country during the new normal.

National development not only involves the infrastructure development, but also the human development. A developed human resource is a shield against certain soft threats. The programme 'connect Sri Lanka' was launched during the new normal, initially providing four remote areas with 4G connectivity. We are planning to expand it into all 9 provinces.

The pandemic period where schools had to be closed was also used to plan education reforms aiming at producing future generations that are better equipped with battling their way through the ever-changing global order. These enhance opportunities for the public, especially the children to gain access to knowledge that is amply available to children and citizens of many developed countries, and also to equip themselves better to assist with development initiatives of the Government.

Fruits of this labour will be reaped only in the future, where our country will continue to have a learned, open minded younger generations, and through them, smarter work forces. The activities that the Government has started today contribute to national development in the future on the one hand, security on the other, and to stability of the country, overall.

The last example that I wish to draw has a direct connection with all institutions in the public as well as the private sector, electricity. The Government spent over US$ 2.3 Bln for oil imports in 2020. We all know that a considerable amount of this is spent for generating electricity. This is an unbearable amount for a developing country like Sri Lanka, to be spent notwithstanding the prevailing health pandemic. It is also a waste of funds considering the vast and untapped potential that Sri Lanka has for renewable energy.

The Government gave due consideration to both these when establishing 'Thambapawani' the first wind power station owned by the Government of Sri Lanka. Another similar plant has been launched in Pooneryn. Use of solar power has been introduced to households. A waste-to-power plant was also declared open at Kerawalapitiya. It is not an easy task for a developing country like Sri Lanka to manage this shift while battling with a pandemic, but amidst all, the Government plans to increase the renewable energy component to 70% of the total consumption of the country by 2030. It Is an ambitious target, but it helps the country to reach a higher status in self-sufficiency and also prepares the country to face worse calamities than the present one that might arise in the future. The 'failure to prepare' as the old saying

goes, is 'preparation for failure'. We intend to avoid it.

Moving back to the concept of security with these examples, with special emphasis on human security, it is evident that the national development and security are inter-linked. These cannot be achieved separately. This is probably what caused the formerly known definition of security, 'freedom from fear', to be redefined as 'freedom from want', indicating the link between security and development. Human security, as we all know, is an integral part of State security, which in turn, has an equally strong connection with national development. This is why if you have a closer look at Sustainable Development Goals, you will see that all 17 goals are connected to human security.

In this context, I believe there is something vital that we all need to understand about security, development and the stability that those bring about. The new normal caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is calling us to re-think our actions, plans and concepts on security and development both.

Is it not high time for us to re-think our national security and national development?

Is this not the best time for us to redefine our development-security nexus?

Let me conclude by bringing back to your memory, extracts from a famous speech delivered by Robert F. Kennedy during his run for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency of the United States. Over 50 years later, his remarks about the measurements of development resonate with something that we need to re-discover with experience we had during this new normal. He said, and I quote,

"... the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile."

Distinguished scholars, ladies and gentlemen, let us try to fathom the lesson that this global pandemic and the new normal is trying to teach us. Let us acknowledge the all-encompassing nature of national development and pay attention to the vital fact that has evaded our comprehension thus far – the fact that the individual, the human has assumed the central focus in security as well as in national development. Let us use that understanding to re-define our development-security nexus and bring a lasting stability to our country during the new normal.

Stay safe and take care of yourselves.

Thank you.

Address by Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka

General Kamal Gunaratne (Retd) WWV RWP RSP USP ndc psc MPhil

Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka

Chief Guest and Keynote Speaker of the 14th International Research Conference of KDU, Principal Advisor to the President Mr. Lalith Weerathunga, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, Foreign Secretary Professor Jayanath Kolombage, Chancellor of KDU General Jerry De Silva (Retd), Chief of Defence Staff and Commander of Army General Shavendra Silva, Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne, Chairman of University Grants Commison Professor Sampath Amarathunga, Vice Chancellors of other Universities, Vice Chancellor of KDU, Chief of Staff of Air Force, Director General at Institute of National Security Studies Professor Rohan Gunarathna, Deputy Vice chancellors, All Deans and Directors, former Chancellors and Commanders at KDU, Eminent Scholars, Senior Officers of the Armed forces and Police, distinguished guests joining us virtually from Sri Lanka and Overseas, Ladies and Gentlemen;

I consider it as a great pleasure and a privilege to be present here today at the inauguration ceremony of General Sir John Kotelawala Defense University's International Research Conference which is taking place for the 14th consecutive year and I would like to thank the Vice Chancellor and the conference organizers for the invitation extended for me to be present here to participate in this event. The International Research Conference of KDU is providing the opportunity for academics, professional researchers and practitioners to share their research findings and expertise addressing the mutual challenges in their fields. Therefore, this event has gained tremendous recognition among all interested parties around the world. Further, the provision of a wider interaction and

networking with national and international scholars in respective fields would be absolutely beneficial for all the participants to broaden their horizons of knowledge through intellectual discussions. However, due to the global pandemic situation in effect, most participants may join the event through a virtual platform for this conference as same as the last year. Yet, I'm sure we will be able to achieve the desired objectives in a state amidst this pandemic situation.

Furthermore, I'm extremely pleased that the theme selected by the KDU for the conference this year security, stability, and the national development in the new normal is a timely theme capable of augmenting the significance and focus of the subject of strategic national importance. Further, I firmly believe that the endeavor towards warranting the national development and ensuring national security becomes further from achievement by undermining the routine activities due to the ill effects of the pandemic but becomes attainable by ensuring the adaptability to the new normal as widely accepted by all the countries in the world, today which is implied by the theme that you have selected. In fact, as comprehensively illustrated by the keynote speaker Mr. Lalith Weerathunga it is quite imperative that all of us understand and pursue the ways and means of adopting the circumstances embedded with the new normal. in order to coexist with the Covid 19 pandemic which has not shown any expiry date as of yet.

Ladies and Gentlemen in a context of globalization and further economic integration, in recent decades the relationship between national development and national security of a country has become increasingly

interlinked for Sri Lanka. These connections represent both opportunities and potential threats to the country's national security. The open and interconnected Sri Lankan economy creates vulnerabilities from potential international and external threats. Against this backdrop, national development has emerged as an important strategic priority for the Sri Lankan government with the connection between development and national security which will be orchestrated upon the vistas of prosperity and splendor, the national policy framework of our government headed by his excellency the president Gotabhaya Rajapaksha.

Ladies and gentlemen, the development generally depend on the stability of a country which should be achieved by ensuring national security. Sri Lanka being a country endangered by ruthless terrorism for almost three decades has experienced a lot of hardships during the past and was in the stage of eyeing its development in the last decade. Even though we were able to relieve the country from the menace of terrorism we have found another security threat in the form of a pandemic which has posed a greater threat to the entire world. The threat that we face today is progressing in its second continuous year without any indication of a possible termination we are yet to find a permanent solution for the same. However, we must always work towards reaching our development goals without letting our country at peril. In such a context our endeavor here as Sri Lankans should be to seek possibilities to find ways and means to steer the country towards development goals amidst said difficulties. Sri Lankan government is at the threshold of trying all possible methods to meet its economic growth and objectives yet with lots of empidements while ensuring human security. When the domestic affairs of a country are affected it is extremely difficult for a country to reach its desired end state. Sri Lanka is no exception in this, regard being a developing country Sri Lanka cannot accept any economic standstills for a protacted time frame. However, any plans to expedite the economic gains should never be at the expense of human lives. Therefore, his excellency the president himself has expressed his keenness on this aspect to see and inspire all possibilities available to ensure the maintenance of momentum in the economic sphere.

On the contrary, we should also note the other contemporary security concerns such as violent extremism, terrorism, piracy, drug, and human trafficking, smuggling, cybercrimes, and other organized crimes and natural disasters pose a grave threat to the stability of a country. Sri Lanka's geostrategic location is susceptible to such threats as it is located in the main sea routes in the Indian ocean. The same geopolitical significance has given a greater recoginition to the country, thus it has gained greater demand from the rest of the world. In such an instance, the possibility of Sri Lanka becoming susceptible to threats posed from violent extremism and organized crimes is very high and present the government has initiated several steps to curtail such illegal activities and such measures taken such as the demarcation of maximum security prisons concept and highly effective maritime domination programs launched by the Sri Lankan Navy which have become very effective in restricting such threats. However, the effects of such activities pose a moderate level threat to the stability of our country.

Ladies and gentlemen, a government alone cannot afford to force all these threats that are in concert ruining the stability of a country. Therefore, as responsible citizens, it is our bounded duty to provide novel ideas, suggestions, and proposals to consider in regaining our country's stability and development. I hope the academic events of this nature will undoubtedly serve this national requirement. Such efforts are

arranged to address emerging challenges. Promoting more research and development becomes a task of topmost priority for all of us.

Fortunately, as the Secretary of Defense, I feel tremendously proud and content to say that the Kotelawala Defence University is at the forefront of researching the development of security-related problems in the new normal. The approach adopted by the Kotelawala Defense University to understand the contempaty complex situations concerning the bigger picture rather than dwelling on the narrow passages will become far more effective in resolving the emerging complexity of future challenges. Therefore, I'm well certain that the faculties of General Sir John Kotelawela Defence University with their interest, commitment, dedication, and knowledge in diverse academic disciplines and outside rich researches inputs would contribute immensely to this year's conference theme. The knowledge that you are going to unearth and share during this conference would be of immense benefit not only to the academic community but to the entire humankind to make their lives better.

In conclusion ladies and gentlemen, I should express my most sincere appreciation to the Vice Chancellor and the organizers of the General Sir John Kotelawala Defense University's 14th International Research Conference 2021 for organizing this timely important event amidst the covid 19 pandemic concerns and I wish this event be successful in all way imaginable. Ladies and Gentlemen thank you very much for your patience, thank you.

Vote of Thanks

Dr Harinda Vidanage

Conference Chair, 14th International Research Conference, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

Mr Lalith Weeratunga, Principal Advisor to HE the President of Sri Lanka, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, General Kamal Gunaratne, Vice Chancellor – Maj Gen Milind Peiris, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Defence & Administration), Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academics), Rector – Southern Campus, Senior Professors, Deans and Directors, Senior officers representing Tri Forces and Police, Distinguished guests, colleagues, Ladies & Gentlemen, Good morning!

In its 40th Anniversary since its inception the flagship academic conference of the KDU, the international research conference progresses to 14 years of continuity. I stand here to reflect and provide my gratitude to a team of individuals who despite every challenge in the form of material and the forces of nature has confronted us with, have managed to successfully bring us to where we are today.

Since 2019, the country has witnessed unprecedented upheavals from violent extremism to microbial threats that have forced a drastic rethinking of every aspect of social life. These challenges have made all of us believe in a reality that long established norms, traditions, beliefs do have their limits and if we are to survive and thrive in the new normal, we must adapt, adopt and innovate. The core fundamentals driving this year's IRC is based on this conviction and that the KDU as a leading force of defiance and a beacon of hope amidst such calamities.

On behalf of KDU, I would first and foremost like to extend a heartfelt appreciation to our Chief Guest and Keynote Speaker, Mr Lalith Weeratunga the Principal advisor to H E President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Your presence today is a blessing to us as an institution and to the IRC as a process and your observations made at the keynote enriched us with

knowledge and perspective. Your wise words of wisdom will have a bearing on the deliberations of all academic communities within and well beyond this conference. I also would like to thank Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, General Kamal Gunaratne for his presence, his insights and his towering leadership that has seen KDU through fair weather and through some rough storms.

I would like to highlight and appreciate the visionary leadership of the Vice Chancellor, Maj Gen Milinda Peiris and his belief in maintaining continuity of this apex academic event of the KDU. I must then appreciate the critical roles played by Deputy Vice Chancellor (Defence & Administration) Brigadier Wipula Chandrasiri in ensuring that the IRC will take place and in providing the administrative leadership towards the materializing of the conference. The support and blessing of the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academic) Professor KAS Dhammika is highly appreciated, along with the support of all Deans of faculties who came together to make this event a success.

Even at a time when every institution is careful about its purse, our sponsors have stood by us, let me profoundly thank and appreciate the generosity of our Gold Sponsors, the Bank of Ceylon and the People's Bank and with Huawei Sri Lanka and National lotteries board being our silver partners. There are many more who have chipped in and do not want their names mentioned and a big thank you for all.

I must mention that this year it is the first time the faculty of Defense and Strategic Studies have been tasked with the overall IRC and holds the chair. I must with gratitude mention the hard work of my colleagues in both departments of Defense and Strategic Studies under the leadership of Col Enoj Herath the Dean of the faculty. The FDSS represents the tip of the Spear of the KDU and bears

testimony to the perfect convergence of civic-military relations.

Towards the buildup to the conference the shutdowns became lockdowns and lockdowns became enforced quarantined curfews, yet the main committee of the IRC 2021 managed to work tirelessly around the clock. We knew it was all for a greater cause and I must appreciate the gargantuan task that was handled by the secretary of the IRC committee Ms Lihini De Silva who virtually was my prime buffer and the tremendous work done by the three co secretaries, Maj Ranushka Ferdinandesz, Ms Isuri Uwanthika and Captain Abeetha Athukorala. We were all supported by the dynamic team of faculty coordinators who labored hard and were endowed with patience.

It is with sincere gratitude I appreciate the services of Mr Kithsiri Amaratunga the president of the Editorial committee and Dr Faiz Marikar the deputy editor. I also want to mention the prudent actions taken by Commander Bogahawatte, the president of the publication committee. I would like to thank all committee presidents, committee members, faculty committees, the office of Bursar, Registrar, Adjutant and C/O Admin and the staff at the Vice Chancellor's office.

New normal pushed us to the limits, yet we managed to overcome as we functioned as a collective team. Yet, finally the work would be incomplete if not for the researchers who had put faith in us and submitted papers and reviewers who filtered them. This year's IRC is the most decentralized event out of all IRCs, facilitating intellectual deliberations of this scale is no easy task. To keep this grid alive and robust the contributions made by Director IT and his team needs a special word.

We have truly embraced the new normal. We have not run away from it, instead we have transcended it. Thank you all for accepting and believing in us. We shall prevail and we shall overcome.
Thank you very much!

DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

PLENARY SESSION

Summary of the Plenary Sessions

I.   PLENARY SESSION I

The Plenary Session I titled Security, Stability and National Development in the New Normal was held at the auditorium, Faculty of Graduate Studies on 9th September 2021 from 10.30 A.M to 1.15 P.M. The session was chaired by Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Director General, Institute of National Security Studies. Professor Rohan Gunaratna initiated the session by briefly speaking about the KDU and how events like IRC develops a progressive aspect in the contemporary research culture. Further he highlighted that it is required to adhere to the new normality within this period of Covid-19 pandemic. The Chair created the background for the session by briefly describing the Taliban situation which has become a controversial topic in modern-day world politics.

Professor Roger Kangas, Dean, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, NDU. Washington D.C. USA. was the first guest speaker who spoke about US perspective related to the session theme. In terms of security, he further highlighted how the Taliban Government yet remains a surprise element to the International Community. Mr. Nitin. A. Gokhale, Senior Defence Analyst, Editor-in-Chief of the Stratnewsglobal.com India emphasized how the Indian Military handles the Covid-19 Pandemic situation and how it became a priority in the case of national development. He spoke about issues which has been prevailed between India and Sri Lanka. Then, Dr. Asma Shakir, NDU, Pakistan expounded the emerging technological challenges in the South Asian region. She further spoke about strategic stability within the region focussing on India and Pakistan. She especially elaborated on the Kashmir issue and nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan while expounding the danger of terrorists. The fourth speaker, Professor Shahab Enam Khan, Associate Research Fellow, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, China mentioned the role of Armed Forces in promoting strategic and National interests within the region. Further he enriched his presentation by speaking about the geo-economic gap and the issues of the new Thailand government. The fifth speaker, Air Marshal D Choudhury Commandant National Defence College, India pointed out a border view about the globalization which includes the realities of peace and

Traditional and Non-Traditional security threats. He spoke about the economic growth in the pandemic situation and on how it has evolved into an economic disaster. He noted that it is required to adopt a collective leadership within the region. The last speaker, VADM Prof Dr Ir Amarulla Octavian ST MSC DE SD mainly highlighted how some parties are being affected by the rapid spread of Covid-19 pandemic. Then he stressed that we should strengthen the health sector, state institutions and the military. He presented his perspective on how parliaments needs to draft new roles and formulate state institutions to manage Covid-19 situation. The session was also followed by questions and answers.

II.   PLENARY SESSION II

The Plenary session titled "Security, stability and national development in the new normal" was held at FGS auditorium on 9th October from 1.30 P.M. to 5.00 P.M. The Chairperson, Ambassador (Retd.) Bernard Goonetilleke (Chairman, Pathfinder Foundation) started the session by narrowing down the theme and its importance in the contemporary international system. The first presenter Assistant Professor Mohd Mizan Bin Mohammad Aslam, Naif Arab University for security science, Saudi Arabia highlighted the impact of the pandemic on education, especially in developing countries and its contribution towards digitalization of economies. The second presenter, Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan who is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology in Observer Research Foundation India explained how the development of nuclear weapons affected global security. Further, he discussed nuclear related issues in Iran and North Korea and the threats which Pakistan faces due to the China's expansion. The third presenter who is Professor Girish Ram Kumar, Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, India discussed the current dynamics of global power politics and India space innovation system. Also, he compared the role of China and India in balancing the Indo-pacific region. The fourth presenter who is an Associate Professor David B Des Roches from Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defence University, United States of America pointed out the evolution of surveillance and the modern-day

Developments of drones. The fifth presenter, Assistant Professor Maria Saifuddin Effendi from the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Faculty of Defence University Islamabad, Pakistan mentioned about security challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. He also suggested that a timely mechanism needs to be adopted in order to face new challenges of new normality, particularly collective norms within the framework of SAARC. The session was also followed by a question and answer session.

TECHNICAL SESSIONS

Civil Military Interdependency to Counter Terrorism: A Case Study of Sri Lanka

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Abstract— Terrorism has become a major threat to many countries worldwide and has made it difficult to maintain world peace whereas some countries find it difficult to manage due to the destructive terrorist activities of various terrorist groups with innovation. Terrorism is an issue that Sri Lankan military and the communities consider as a security threat. Since Easter Attacks, Sri Lankan military and law enforcement authorities have been increasingly tasked with preventing, responding to, and investigating extremist movements and terrorist organizations. The aim of this article is to examine the importance of building relationship between military and local communities, creating an information highway in order to counter terrorism. Data collected from secondary sources and existing literature confirmed the findings of the article on this topic. The findings explain the importance of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and how to utilize a maximum output to the intelligence services from the local communities by developing a civil military interdependency. In order to build that, building trust is a major component. This also focuses on strengthening information sharing through better relationships. This demands that Military and law enforcement agencies to establish a system of public participation in the countering terrorism measures by working closely with their communities. The conclusion of the article demonstrates suggestions to build better relationship among the military and civil society which namely are initiating the concept of civil joint task force and inculcating community building and education. Some broader implications were also extracted for the Sri Lanka Military from a realistic point of view.

Keywords— terrorism, law enforcement, intelligence, civil military cooperation.

I.   INTRODUCTION

Today, nations across the world have engaged in some kind of war with other nations or terrorist groups due to different reasons. According to Tzu (2005), terrorism has become a greater threat to world peace and some countries find it difficult to manage due to the destructive actions of these terrorist groups. And the worst part is that these terrorist activities are taken place in society interrupting general human routines and takes strenuous operations in tracing them. In the contemporary world, a lot of technology is used by the military to trace such activities but the greater challenge is that the terrorists are hidden from the eyes of the security forces (Collins, 2007). Either they live in the society among civilians or deep forests in which even satellites are being unable to keep a track of such activity.

According to Richard (2011), the 9/11 attack was a dreadful incident of which happened due to an intelligence failure that took terrorism to a whole new level. Everyone, including the military intelligence sector around the world, was shaken by the dexterity of preparation and the precision of its execution, the death count and more. The United States which is known to be equipped with the best military and intelligence services failed to make their information into intelligence and one of the most valuable lessons learned was that their enemies also had changed their existence to be able to disclose their secrets. What we can learn from this is that terrorists participate in warfare of asymmetry, forming capacities toward human weakness and poor security. They engage in intense tactical investigations through a huge quantity of information available to them. To overcome this, it is very important to build trust and a positive relationship with the community, the people. The most effective way of fighting against terrorism is the Isolation Theory (Collins, 2007). This refers to the process of isolating the terrorist from the general public. In order to do that, the military must make sure that the public is on their side. This is where the trust component and the civil-military interdependency should come into the limelight.

II. INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is one of the most important factors in statecraft. In the military aspect, Intelligence is a crucial component in defeating terrorism. How does Intelligence help to defeat terrorism? Intelligence is an exclusive thing with a dark world with secrecy (Turner, 2005). According to Jackson (2014), it is the first step in preventing terrorist activities and more importantly, it is the process of obtaining information about the terrorist and their operations. Intelligence isn't something that is only limited within the borders of a country, but also outside the borders due to changing environment of global terrorism at a transnational level. Intelligence is all about identifying the possible trend, challenge or threat with conclusions by processing and analyzing information. According to Warner (2002), intelligence refers to a secret state activity to understand foreign entities and influence them. He also identified intelligence as key policy information, gathered by accessible and covert means and evaluated for educational purposes, informing or assisting policymakers in the formulation and implementation of national security and foreign policy. His definition of intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis in short of our plans and operations"

International organizations may be linked to other states that could not clarify non-state actors that are threats to national security; this conception often falls on the same dialectical deficiency (Gill and Phythian, 2006). A variety of sub-state actors, corporations, non-commercial, criminals, and terrorist groups often feel the need to gather and evaluate intelligence to defend against the theft of secrets. In intelligence, several intelligence disciplines are used by the military to acquire information. These disciplines are broadly categorized into human intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), and technical intelligence (TECINT). Lohman (1989) insists that out of the above human intelligence is the most important and the most valuable intelligence function. It is very accurate and timely. Human intelligence is received through interpersonal contracts built on trust. Most nations, and many private organizations, have HUMINT capabilities that they use to collect data on their adversaries and competitors.

HUMINT plays an integral, if not an indispensable role within the intelligence and national security arenas. Whether it is against traditional nation-state adversaries or newer and more pronounced threats, such as terrorist or insurgency networks, or the more esoteric, like cybersecurity, the human factor remains a dominant force (Thompson, 2016). Intelligence should come from the human being. To do that, the military needs to create an environment including the civilians. Therefore, before creating an information highway, trust must be built between the military and the civilians. This strategy is known as interdependency.

III. INFORMATION SHARING AND CIVIL-MILITARY INTERDEPENDENCY

Many countries around the world are facing terrorism threats which some governments have been able to manage diplomatically, but some have failed. Field (2009) stated that many intelligence failures have occurred due to the lack of intelligence sharing among the military and the community throughout history. Information sharing is very important as it is the first step to prevent a terrorist attack (Travers, 2021). Shared information can improve the quality of investigations as there could be vital information or a missing piece. A single piece of information that comes from the community could be the key to an investigation. Day-to-day activities that happen in society may have a connection to a terrorist network. Dealing with currency, smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking may have direct connections with terrorism as they may be funding sources for terrorist activities. Travers (2021) stated that throughout history, there had been many failures happen due inability of connecting these dots with different pieces of information gathered from the community. Many civilians have very valuable information, but without a good trusted relationship and proper system or a position in the body to coordinate, sharing of information is very limited. Getting the support of the community into the intelligence process is not simple. It takes a lot of commitment and a lot of faith needs to be developed among the military and the community. The ultimate objective is to prevent terrorism using valuable information and to safeguard national interests at large.

Civilians are suffering the consequences of armed conflicts increasingly. They also find themselves close to aggression, attacks, and security, requiring the military to be increasingly involved in situations of conflict (Tzu, 2005). When there is a conflict or lack of security, people of the community live in fear and anxiety. When military operations take place, it is very important to build a positive relationship with the

community with which they live. The discipline which the military should maintain and the way they mingle with society is very important to develop a positive relationship. In some cases, there had been incidents around the world where activities of the military obstruct the day-to-day life of civil society. Connell (2012) states that "When civilians see soldiers with red collars, they fear. When the civilians fear the military they will not be transparent and will not share information. Locals are hesitant to deal with military personal if such encounters happen and many of them will withhold their valuable information of terrorism activities or might help the enemy to get rid of the military. However, the confidence and the trust between the local community and the military is very important to increase security effectiveness as the main duty of the military is to protect the civilians. The military has to understand the importance of such mutual trust and implement strategies to create civil-military interdependency.

IV.   IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING TRUST

The trust component plays a vital role when it comes to building effective relationships. The role played by the trust is the most important aspect in whatever the engagement activity and it cannot be underestimated. Trust is the key to a strong, consistent relationship which makes a strong pillar in every organization (Connell, 2012). Whether it is a private or public organization, military or non-military, building trust among the stakeholders is the key to success. However, the challenge is that we are in a world in which trust is declining at every level in society irrespective of the country. Due to these trust issues military is facing a lot of challenges to engage with the communities to make effective discussion and get the required support in defeating terrorism. The military should always see the possibility of building trust among the public mindset and making use of it to the maximum of national interest.

According to Tzu (2005), trust is very important when using human intelligence. There are several reasons for deteriorating trust, and effective management processes should be implemented to address the issues. These problems include;

- Lack of emotional intelligence of military

- Limited involvement or understanding of the processes and expectations of engagement of local community

- The growing gap between the military and people, due to complex governance processes and practices.

In literature, they have identified many ways of building trust. Effective communication is a vital factor in building trust. If communication is done effectively, more people and communities understand the process, priorities, and expected results of the military. The community will know the formal dedication done by the military to ensure the security of the society and its people. Respect also plays a significant role in building trust. Although this sounds obvious, it is absolutely important that the tone, material, and facilitation of military interaction activities fully appreciate the feedback of all participants, even if it is challenging at times. Next will be the transparency of military processes. The military should be transparent and well-understood in their entire participation activities within the local community. Free of personal, political, or informative and truthful about the role and effect people would have in the decision-making or implementation of solutions. In this regard, many community involvement programs have failed. Successful commitment and confidence enable all parties involved to function as best as possible from a shared understanding of the issue. If the community believes that knowledge is exchanged only with certain stakeholders or that all the views on a topic are not taken into account, it is highly doubtful that the military will build confidence in a successful or lasting interaction. Closely related to respect, people will show greater faith and confidence in the engagement efforts that account for their perspectives, view their contributions and employ their skills in a manner that they feel is consistent with their involvement.

V.   SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE

Nearly three decades of brutal terrorism which crippled Sri Lanka's economy and social structure ended in the year 2009 giving the people of Sri Lanka a ray of hope and opportunity to embrace peace and pursue prosperity. In 2019, a decade of peace was shattered by the Easter Sunday attack on churches and luxury hotels by a small terrorist group linked to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). In order to counter those challenges and threats, a strong National Security policy was deemed a prerequisite. For Sri Lanka to be secure, the policy should focus on all levels of the National Security Complex and sectors giving special emphasis to the ethnic group level. History has shown that the tensions are at that level due to fear of

extinction and survival by ethnic groups in Sri Lanka which should be erased through a solid policy (Perera, 2020).

Due to unsettled Islamist extremism issues during the recent past, some radical Muslims have been encouraged to form groups like NTJ (National Tawheed Jamath) & JMI (Jamaathei Millath Ibrahim) resort to violence by marginalizing Muslim moderates. Finally, this group carried out the Easter Sunday attack on 21st April 2019. Before the Easter Sunday attack, the traditional Muslim community was able to provide reasonable information regarding this extremist group and its development. Months before the bombings, Mohamed Razik Mohamed Taslim, a Muslim social worker from Mawanella, had been at the forefront of efforts to investigate the extremists. Taslim's story depicts both how the country's traditional Muslim community actively tried to stop the emerging radical elements within their own community, and how the authorities failed to recognize repeated warning signs ahead of the Easter Sunday attacks (BBC, 2019). His information and coordination with Criminal Investigation Department led to the raid in Wanathavilluwa, Puttalam where a large number of explosives and chemicals were found. Moreover, a Muslim religious leader, Mufthi Mohammed Rizwi who testified before the select committee looking into the Easter Sunday attacks said he had warned the defense authorities on the National Thawheed Jama'ath in November 2012 (Daily Mirror, 2019). Therefore the information from this community is very important to combat extremism by obtaining information about extremists behaviour within their community.

VI.   RECOMMENDATIONS

A.   Civil Joint Task Force

The concept of the Civil Joint Task Force (CJTF) is the main suggestion we would like to make for the Sri Lankan military to get the community involved in achieving the National Security Strategy of Sri Lanka. CJTF is a well-structured entity consists of civilians from the local community that operates in an organized manner with more authority. The CJTF should be created and strengthened to reposition the agenda for state intelligence. We suggest that every village or administrative region must have an intelligence unit to be coordinated by the military. This will provide reliable intelligence and early warnings against terrorist threats, if well-arranged and organized.

During the 30 years of ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan military received that support from the local communities and their contributions to the successes of the military were remarkable. However, with the emergence of religious extremism, the strategy of forming the CJTF has to be revamped and new strategies have to be put in place. The nature of modern terrorism has taken the fields of combat too close and its asymmetrical nature makes predictability difficult, if not impossible.

Members of the CJTF can provide reliable intelligence as representatives on the supporters or terrorist activists, providing information about particular individuals or groups, suspicious activities, changes in the religious ideology, potential attacks,which makes it easier for the military to analyze from the root level to conduct proactive operations.Another advantage of initiating this is that these members are locals who know the culture of the areain which they live in and they are fully aware of the evolution of fundamentalism, radicalization, and extremism which leads to terrorism. This initiative brings intelligence to the local community from the high levels of governmental circles. Also, the state must strengthen this and expand their intelligence to the top to the bottom level if early signs of terrorist threats can be detected and avoided. The higher intelligence officials will have to focus on external threats, detect and respond them while maintaining firm intelligence efforts within the state and society at the same time.

Moreover, the value of information received from the local community in countering terrorism also serves as an identification of the potential reasons the individuals are enrolling for acts of terrorism. Reflecting on such themes could lead to the discovery that we wouldn't be able to explain terrorism until one can completely empathize with the pain and the frustration that cause it (Stern, 2003). Gaining a better understanding of these facts could lead to appropriate actions towards fighting terrorism. CJTF will have the capacity to provide the military with valuable information that will help them to prevent terrorism at the base level itself. Hence this can become the human intelligence scheme applied in fighting terrorism ensuring the security of the community as well as the state.

The Civil joined Task Force is responsible for gathering information related to any existing or perceived threats and act as a Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group, those who receive information from the local communities. This team may include

religious leaders, retired military officers, intellectuals, and representatives from youth and social welfare organizations within the community. These groups engage with social activities and this enables CJTF to identify the changes happening within the society. It enables the military to obtain early warning on any potential threat. CJTF which consists of different sectors in the community can contribute in different ways to achieve the national security objectives. The information should be evaluated within this group before disseminating it to the authorities. Proper training and awareness programs such as terrorism awareness and first responder training should be provided to CJTF frequently by the military. Furthermore to terrorist threats, this group should involve in finding other threats such as drugs and other criminal activities within their areas. Social and economic problems also need to be addressed, because these are factors that motivate vulnerable individuals to engage in criminal activities. CJTF should be able to identify the preconditions of terrorism in areas in which they live and monitor radical political, religious, and racial activities. CJTF should have proper coordination and integration with the military. Collected and disseminated information should be properly stored in a secured database.

Recruitment of this CJTF should be conducted under the direct supervision of the military with coordination of the area law enforcement agencies. Proper recruitment and selection need to be taken place to ensure the effectiveness of operations. Moreover, the loyalty of members of CJTF is very important as the security of the information has to be ensured and information to be shared in real-time. However, it is the responsibility of the military and intelligence community to verify the information received by the CJTF. Processing and analyzing the information and the dissemination have to be done effectively for maximum utilization of the information received from CJTF. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the military to provide feedback to the CJTF which they receive from the security authorities from a higher level.

B. Community Building and Education

One of the key things that the Sri Lankan military should do is to establish relations with the local communities in which they operate. Sometimes there is a broad divide between civilians and the military to protect their rights. However, the military can bridge the differences through volunteerism and community relations. Military getting involved in community

work is very important and education is one main aspect which military can get involved in. Through these practices, the military will show the nation in many ways' parallels and common values.

For an example officers or soldiers can volunteer at schools and help students with their education. In addition, soldiers can be mentors to the students of the community who helps out the community to build up their personal and professional development. There is sportsmanship build in every military personnel. Hence, soldiers can serve as coaches for sports for school teams and youth groups. Developing sports or sportsmanship which improves the relationship with the youth will be very useful in keeping them attached to the military. Also by doing sports they help children and youth to stay healthy and active. Moreover, soldiers also get a chance to improve their skills by being mentors and role models. They also help teach teamwork, resiliency, leadership, discipline, respect, confidence, and sportsmanship

In our opinion, the additional hours military put in their community work keeps the bond between the society and the military which eventually improves the security. Even though none of these results can be physically influenced, individuals and society certainly experience them. The social links between military and civil society will lead to a more stable, friendly, and confident relationship between both parties. These activities open up the world to military and communities who may not otherwise come in contact with people who are different – ethnically, religiously and politically. The strong relationships developed by volunteerism and community engagement allow us to see beyond the common ground differences and demonstrate that differentiation is not inherently evil.

VII. CONCLUSION

No doubts are admitting that the information obtained from civil society or human intelligence is more essential than was necessary to introduce policies to deal with the most important part of countering terrorism. The main role of intelligence is to assist the leadership of the state in statecraft and human intelligence plays a vital role in it. However, controlling the quality of the intelligence received by the community is a very challenging task and trickier than the other means of collecting information. So, military must be very careful when processing human information into intelligence as outcomes are not determined in mathematical precisions. Tzu states that "just water which carries a boat from bank to

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bank may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on human intelligence, whilst production of great results is often timing the cause of the utter disaster."

Trust is very important when using human intelligence, according to Walker (2012), within the same community, there may be people who were former terrorists who have been deposed or degraded or undergone punishment and expecting to have vengeance. Human intelligence must take the lead in the battle against terrorism, with help from electronic collections and an open-source infrastructure. Terrorists are not states, they are non-state actors. They protect themselves by mixing their activities into normal social life, and they are ready to risk their lives for whatever belief they have.

In National Security, the information you receive from the locals is very crucial for intelligence. Moreover, Tzu (2005) states that "knowledge of the spirit–world is to be obtained by divination; information in the natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of the enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone". In the heart of the enemy country, the intelligence community must win people over through kinder treatment to fill the demand for information by the local community.

However, the collection of information is yet another small step in the process. In the contemporary world, there is a lot of information and this information has to be converted into intelligence where the bigger picture can be seen. However, this valuable information or processed intelligence itself is not enough, possible action should be taken on time to prevent an incident which means it must lead to action. Lack of Cooperation can be seen as one major reason for information not being shared. Cooperation among local communities is of utmost importance when promoting counterterrorism.

Educational Institutes like General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) has an important role in developing the civil-military relations in Sri Lanka. The military and the civilians receive the opportunity to interact, get connected and produce knowledge and research through such education channels. KDU creates a tendency in both the civil and military mindset that they could trust and work together in achieving the national security objectives of Sri Lanka. This could also be expanded by introducing domestic preparedness programs, terrorism awareness and first responders training

programs to educate the civilians in understanding the basics on threats and how to act against.

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The Taiwan Issue: Exploring the Possible Standoff between QUAD and China

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Abstract— This paper aims to explore the stance of the present governments in each member nation that is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) if China invades Taiwan in the near future. However, the author wishes to state that Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not be a direct military assault but a carefully calculated machination in which the island-nation would be subdued into submission without firing a single bullet. Nevertheless, securing Taiwan's independence would be the first formidable challenge the nations of QUAD would face since the sole mission of this union is to contain Chinese influence and expansion into the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific regions. Therefore, the research question outlying this paper is if QUAD will intervene to save Taiwan from an imminent Chinese invasion? To answer this question, this research identifies two objectives. The first is to gather information on the nature of the diplomatic relationship maintained by QUAD member states with China. The second objective on the other hand, is to explore academic and defence related material available on strategies that QUAD may apply to prevent Chinese consolidation of Taiwan. When exploring the resources available on this scenario, it appears that there are a number of factors to consider by each member state before they all agree on defending Taiwan from China. Similar for China, it is a question of whether the Communist Party of China believes that its military is capable to confront the united forces of four economic powerhouses. Nevertheless, despite the reservations of Japan, India and Australia, The United States would be compelled to come for Taiwan's aid if USA wishes to maintain its superiority in Asia Pacific, even if it fails to prevent China ultimately consolidating Taiwan into PRC. The methodology applied on this paper was based purely on qualitative research and on secondary sources.

Keywords— USA, China, Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan, QUAD

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Brief on the History between China and Taiwan

The Republic of China (or commonly referred to as Taiwan or ROC) is a controversial island nation that is located in the East China Sea and separated from Mainland China by the Taiwan Strait. Despite meeting the requirements for state-hood as stipulated in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, Taiwan is not recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign nation-state. The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971 recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only internationally accepted representative of China in the international organization. This resulted in Taiwan having to relinquish its UN membership along with its permanent seat in the UN Security Council to PRC (Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, 1971).

Nevertheless, Taiwan currently maintains diplomatic relations with 15 countries and non-diplomatic representation with over 50 nations (Clarke, 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China, 2021). The latter include trade, cultural exchanges and scientific collaborations. Despite being considered unofficial state level relations, diplomatic protocols are practiced to a certain extent with these nations. Moreover, Taiwan is a member in several international organizations such as the Word Trade Organization, International Olympic Committee and in the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2020; IOC, 2021; WTO, 2019). However, over 100 nations strongly adhere to UN Resolution of 2758 hence neither maintain diplomatic nor non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Sri Lanka is one such nation-state (Rajasingham, 2020).

The People's Republic of China (or commonly referred to as China or PRC) has always protested against Taiwan's independent status since the Communist Party of China took control of the Chinese government after the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1945-1949 (which is also referred to as the Second

Phase of the Chinese Civil War). Prior to annexing Taiwan into the Japanese Empire (after the Japanese Invasion of Taiwan in 1895), Taiwan was considered either a sovereign territory or a vassal state by successive dynasties in Imperial China. During the Qing Dynasty (which was the last dynasty of Imperial China), Taiwan was sovereign territory of the Empire (Copper, 2014).

When Taiwan was under Japanese rule, drastic political changes were taking place in Mainland China. In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown by the Chinese Revolution, which ended over 5,000 years of imperial rule in China. From there on, China would be referred to as, Republic of China. Sun Yat-Sen would be the republic's first President. However, this period was marked by political turmoil and is commonly referred to as the Republic Era of China. During this period, China would experience a fusion of democracy, authoritarianism, and a brief restoration of the Qing Dynasty. Nevertheless, when Japan invaded China during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1949 (which was part of the Pacific theatre of WWII), the President of China was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who represented the Kuomintang political party. Since his government was a significant contributor in WWII, the Republic of China was awarded a permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 1945.

After the defeat of President Kai-shek's Kuomintang majority Government at the Second Phase of the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949, key Government officials of the Republic of China swiftly migrated to the island of Taiwan in 1949 during the latter stages of the war (Cheung, 2016). This was done to avoid persecution from Chairman Mao's Communist regime. However, during this time Taiwan was still considered part of Japanese territory since the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 (Haipeng and Guoqiang, 2016). Nevertheless, at the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, Japan ceded Taiwan to China (Zha, 2001). It was at this particular juncture where the territory of Taiwan and the representatives of Mainland China becomes a substantial global issue. Does the two landmasses belong to the exiled government of the Republic of China? Alternatively, does Taiwan belong to the new Communist Regime of the People's Republic of China?

The People's Republic of China argues that Taiwan is a part of its territory. This is because, as mentioned previously, when Japan invaded the island in 1895, Taiwan was sovereign territory of the Qing Empire.

Therefore, when the island was ceded to China in 1951, it should be rightfully under the sovereignty of PRC according to the theory of Succession of States. Furthermore, the Communist Party Government exerted its governance over all of mainland China and its population. It was on these grounds that PRC was granted UN membership in 1971 by an overwhelming majority. On the other hand, Republic of China argues that its Government has existed in Taiwan since 1949, long after the establishment of PRC. Furthermore, Taiwan argues that by complying with the requirements of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 for nation-statehood, engaging in international trade and maintaining de facto diplomatic ties with over 50 countries, does make Taiwan a country independent from PRC.

B. Previous Attempts made by China to Invade Taiwan

There have been three previous attempts where China has attempted to conquer the de facto island-nation of Taiwan. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-1955 resulted in the PRC seizing the islands of Hainan, Yijianshan and Dachen from Taiwan and incorporated them into its sovereign territory. This crisis led to the signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty in 1955 between the Eisenhower Administration of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Government of Taiwan. The treaty specifies that Washington will come to Taipei's aid if only PRC attacks the Island of Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago (Pescadores Islands).

At the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, the Eisenhower Administration was loyal to the Treaty. This is because PRC attacked the islands of Kinmen and Matsu that were Taiwanese territories not covered under its obligations. Nevertheless, Washington deployed a reinforced US Navy Seventh Fleet to aid Taipei in protecting the supply lines to these islands thus placing the crisis on a track towards a stalemate. Since PRC was unable to conquer those two island chains, the crisis ended in status quo ante bellum. Kinmen and Matsu islands remain under the territorial integrity of Taiwan to this day. It can be argued that this crisis was part of Mao Zedong's strategy to evaluate the level of US commitment to the treaty. There was a significant hiatus (37 years) between the Second and Third Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. By this time China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had evolved significantly since the 1950s. The reason for PRC aggression was the growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan spearheaded by the de facto

President at the time, Lee Teng-hui. Despite ending in a stalemate, the showcase of PRC's military strength and Beijing's confidence to do so made policymakers in Washington realise that a new defence alliance against China is paramount to securing American interest in Asia-Pacific.

C. Brief on Quad

As for the United States, Taiwan as an independent democratic country, opposing China's Communist government, benefits in maintaining American interests in the East China Sea. It also helps to contain China's territorial expansion into Asia Pacific. Currently, China's growing influence around the world has threatened the very foundation of Post-World War II American world order and as a maritime super-power. Therefore, maintaining American influence in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific has become an increasing priority in American foreign policy over the past years. As a viable strategy, the Bush Administration began engaging with regional powers that were threatened by China's influence in their respective domains. Hence, in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialog (commonly referred to as Quad) was established (and was reinvigorated in 2017 during the Trump Administration). This was a defence alliance between the democratic countries, the United States of America, Japan, Republic of India and the Commonwealth of Australia (Smith, 2021). The underlying purpose of this alliance is to contain China's territorial expansion and influence in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific Regions. (Gale and Shearer, 2018).

The 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami brought together these four democratic nations to provide much needed humanitarian assistance to countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka etc. (Gale and Shearer, 2018, pp.2). The magnanimity of providing over 30 ships and 5,000 troops towards international humanitarian aid by Prime-Minister Manmohan Singh's administration, astounded the world of India's military resources and competence. Nevertheless, the United States was aware of India's maritime capabilities since both countries have engaged in the Malabar joint naval exercise since 1992. Therefore, the Bush Administration at the time recognized that India was now an emerging power and that the country has the potential of becoming a strategic ally to maintain American interest in South Asia (Rai, 2018, pp.138). As a result of developing closer ties between these

four countries, in 2007, the Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe initiated the idea for a dialogue involving diplomatic and military engagements. In support of this, the Vice President of USA; Dick Cheney, Prime Minister of India; Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Australia; John Howard, joined hands to make his vision become a reality (Speers, 2021; Rai, 2018, pp.139). Therefore, in 2007 both Japan and Australia (along with Singapore) participated in the Malabar naval exercise. The latter marked the first Quadrilateral maritime exercise conducted by member states and the first Malabar naval exercise to have conducted outside the Indian Ocean. The location that year was the surrounding waters of Japan's Okinawa Island. It was at this juncture that Beijing officially informed the member states of its dissatisfaction with Quad (Rai, 2018, pp.139; India Today, 2017).

China's dissatisfaction with Quad, resulted in the newly elected Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd to withdraw his country's engagement from this defence alliance (Gale and Shearer, 2018, pp.2). Since China was a major trading partner for Australia, naturally, the Rudd Administration viewed that antagonizing China on USA's behalf would result in damaging the existing cordial Sino-Australian relationship (Envall, 2019, pp.4). However, disclosures of Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) infiltration and interference in domestic politics resulted in the Australian public to favour a government that opposes China's expansionist ambitions. Hence, in 2010, Julia Gillard was elected Prime Minister of Australia on the assurance of curtailing CCP influencing Australian policy decisions (Gale and Shearer, 2018, pp.2). Her administration resumed Australia's involvement in Quad and agreed to establish a US Marine base in northern Australia with the Obama administration (Rai, 2018, pp.139).

The four leaders of Quad member countries met on the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit (held in Manila), to recalibrate Quad's mission. At this meeting, all four nation-states generally agreed to curtail China's influence in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific regions (Roche, 2017). However, there were areas in which all four powers did not unanimously agree up on. According to a study conducted by the American think tank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the official readout from India did not refer to freedom of navigation and overflight, respect for international law and maritime security. Japan on the other hand reserved any mention of connectivity of supply chains between

member states. The United States and Australia were the only countries that mentioned the term Quadrilateral in their official readouts. Despite these minor variations, it can be argued that the threat perception of China varies between these four countries (Gale and Shearer, 2018, pp.2). Nevertheless, in 2020, Australia engaged in the Malabar naval exercise after a thirteen-year hiatus since 2007. During this period, Japan was made a permanent participant of the naval exercise in 2015 (The Economic Times, 2020).

Chinese policy makers have publicly taunted Quad since 2017. For example, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi stated that the coalition was like "foam in the ocean, destined to dissipate soon" (Rai, 2018, pp.138). With recent Chinese policies of tightening its grip over the Autonomous Uyghur-Xinjiang Province and on the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, the Communist Party of China has openly stated its intentions of incorporating Taiwan under the sovereignty of PRC (BBC, 2019; Erin, 2021; Ward, 2021). This is now a growing concern for the people of Taiwan who have enjoyed democracy and freedom of speech for most of their lives. As for the United States and for regional powers, Taiwan uniting with PRC would solidify China's expansionist ambitions. Thus, protecting Taiwan's de facto sovereignty has become priority for Quad and the first challenge that would either congeal or fragment this defence alliance. This is because similar to the United States, Japan, India and Australia remain ambiguous on the idea of an independent Taiwan.

D. Research Question & Objectives

The aim of this research is to analyse if Quad members will confront China if the latter invades Taiwan. Therefore, the research problem is as follows.

Will Quad intervene militarily to save Taiwan from an imminent Chinese invasion?

Hence, to answer this question this paper will focus on the following two research objectives. The first is to gather information on the nature of the diplomatic relationship maintained by individual Quad member states with China. The second objective is to explore academic and defence related material available on the policies individual Quad member-states might pursue in the event of a Chinese (PRC) attempt to consolidate Taiwan (ROC) into its sovereign territory.

II. METHODOLOGY

This research is qualitative in nature. Hence, this study will contain one type of methodology and it will be content analysis. Krippendorff (2013) explains that content analysis is indigenous to communication research and is potentially one of the vital research techniques in social sciences. He further states that content analysis is widely used in intelligent gathering and political studies. This is because a government's knowledge about political developments in foreign nation-states depend on information received in the form of diplomatic correspondence, foreign broadcasts, academic articles, journalistic articles and speeches made by the political leadership of that sovereign state (Krippendorff, 2013). Hence, content analysis was suitable because the above-mentioned sources were used to gather information for this research.

Content analysis falls under unobtrusive research which means research that does not involve data collection from different people. Hence content analysis is the study of recorded human communications (Pashakhanlou, 2017, pp.447-465). This means data is gathered from secondary sources such as journal articles, books, newspapers, government reports and publications etc. Further Pashakhanlou (2017, pp.447-465) states that in content analysis there are two types of content that can be analysed, and they are manifest content and latent content. He explains that 'manifest content' is observable content, and these are content that can be looked at or listened to. The second is latent content which is the underlying meaning of the content itself (Pashakhanlou, 2017, pp.447-465). In this study, both manifest and latent content was analysed.

Discourse analysis is another methodology applied by the researcher to conduct this study. Discourse analysis means the analysing of language used in secondary sources such as journal articles, books, newspapers, news readings etc. Since this research is based on content analysis and discourse analysis; desk research was used as a methodology and technique. As described by the name, desk research is the research technique which is mainly acquired by sitting at a desk. The data for conducting a desk research can be generated through the World Wide Web or commonly known as the internet.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Recent Developments in Cross Strait Relations

At the recently concluded 100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (1st July 2021), President Xi Jinping officially communicated his Government's intention of consolidating Taiwan into the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (Nikkei Asia, 2021; Xinhua, 2021, pp.11). This rang alarm bells in Taipei and Washington since both governments are now extremely concerned of a forthcoming Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the near future. Ian Easton (2021a; 2021b), who is a Research Fellow at the American think-tank, Project 2049 Institute, says an amphibious Chinese invasion of Taiwan cannot be directly compared to the D-Day landing of 1944 on the beaches of Normandy of France by the allied forces against Nazi German occupation. Given the size and technology adopted by China's PLAN and the latter's close proximity to Taiwan, he further elaborates that the scale of such an invasion can even be multiple times larger and more devastating than that of the D-Day landings.

Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, there has been growing nationalism in Taiwan and public outcry for independence (Chung, 2018; Global Times, 2021; Rich and Einhorn, 2021). The latter would mean Taiwan's recognition as a sovereign nation-state within the international system. For Beijing, as explicitly mentioned by China's Taiwan Affairs Office, Ma Xiaoguang, this is unacceptable and PRC will do whatever it takes to prevent Taipei from taking such action (The Times of India, 2020). Therefore, to counter PRC's threat, Taipei has recently maintained very close ties with Washington (Tan, 2020). It can be argued that the Ing-wen Administration is trying to extend Washington's obligations to the treaty by not only supporting Taiwan as a bystander but to get actively involved and deploy troops to fight against an invasion force.

Moreover, it can be argued that Beijing's acceleration of withdrawing the "one country, two systems" policy for Hong Kong have led to Taiwanese not trusting President Xi Jinping's Administration to honour the 1992 Consensus (signed between the administrations of President Yang Shangkun of China and de facto President Lee Ten-hui of Taiwan) where the same policy was applied to ROC.

According to an article published in 2021 by Lee Hsi-min (Former Chief of the General Staff of Taiwanese Armed Forces) and Eric Lee (Research Associate at Project 2049 Institute), for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), unifying Taiwan into PRC's territory is the final piece in making China great again. They

further state that a successful consolidation of Taiwan into PRC's sovereign territory would solidify President Xi Jinping's victory at the upcoming 20th Party Congress in 2022 where he has bid to run for President for the 3rd term. However, analysts deny that Xi Jinping's administration would not invade Taiwan immediately since it would bring the nation into severe financial constrains as Beijing will be hosting the Winter Olympics in 2022 (Feng, 2021). Nevertheless, Jacob Stokes (2021), a Research Fellow at the American think-tank, Centre for New American Security explains that any attempts by President Tsai Ing-wen's Government to declare independence of Taiwan would instantaneously provoke Beijing to deploy an invasion force on the island. Kyle Mizokami (2021) argues that, failing to react immediately against the declaration of independence would undermine the credibility of CCP. He further states that the Government of China does not have an urgent need to invade Taiwan but an attempt of declaring independence would force Xi Jinping's Administration to authorize an amphibious invasion.

If an invasion is to take place, the date and China's capability to execute it remains a question at large. According to the United States Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. Mark A. Milley, an invasion is probable by 2027 because by then China's PLAN would have developed into a fully modernized and technologically advanced war machine (Mizokami, 2021). However, Stokes (2021) argues that his research reveals 2035 would be more realistic. In terms of capability, China has the capacity to deploy large amounts of troops and supplies through its numerically massive and structurally enormous merchant fleet (Wood and Ferguson, 2001, pp.61). Moreover Chinese anti artillery would have two factors to their favour. They include enormous volumes of it and concentration of fire- power (Wood and Ferguson, 2001, pp.4). In addition, the number of Chinese troops deployed will be an overwhelming force to counter (Wood and Ferguson, 2001, pp.12). With these factors taken into consideration, China's military capability is multiple times powerful than that of Taiwan.

A study conducted in 2001 by Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson explain a three-phased Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The first would be to seize Quemoy (Kimmen) and other islands close to Mainland China. The second would be capturing the Peng Hu islands and the third phase would involve finally attacking the coast of Taiwan.

Stokes (2021) argues that PRC might face dire economic consequences in its ambition of consolidating Taiwan militarily. He further states that economic growth and stability are the foundational pillars of CCP rule in PRC. Hence, if China's economy slides back into recession due to a war with USA over Taiwan, it would significantly risk CCP's grip of power over the PRC. In addition, Andrei Lungu (2021), who is the President of The Romanian Institute for the Study of Asia-Pacific, states that if China were defeated by the United States, it would sound echoes of China's Century of Humiliation that might also contribute to shattering the invincibility of CCP. However, he further states that Beijing still holds on to the belief that a peaceful reunification is possible. Nevertheless, as mentioned before Taipei's steady drift towards Washington thus gaining confidence in declaring independence might force Beijing to deploy an amphibious assault on Taiwan. PLAN's continuous and steady modernization followed by the assumption of Washington's decline (due to immediate US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan), might further give Beijing the confidence in carrying out an invasion (Lungu, 2021).

B. Japan: Political opportunity and a threat to sovreignty

From the four Quad member-states, Japan is the country that will be most affected if China successfully invades Taiwan. This is due to the close proximity of Japan's territorial islands with Taiwan. Unlike for Japan, India and Australia are the two member-states that will not be directly affected if Taiwan falls under the jurisdiction of China.

The divide between the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea is made up of a chain of islands extending from the Southern Japanese island of Kyushu to the northern part of Taiwan. The closest Japanese island to Taiwan is Yonaguni that is 110km away (Jennings, 2021). Experts such as Bruce Kilngner (a Senior Research Fellow at the American think tank, Heritage Foundation) and Sidharth Kaushal (a Research Fellow of the British think tank, Royal United Services Institute) state that if Taiwan falls into the hands of PRC, Beijing may claim Yonaguni and several other Japanese islands as sovereign territory of China by extending the boundary of its Exclusive Economic Zone. Currently Beijing and Tokyo are in dispute over the ownership of the uninhabited group of islands in the East China Sea. According the Chinese, these islands are referred to as Diaoyu while the Japanese refer them to as Senkaku. Japan fears that China would solidify its ownership after a successful invasion since these islands are located closer to Taiwan and Mainland China than to any Japanese island. Seizing of these islands would break PRC's containment in the East China Sea and open doors into the Philippine Sea and the American sovereign territorial island of Guam.

Nevertheless, Japan is channelling this threat to amend or relax conditions imposed on its Post WWII Constitution. This particularly applies to Article 9 of Chapter II: Renunciation of War (The Constitution of Japan, 1946; cited in Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 2019). This Article explicitly denounces Japan's use of war as a means of settling international disputes or maintaining a military that is fit for war. Therefore, Tokyo is dependent on Washington for defence of its sovereignty from external forces. If the United States expect Japan to engage militarily, then this constitutional constrain require amendments. Therefore, Premier Yoshida Suge's Administration is relying on China's imminent invasion on Taiwan to justify the necessity for Japan to engage militarily to secure its sovereignty as a nation-state.

Furthermore, there has been a resurgence of nationalism in Japan since the late 1990s (Dickson, 2010; Estévez-Abe, 2014). Therefore, policymakers in Japan exploit this sentiment to gain election victories. 28th November is the scheduled Election Day for the Japanese House of Representatives. It can be argued that if the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū-Minshutō) wishes to remain in power, making sense of a security threat on Japan due to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would help in securing a significant voter base by stirring up nationalist sentiment.

However, war would take a severe toll on the Japanese economy since China is both a significant import and export destination. In 2019, Japanese exports to China amounted to US$ 134 billion (19% of its total exports that year) and imports from China was valued at US$ 170 billion which was 23% of its total imports for that year (IMF, 2021). On the contrary, for China, the share of Japanese imports and exports as a percentage was 8% and 6% respectively (IMF, 2021). In addition to bilateral trade, both countries are members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that is the largest regional trade bloc to have existed in the history of multilateralism. Engaging in a military conflict will destroy the opportunity for both countries to reap significant future benefits from this economic partnership.

C. India: Balance between non alignment and strategic alignment

For India, Taiwan is beyond its sphere of influence since the island is not located in the Indian Ocean Region.

India holds a unique position within Quad. This is due to several factors. The first is that India is the only country that shares a land-border with China. It is also the only developing country in Quad whereas the other three member-states are developed. Furthermore, India has always embraced a non-aligned foreign policy since its independence in 1947 as opposed to the more obvious American Camp favouring foreign policies of Japan and Australia. Moreover, it is important to highlight the fact that in 1971, India voted in favour of The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 and recognized PRC as the only internationally accepted representative of the Chinese people at the UN. In contrast, USA, Japan and Australia voted against it. India's non-aligned foreign policy further complicated its membership in Quad because in 2017 the country was admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This was the same year Quad was reinvigorated. SCO is a political, economic and defence alliance where China and Russia are its most influential member-states. It is therefore possible to argue that India might compromise its commitment to Quad on the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, India faces tensed border issues with China on the three fronts; Aksai Chin, Doklam Plateau and Arunachal Pradesh (Dutta, 2020; Marcus, 2018; The Tribune, 2021). Teaming up with Quad to counter China's invasion might heighten the tensions between Beijing and New Delhi thus complicating India's membership in SCO. India's External Affairs Minister, Subramanyam Jaishankar, expressed this sentiment at the Global Dialog Series event in London where he stated that Beijing could not expect New Delhi to maintain cordial relations on other domains while being intimidating and hostile at the disputed territories (Prakash, 2021).

India has economic benefits tied to Quad. The United States wishes India to compete with China in producing American developed Covid-19 vaccines at a mass scale to counter China's Vaccine Diplomacy (Zeeshan, 2021). This is because unlike Japan and Australia, manufacturing in India results in major economies of scale. Furthermore, India maintains cordial bilateral relations with USA, Japan and Australia. These collaborations include modernizing Indian agriculture, developing defence technology,

building clean energy solutions and improving the quality of India's education sector (Zeeshan, 2021).

The founding fathers of the Republic of India have physically interacted with Chiang Kai-shek even before independence. Both parties maintained cordial relations but never solidified. This is because soon after the Communist takeover of Beijing, India recognized PRC to be the legitimate representative of China. Unimpressed by authoritarian and pro-western policies, Prime Minister Nehru distanced India's diplomatic ties with Taiwan and was reluctant to recognize it as a nation-state (Sen, 2020). As time passed relations soured over Taiwan openly stating that it does not recognize India's claim to the disputed fronts in the Sino-Indian border (Panda, 2019). This further alienated Taipei from New Delhi. Despite establishing de facto missions in both capitals in 1995, India's relations with Taiwan gained traction only after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into power. Due to recent tensions at the border, the Modi Administration has subtly demonstrated support for Taiwan thereby vexing Beijing in the process.

Regardless of India's rejuvenated de facto diplomatic engagements with Taiwan, New Delhi is the second largest shareholder of the Chinese Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB, 2017). Through this lending institution, India has financed many of its infrastructure projects and has borrowed close to US$ 3 billion over the course of its membership since 2016 (AIIB, 2019). In 2017, India was the largest beneficiary from this lending institute (RWR Advisory Group, 2018; The India Times, 2018). In 2019, Indian exports to China amounted to US$ 17 billion (5% of its total exports that year) and imports from China was valued at US$ 68 billion which was 14% of its total imports for that year (IMF, 2021). On the contrary, for China, the share of Indian imports and exports as a percentage was 1% and 3% respectively (IMF, 2021).

New Delhi requires deeper thought on the Taiwan Issue by weighing its options before it declares war with China over Taiwan. This might be the reason why India's former National Security Advisor, Shivashankar Memon stated that India will support Quad members on the Taiwan issue but not engage militarily. The reason to support Quad will of course be New Delhi's strategy to contain Chinese influence into South Asia.

D. Australia: Dilemma between defence and economic partnerships

Taiwan is beyond Australia's immediate Southeast Asian neighbourhood.

In addition to Quad, Australia also holds membership in the collective security agreement, Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, commonly referred to as ANZUS which was signed in 1951 (NZ History, 2021). Although the treaty is not binding as NATO, Canberra does oblige to it whenever USA has gone into war with another country. Examples include the Korea War of 1950-1953 and Vietnam War of 1955-1975. Australia also maintained the largest number of troops by a non-NATO member-state in Afghanistan up until Washington decided to withdraw its troops. Moreover, Australia participated in the Iraq War of 2003 (NATO, 2021). According to a commentary published by the Australian think-tank, Lowly Institute, Washington might expect Canberra to aid militarily on the Taiwan issue. Failing to do so will lead to cracks in diplomatic relations between the two Anglosphere nations (Taylor, 2021).

Nevertheless, China is an important trade partner for Australia. In 2019, Australian exports to China amounted to US$ 104 billion (38% of its total exports that year) and imports from China was valued at US$ 58 billion which was 26% of its total imports for that year (IMF, 2021). Export items include barley, wine, coal and lobster and the trade data indicate that Australia is comparatively more dependent on bilateral trade with China than the other three Quad member-states. On the contrary, for China, the share of Indian imports and exports as a percentage was 6% and 2% respectively (IMF, 2021). Hence, China has the upper hand of this bilateral relationship. Therefore Beijing was able to target these items with a series of trade actions against Prime Minister Morrison's request to call for an investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic (Hurst, 2021). On the other hand, similar to the United States and Japan, Australia is home to people of Taiwanese descent and the latter advocate for Canberra engaging militarily to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (Taylor, 2021).

Taylor (2021) mentions that the Australian public might not agree to fund a military campaign in Taiwan because that would mean a significant hike in taxation in order to expand the current military budget. This is because a poll conducted by Lowly Institute in 2021 brought forward the following results. Out of all the respondents, 14% strongly disagree to a military engagement while the vast

majority representing 49% somewhat disagreed to Australia going to war over the Taiwan Issue. However, 28% somewhat agreed that Australia should abide with the ANZUS treaty while a minority of 6% strongly agreed to military confrontation.

As of date, Canberra has not been specific on its policy over the Taiwan Issue. The government might be facing a dilemma trying the balance between the consequences of its economic benefits with China and defence alliance with USA by agreeing or refusing to engage militarily. According to Tony Walker (2021), a Vice Chancellor's Fellow at La Trobe University, it is unlikely that China would invade Taiwan in the near future. He further states that Australia should approach both China and Taiwan to broker an amicable settlement rather than standing behind the shadow of ambiguity over an imminent invasion. By doing so Australia can save its economy from a recession and alleviate the loss of thousands of lives. This would address the crux of the issue rather than war, which is palliative. Furthermore, Australia too is a member of RCEP. Therefore, if a military conflict breakout, Canberra might not reap the benefits from the opportunities offered by the largest trading bloc in multilateral history.

E. USA: Endeavouring to maintain superiority despite changing global power dynamics

The United States of America, as a super-power has always been the champion and defender of democracy and free markets. Therefore, whenever these political and economic ideals are threatened, the United States intervenes either directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, one can argue that securing American interest is what really drives Washington to intervene rather than securing democratic values. Examples include aiding the 1953 Iranian coup d'état to oust the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh government, supporting the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1970s, and recognizing the Duvalier regime in Haiti as an ally during the Cold War to name a few. With the recent scurried US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, experts doubt if Washington is after all a reliable partner when it comes to security and defence.

According to an academic commentary by Patrick Porter and Michel Mazarr (2021), American public do not support for another US engagement in a distant war. It can be argued that for the American public, engaging militarily to fight-off a Chinese invasion would not be seen a strategic justification to abandon US commitments in Afghanistan. However,

the authors also state that failing to engage militarily would mean a deterioration of American superiority in the eyes of the international community. Currently, this is the dilemma faced by Washington. Moreover, as mentioned before, securing American interest is usually at the heart of Washington's decision-making process. Taiwan is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (better known as TSMC), which alone produces over 50% of the worlds sophisticated computer chips. American tech companies such as AMD, Apple, ARM, Broadcom and Marvell are some clients to name a few. Taiwan falling under the control of PRC would mean Beijing having a monopoly over the semi-conductors. This might threaten USA's multi-billion dollar tech industry since China would control the global microchip monopoly (East Asia Forum, 2021; Graham Jr. and Budjeryn, 2021).

Furthermore, Washington has maintained an ambiguous policy on PRC and ROC. It took another eight years for Washington to recognize PRC as a nation-state and the legitimate government that represented the people of China in global affairs after the passing of UN Resolution 2758. It was in 1979, through the Second Joint Communique of the United States of America and People's Republic of China that relations between these two nation-states normalized (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 2021). This was a diplomatic achievement by US President Jimmy Carter and the Paramount Leader of China, Deng Xiaoping. Despite this historic achievement, it appears that Article #7 in this communique was deliberately left ambiguous and open for interpretation by Washington. Article #7 states that, The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The ambiguity here is the word "acknowledge". The latter is not the same as "accept". Therefore, this article would mean that USA does not accept that Taiwan falls under sovereignty of PRC but understands that Taiwan also reserves the right not to consider itself part of PRC. This has added to the confusion of whether USA recognizes Taiwan as a country or not. On the other hand, Taipei is a significant buyer of US weapons and military equipment. In 2019 alone, Taiwan has purchased over US$ 10 billion worth of American military equipemnt (TECRO, 2019a; TECRO 2019b; TECRO, 2019c; TECRO, 2019d). Therefore, by maintaining such ambiguity on the side of US policy has helped secure a market by creating suspicion

between China and Taiwan. Some experts argue that this policy of ambiguity has prevented Beijing and Taipei from initiating hostile acts on each other's territories.

In terms of bilateral trade, American exports to China amounted to US$ 107 billion in 2019 (6% of its total exports that year) and imports from China was valued at US$ 452 billion which was 18% of its total imports for that same year (IMF, 2021). On the other hand, for China, the share of American imports and exports as a percentage was 17% and 6% respectively (IMF, 2021). It can be argued that trade policies introduced during President Trump's tenure brought about an equal dependency in trade between these two countries.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, all four members would not engage militarily to prevent Taiwan being invaded by China in the near future. Japan and the United States will actively engage militarily to defend Taiwan but India and Australia would not. For Japan, a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan would threaten its sovereignty due to the possibility of losing its hold on Yonaguni Island and claim to Senkaku Islands. Tokyo's alacrity to intervene militarily would provide an opportunity to amend Article #9 of its 1947 Constitution. India on the other hand would not engage militarily due to Taiwan being beyond its sphere of influence. Nevertheless, New Delhi will assist Quad as a logistics hub and even create skimishes at the Sino-Indian border as part of a deception strategy to distract Beijing from being soley focused on the Taiwanese invasion. Similarly, Australia too would avoid a military confrontation with China and only aid Quad as a logistics hub. This is because Australia benefits immensely from bilateral trade with China. However, Canberra's decision to cancel its French submarine orders as part of its entry into a new security agreement, AUKUS, thus creating a diplomatic rift with Paris, can be argued as a strategy taken to maintain its relations with Washington, and to assure its commitment to the longstanding defence partnership between the two Anglosphere nations. For the United States however, a military engagement will be mandatory if this country wishes to project and maintain its superiority in the region and super-power status in the world. Beyond this Washington wishes to prevent Beijing from gaining a monopoly in the semi-conductor industry and to secure Taipei as a loyal

and lucrative client for US manufactured sophisticated military equipment.

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Mawanella in the Balance: Roots of Indoctrination of Muslim Youth: Preliminary Results of a Field Study

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Abstract- This presentation covers the preliminary results of a qualitative field study in Mawanella in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday suicide bombings in Sri Lanka. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks heard that there were three critical networks, based in Kattankudy, Colombo, and Mawanella that helped stage the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019. The Muslim community in Mawanella had not been suspected to breed extremism and fundamentalism hitherto. Therefore, it is important to find out the causes and roots of indoctrination and subsequent radicalisation of some Muslim youths in Mawanella, which has a relatively better educated Muslim population. These preliminary results reveal shrinking of space for inter-communal interactions and social cohesion in Mawanella over the past two decades. It also reveals the indoctrination of Muslim youths over a long period of time by orthodox and fundamentalist sectarian groups such as the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Keywords— Muslim extremism, Muslim youth, Mawanella

I. INDRODUCTION

Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi religious country where a number of ethno religious groups have co-existed for centuries. However, the interactions between these communities have not all been peaceful, there have been episodes of violence throughout history. This is not surprising given that ethnicity, language and religious affiliation are key determinants of an individual's identity. Around 70.2% of the population identify as Buddhist and are typically of Sinhalese ethnicity, while those who identify as Hindu (12.6%) tend to be ethnically Tamil, Christians make up 7.6% and 9.7% identify themselves as Muslim, most being Sri Lankan Moors.

The Sri Lankan moors also known as "The Sonahar"/ "Marakkala (ship people) are the descendants of Arabs who were merchants and settled in the country over a period of time in pre-colonial times (pre-1505). They were mainly involved in the global trade in spices (cardamom, cinnamon, cloves, and pepper), for which Sri Lanka was famous historically. They formed eight considerable settlements along the north-eastern, northern, south-western, and western coasts of the island – Trincomalee, Jaffna, Mannar, Kudiraimalai, Puttalam, Colombo, Beruwala and Galle. Later, during the Dutch colonial (1648-1796) period the Sri Lankan Moors were the pioneers of coffee plantations in Sri Lanka in the 18th Century. Muslims of Sri Lanka have different ethno-social backgrounds. Based on this, they are called Sri Lanka Moors, Malays, Indian Moors (Moplas – Malabar Muslims, Pathans - North Indian Muslims), the Memons, Hambayas, Bohras, etc. Their diversity can be seen in their languages and practices. They had adopted the main languages of Sri Lanka as their mother tongue (Tamil and Sinhala) and incorporated some cultural practices into their own culture (Thowfeek 2019).

As mentioned earlier, religion, ethnicity and conflicts are inseparable in the political context of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese have seen themselves as the nation forming ethnicity and in the post-independence phase; the nation's identity has become Sinhala – Buddhist and starting from the 1972 Constitution Sinhala – Buddhist majoritarianism was institutionalised in the country (DeVotta, 2017). During the post-independence period the polarization between the three communities have grown, especially with the beginning of the ethnic conflict in the 1970s. This does not mean that there were no inter-ethnic clashes during the colonial period or in the early post-independence period.

The anti-Muslim riots of 1915 were the deadliest anti-Muslims pogrom to date. A series of attacks happened in more than five provinces killing 25 people, four were raped and over 4,000 Muslim properties destroyed, with 17 mosques being burnt

and 86 damaged. Apart from that 119 were wounded (Roberts, 1994). These riots lasted for nine days and that Sinhala-Buddhist antagonism was directed at Muslim owned businesses.

On 22 May 1958 riots targeting the Tamil minority erupted and lasted until June 2. The most immediate reasons for this riot are the 1956 Sinhala Only Act and subsequent events such as the Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam talks. Deaths exceeded 400 and most of the fatalities were Tamils, some Sinhalese civilians and their possessions were also affected. This was the first major race riots since 1915 Sinhala-Muslim clashes, the events of 1958 shattered the trust the groups of people had in one another leading to further distrust among people. As exclusion and discrimination gradually increased, so did the Tamil demand for a separate homeland. The anti-Tamil riots of 1977 and 1981 further strengthened support for the cause of Tamil Eelam and militancy. The burning of the Jaffna Public Library in 1981 and the incidents of 23 and 24 July 1983, also known as 'Black July," which resulted in a week of massacres, which saw the deaths of over 4,000 Sri Lankan Tamils were catalysts for the country's civil war that lasted over 26 long bloody years, ending with the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009.

While the focus on recent scholarship has been mainly on the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils, there was sporadic violence between the Muslims and the Sinhalese and Muslims and the Tamils.

Mawanella has also been a main base of support towards various Islamic movements such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. Local sources revealed that many of its founding members in the country in the 1960s were from Mawanella. Since then, a majority of its past presidents have been from Mawanella. Jamaat-e-Islami's recent past President, Hajjul Akbar (who is in custody now), also reportedly went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the Mujahideen against the Soviets.

Mawanella is located in the Kegalle district and has a population of 111,727 (Census Data 2012). 68% are Buddhists and about 30% of the population are Muslim. The Muslims are mainly concentrated in the main city area, giving the impression that this is a Muslim dominated town.

The non-Muslim residents of Mawanella that we spoke to feel that the Muslim community is assertive and expansionist. One of the monks from a main

temple in the area told us that the number of mosques in the town had increased exponentially over the years, giving the impression of 'aggressive expansion' by Muslims.

According to data from the Department of Muslim Affairs in 2019, there were 30 mosques registered from Mawanella. There are however many more unregistered mosques and they were only asked to register after the Easter Sunday attacks.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUSLIM POLITICS IN SRI LANKA

The strategy followed by early Muslim settlers of Sri Lanka was the cultivation of the Sinhalese rulers, and this strategy was largely successful since the local Sinhala rulers allowed them to pursue their religion and trading interests peacefully. As Zarin Ahmad (2012) says in his Contours of 'Muslim nationalism in Sri Lanka,' Muslims up to the early 20th century were a 'collection of very different groups with different interests, "and that it was the rise of the Sinhala Buddhist identity and the Tamil Hindu identity" that propelled the formation of an Islamic identity.

In 1888, when Tamil leader Ponnambalam Ramanathan asserted (Ahmad 2012) that Muslims were Tamils by nationality because of their language, Muslim leaders such as M.C. Siddi Lebbe and I.L.M. Abdul Azeez opposed this claim and emphasized the Arab roots of the Muslims. Sri Lankan Muslims also demanded adequate representation in the State Council of Ceylon. Mohamed Cassim Abdul Rahman, the first Muslim unofficial member was nominated to the Legislative Council in 1889.

They were cautious during the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 and Soulbury Constitution of 1947 (Britannica 2016) and disassociated themselves from the Tamil cause. However, they focused on having a separate education and consolidation of their cultural identity. In 1936, Sir Razik Fareed demanded (Ahmad 2012) the State Council to close government offices on Friday noon for prayers and formulate a Muslim Personal Law based on the Islamic Shariah. These show the Muslims' need for distinction from Tamils and the increasing importance of Islam as an ethnic marker. In the post-independence period, Muslims often allied with the Sinhalese to assert their distinctiveness from the Tamils. They also believed their sociocultural interests and political representation would be better protected by aligning with the Sinhalese majority and this decision made them a part of national political mainstream when

Tamil leaders were often relegated to the opposition in Parliament. Muslim leaders did not support S.J.V. Chelvanayakam's demand for five autonomous states in Sri Lanka (three Sinhalese, one Tamil and one Muslim) around 1970 and 71. Muslim ministers played a prominent role in both United National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom Party administrations and attempts to create a Muslim party named All Ceylon Islamic United Front in 1960 failed.

The 1980s were an important decade for Muslim politics. The hostilities between the Sinhalese and Tamils were rising and Muslims, especially in the East, were not able to escape the growing escalation. In August 1990 LTTE killed around 150 Muslims at the Kattankudy Mosque and the entire Muslim population of the Northern Province (from Jaffna, Mannar, and Mullaitivu districts) about 75,000 people, were expelled within 48 hours in October 1990 (Ali,2009). The LTTE harboured a suspicion that the Muslims in the North and East had helped the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) during their operations there. After the departure of the IPKF in 1989 and the subsequent massacres in the mosques in the East and forcible expulsion from the North (ethnic cleansing) in 1990, members from the community played a considerable role in Army intelligence and as home guards in the border villages of the Eastern Province. On the other hand, a large number of Sri Lankans, including Muslims, started going to the Middle East in the 1980s and the Sri Lankan Muslims were exposed to Wahabism, and Salafism practiced in the Arab countries. The returnees brought with them Arabic customs (Ali,2009) and with Gulf countries opening embassies in Sri Lanka aid poured into building new mosques, refurbishing old ones, and promoting Wahabism and Salafism. These developments spurred Muslim identity formation and political expressions of such identity through formation of Muslim political parties.

The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) was formed by M.H.M. Ashraff in 1981 and the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 made Muslims fearful that they would become a 'minority within a minority' in the merged northern and eastern provinces. Since the emergence of the SLMC, a number of Muslim political parties have emerged with support bases in minor and major Muslim communities.

III. BACKGROUND

Since the end of the war Muslim owned businesses, especially restaurants, were targeted by militant groups like Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Attempts to weaken the material wealth of Muslims by attacking Muslim owned enterprises have been a common feature in post-civil war Sri Lanka (de Silva et al 2019). Muslim owned restaurants were usually the first to suffer, particularly with the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughter campaigns as well as the sterilisation pill rumours perpetrated by BBS.

While the targets of boycotts are predominantly restaurants and large chain clothing stores owned by Muslims, Muslim businesses that provide other products and services too had been targeted.

Another demand of the BBS was the ban on burqas and niqabs. These garments are now linked to Wahhabism and Islamic extremism and a temporary ban was imposed on them under emergency regulations soon after the Easter Sunday bombings. Although the ban has now been lifted, the possibility of a ban continues to be whipped up as a talking point by the administration, a tool wielded as a marker of Muslim-ness/otherness as bait and distraction for its failures. The unending debate benefits both leading parties, playing their roles for and against even as it cements fear, distrust, and segregation between the communities.

The anti-Muslim sentiments created by these campaigns, on several occasions, had broken into riots at certain times. On 2 May 2001, a Sinhala mob rampaged through Mawanella, burning down Muslim owned shops and businesses, homes, and mosques. Two men were killed and 15 injured. The riots had been set off when Muslims protested against the inaction of the government against an attack, three days prior, of a Muslim owned hotel in Mawanella. The thugs, having demanded for the day's proceeds, dragged the cashier out, tied him to an iron fence and slashed his mouth. Two days later, on 4 May, Muslims in Colombo, Kandy, Puttalam, Hambantota and Ratnapura, after Friday prayers, protested against the continued injustice. The government responded by imposing a curfew. On 6 May, Muslim protestors retaliate in the East, blocked traffic and set fire to eight Sinhalese owned shops (Nagaraj and Haniffa 2017).

On 12 June 2014, Poson Poya Day, the Chief Prelate of Kurunduwatte Sri Wijerama Vihara Ayagama Samitha Thero, along with his driver, were allegedly assaulted by three Muslim men in Dharga Town, Beruwala. Members of the temple formed a mob and stormed the Aluthgama police station demanding immediate action be taken. Three Muslim men are

arrested (they were later acquitted of all charges in court) but the mob threw stones at the police and attacked Muslim shops. Three days later (15 June), BBS staged rallies in Aluthgama, Beruwala and Dharga Town, inciting violence against Muslims. After the final rally, the BBS mob, armed with Molotov cocktails and other weapons, marched into Dharga Town, attacking Muslims and looting and burning their shops, homes and mosques. When the mob finally dispersed, four people had been killed, 80 injured, over 60 homes and businesses set on fire and several mosques attacked in the towns of Aluthgama, Beruwela and Dharga Town in the Kalutara district. Ten-thousand people (including 2,000 Sinhalese) were displaced and the government imposed a curfew but the rioting continued unabated (Haniffa et al 2014).

More recently, on 22nd February 2018, a Sinhalese lorry driver was assaulted by four Muslim youth in Karaliyedda, Theldeniya over a traffic incident. On 26th February, a group of Sinhalese men dining at a Muslim owned hotel in Ampara town, claimed to have found remnants of tablets with the power to sterilise them for life, threatened the owner and filmed him nodding acquiescence - in fright - to their accusations even though he did not understand what was spoken in Sinhala. The video, immediately circulated in cyberspace, gathered a mob which attacked the hotel owner and several other Muslim owned shops in the town and surrounding areas (Riza 2018).

After the lorry driver succumbed to his injuries, on 2nd March, his body was taken to his hometown, setting off the first anti-Muslim attack in Udispattuwa on the night. Despite prior deployment of 1,000 Special Task Force (STF) personnel in several areas, Muslim owned shops were burned in Moragahamulla on 4th March. By the morning of 5th March, the violence had spread to Digana, where a large mob whipped up by BBS Secretary Gnanasera Thero and led by Amith Weerasinha (Borham, 2019) burned shops, homes and a mosque. By 3pm the Army was called in with 200 troops deployed, followed by declaration of curfew through the night. By the evening of 6 March, 4 mosques, 37 houses, 46 shops and 35 vehicles had been damaged in the Kandy district.

On Easter Sunday 2019 (21st April), Sri Lanka experienced seven separate near simultaneous suicide bombings in the western and eastern parts of the country. Carried out by members of the (it

couldn't have been shadowy because it was registered with the Muslim Religious Affairs Department) National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) organisation led by Zahran Hashim, the attack claimed the lives of 277 people and injured 400, as per the report of the Parliament Select Committee appointed to investigate it. Easter Sunday services were in progress when St Sebastian Church in Negombo, Zion Church in Batticaloa and St Anthony's Church in Colombo were blown up. Suicide bombers also attacked three five-star hotels in the heart of Colombo City, namely, Shangri-La, Cinnamon Grand and Kingsbury Hotels, as well as a lower grade Tropical Inn in the suburb of Dehiwela later in the day (Malone and Kath 2019).

In the immediate aftermath, as people reeled from the violence perpetrated, documents that showed the government of Sri Lanka had received advanced warnings of the attack were widely shared on social media. A number of members of Parliament including Opposition Leader Mahinda Rajapaksa revealed that their security officers had previously been informed of the possibility of such attacks taking place on Easter Sunday while Minister Harin Fernando stated that his father, who is well connected, had warned him not to attend mass on that day. Later a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the attacks was established and the final report of the commission was handed over to the President in February 2021.

IV.   OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

Following the Easter Sunday attacks, radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism, are at the forefront of Sri Lanka's public and policy discussions. The fear these phenomena have instilled, its connection to wider tensions between and within religions, and how such fear has exposed a lack of social cohesion in seemingly resilient societies, have impacted Sri Lanka in fundamental ways.

There were three critical networks that helped stage the Easter Sunday suicide attacks in Sri Lanka. The suspected mastermind and one of the suicide bombers, Zahran Hashim, was from Kattankudy (in the Batticaloa district of Eastern Province) and headed the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) headquartered in Kattankudy and having numerous mosques throughout the country. Colombo based Jammiyat-ul Millathu Ibrahim (JMI) was the second network involved which had the highest number of suicide bombers on that fateful day. The third

network was based in Mawanella centred on the Ibrahim brothers.

While the Eastern province has been suspected of creeping Islamic orthodoxy and fundamentalism for a while (since the 1980s), a relatively better educated Muslim population of Mawanella was never suspected to harbour fundamentalist tendencies until the destruction of Buddha statues in December 2018. However, the Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks heard that orthodox and fundamentalist sectarian groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami (from northern India) had taken roots in Mawanella since the 1960s. It was also reported that at least one person from Mawanella had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation there. Additionally, Ibrahim brothers from Mawanella had gone to the Syrian territory via Turkey in 2014 to undergo arms and tactical training with the ISIS.

Therefore, as a first step towards our research into the pathways of radicalisation of Muslim youths in Sri Lanka, we planned to concentrate our fieldwork on Mawanella.

The objective of this presentation is to trace the timelines and processes of the roots of indoctrination and subsequent radicalisation of Muslim youths in Mawanella.

V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following are the research questions addressed by this research study:

1. What makes Mawanella an attractive place for radicalization?
2. What attracts these youth to these religious groups/movements? Do they replace a lacuna for youth organizations in the area?
3. How are the parents/teachers not aware of what is happening to the boys? How do they fall through the cracks?

VI. METHODOLOGY

In order to understand the socio-economic background and the story of radicalization of the youth in Mawanella, the three field researchers Zahrah Imtiaz, Nushka Nafeel and Rathindra Kuruwita conducted a series of interviews in Mawanella on four occasions. The first fact finding visit was between June 14-18, 2019, the second was between June 20-24, 2020, September 14-15 and December 15. Each time, we conducted extensive one on one interviews with key community leaders,

teachers, religious heads and focus group discussions among young Muslim men between the ages of 16-35.

After the third visit in December 2019, we had to delay our next visit to June 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. Travel restrictions as well as health guidelines prevented us from visiting Mawanella earlier. Subsequent visits were also put off due to the ongoing pandemic situation in the country.

During the first visit we mostly concentrated on the elders and community leaders in Mawanella as the youth were rather shaken up with the recent arrests and were not forthcoming in interviews. Thereafter subsequent visits helped us identify individuals and groups to focus on further and it also helped build familiarity between the interviewers and interviewees.

By June 2020, the security atmosphere had relaxed quite a bit, allowing the boys to meet and discuss things in retrospect.

As researchers, we did not use a standard set of questions, but the research questions focused on two important points: firstly, their opinion and knowledge of what happened in Mawanella with the Sadeeq brothers and secondly what they believed was the root cause behind the radicalization of the youth in their community. The free form of questioning allowed interviewees to open up more. It also allowed the researchers to get more information on other suitable persons to interview, following a 'snow-ball' method to conduct further interviews.

When it came to focus group discussions however, the researchers felt that there needed to be more structure to the questions and a few questions were prepared beforehand to guide the discussion (See Annex 1).

In the four visits to Mawanella, we were able to interview 15 persons (six individually) and nine in three focus group discussions (three persons in each group).

The interviewees were not taped as it made interviewees in Mawanella uncomfortable, so they were not recorded.

The choice of interview persons in Mawanella were based on local recommendations on who had the most influence in the community. For example, we spoke to a community leader who headed the Mawanella Foundation for Mutual Understanding, a

civil society group formed after the 2001 riots by both influential Muslim and Sinhala persons. The group would come together to resolve any ethnic issues which flared up between the two communities from time to time.

Apart from that we also chose mosque leaders from two of the main mosques in Mawanella to discuss the religious background in the area. We also chose a few active politicians and youth activists to get a better understanding of the place. For the boys from the focus group, they were mostly those who were involved in community activities, and we were able to speak to some boys who were also exposed to the teachings of Sadeeq.

VII. LIMITATIONS

We were not able to cover the Eastern Province, especially Kattankudy, due to the pandemic. Kattankudy is the hometown of Zahran Hashim and more importantly, the Muslim community is the single largest ethnic group in two out of three districts in the Eastern Province (Ampara 42% and Trincomalee 35%). This makes it a hotbed for radicalisation. We hope to visit and conduct further research here once the pandemic situation improves.

One other limitation was not being able to reach many Muslim women in Mawanella. We had heard that the SLJI student movement had also conducted regular five day and seven-day courses for girls post Ordinary Level exams. However, post Easter Sunday attacks, these girls were not approachable and at that point we were told their parents feared for their safety if they spoke about it. Thus, we decided to give them some time before approaching them again. In future we hope to be able to reach some of the girls through online meetings.

VIII. LITERATURE REVIEW

According to the World Youth Report (2003), the 'jihadism' promoted by al-Qaeda and Daesh is "almost exclusively associated with young men under the age of 25." While several suicide bombers on 21 April 2019 were in their mid-30s, the overwhelming majority of those arrested in Mawanella in connection with links to extremism were below 25. Groups such as ISIS promise an opportunity to 'fight the good fight', find employment, marriage and social advancement, and to live a traditional Islamic life — the precise deficits youth are experiencing across the globe. This is discussed in N Benotman and N Malik 'The Children of the Islamic State' Quilliam (2016); R Barrett

'Foreign Fighters in Syria; The Soufan Group (2014) 16-17; 'Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU' IPOL PE 509.977(2014); Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context Global Counterterrorism Forum 4-5.

While making the connection between youth and violent extremism is relatively easy; policy and programmatic communities have been constrained by limited understanding of how the violent radicalization and extremism process evolves, including drivers, pathways and tipping points in intervening. One challenge is that there are no clear or universally accepted definitions that can be applied to radicalism, extremism and violent extremism. Indoctrination can also be understood as a benign phenomena, as the active pursuit of far-reaching societal change, that may or may not involve violence. However, in recent years the term has been generally used to imply violence. The UK's CONTEST or 'counter terrorism' strategy, for example, explained radicalisation as a "process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups" (Tusini 2019).

The concept of extremism too has evolved into present negative connotations such as rigidity, intolerance to alternatives and a penchant for violence. For example, Australia's 2015 'Living Safe Together' policy, defines extremism as a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature. (give reference here) The UK's Prevent strategy understands extremism as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs." (give reference here)

When it comes to explaining the reasons why youth join violent extremist group, the most common explanations are the 'push' and 'pull' factors for radicalization and the decisions to join a violent extremist groups. A detailed description of these 'push' and 'pull' factors can be found in N. Bondokji, L Agrabi and K Wilkinson's 'Trapped Between Destructive Choices: Radicalisation Drivers Affecting Youth in Jordan' (WANA Institute 2016.)

IX. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SRI LANKA

What can compel a young person to join a violent extremist group? Usually, academics claim that they

are driven by certain 'push' and 'pull' factors. Push factors are largely understood as the negative social, political, economic and cultural drivers of individual decision-making, while pull factors are positive characteristics or benefits offered by a group in exchange for participation.

There are a number of pull factors that extremist groups can use for its advantage in Sri Lanka. For example, there are deep seated communal and sectarian fault-lines that extremist groups can exploit to their advantage. These fault lines are discussed in depth in by Nagaraj and Haniffa (2017), where they discuss anti-Muslim violence over the past three to four decades outside of the North and East of Sri Lanka. Since the authors published their report, in 2017, the frequency of anti- Muslim riots has increased, thus increasing the fault lines. In fact, the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) on the Easter Sunday attacks too noted that the deep seated communal and sectarian fault-lines have been a driving force for radicalization of Muslim youth. The Commission speaks about the anti Halal campaigns, boycotts of Muslim businesses and anti-Muslim riots, where Buddhist militant groups such as the BBS played a main role and the impact it has on Muslim youth. The Commission also speaks of how Zahran Hashim used the attacks on Muslims and various discrimination against them to attract and recruit young Muslim men.

Geographically too, South Asia gives Islamic extremist groups an opening to Central and Southeast Asia and offers great opportunities for hiding, recruiting, fundraising, and training in different parts of the region. For example, international terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna (2016) has mentioned that South Asia was pivotal to IS, in its eastward expansion into Myanmar and Southeast Asia and Westward expansion into Central Asia and the Caucus region. This has been discussed by Michael Kugelman (2015) in his article for Foreign Policy titled, "How ISIS Could Become a Potent Force in South Asia."

Another pull factor is the return of South Asian self-radicalised individuals who went to join IS in Iraq and Syria. Several witnesses at the PCoI on the Easter Sunday attacks revealed that those who had fought for IS were returning to Sri Lanka by 2016, as ISIS was suffering defeats in Syria and Iraq. The PCoI revealed that a number of factors, from interagency rivalry to political considerations, prevented the then government from taking the returning fighters into custody. It was also revealed that Ibrahim brothers, who hail from Mawanella, too had received training in Syria.

The unregulated cyber space in Sri Lanka is another potential avenue which extremist organizations exploit vulnerable youth. There are 480 million internet users in South Asia and a significant amount of Sri Lankan youth have access to the internet through smart phones. In areas where terror groups cannot grow physically, they can use the cyber space to expand its footprint. The internet and social media were used by NTJ leader, Zahran Hashim to mobilize supporters and reach out to youths. While no systematic studies on this had been done in Sri Lanka, there is a wealth of resources to draw from other South Asian nations. Bibhu Prasad Routray, "Islamic State: Patterns of Mobilisation in India," (2015) and Farhan Zahid and Muhammad Ismail Khan, "Prospects of the Islamic State in Pakistan," (2016) explore the use of digital spaces by extremist groups and the emergence of educated militants from middle and upper-middle class of urban areas.

X. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOOSING MAWANELLA AS THE RESEARCH SITE

We chose to concentrate on these areas because of the close connection the Easter Sunday attackers had to Mawanella and the story of radicalisation of its members from that town.

Zahran Hashim had three important networks that helped his organization carry out the Easter Sunday attacks. One was the JMI, run by Umair Mohammad, in Colombo and the other was in Mawanella run by Mohomed Ibrahim Sadeeq Abdulla. The JMI also included Abdul Latheef Jameel Mohamed, Mohomad Ibrahim Ilham Ahamed and Inshaf Ahmed Mohomad Ibrahim- three of the suicide bombers on Easter Sunday. According to the Easter Sunday Commission report and media reports, it seems that each of these networks were operating independently of each other prior to joining forces to attack on April 21, 2019. Each of them had their own pathway to radicalisation, be it from exposure to foreign preachers, cyberspace or local extremist organizations that planted the seed of radical Islam in their minds. Zahran brought all these groups together to execute the final plan.

When it comes to Zahran, he had built a strong following for the NTJ in Kattankudy and much has been written about the unique dynamics of the town which groom religious extremists (Ali 2009). However, less is known about how Mohomed

Ibrahim Sadeeq Abdulla, a youth born and brought up in Mawanella and able to attract a large number of youths to their cause.

The role of the SLJI in his transformation is also not highlighted much. This is an organization which has moulded youth for many decades in Mawanella, with branches around the country. It is recognized as a mainstream organization and was involved even involved in academic activities in Mawanella. The acceptance made it easy for certain SLJI members to convince a number of youth that violent extremism was a solution to their grievances.

In contrast, the NTJ and JMI did not have such exclusive access to youth in their communities. These groups instead were able to attract radicalised individuals from various parts of the country based on common beliefs or depended on their close family members for support.

Mawanella is a close-knit community and given the history of anti - Muslim riots, they tend to resolve issues within the community; similar to Velvettithurai the birthplace of the LTTE. SLJI, a large Islamist organization, has also been operating in Mawanella for decades. These factors allowed groups like the SLJI and NTJ to recruit youth and operate with relative safety, in a conducive environment for recruitment.

Mohomed Ibrahim Sadeeq Abdulla herein referred to as Sadeeq was all in all a product of Mawanella having spent the majority of his life and schooling there. Thus, we started our study with his story and looked at reasons that made Mawanella such a vulnerable place for religious extremism. It also helped us get perspective into some of the reasons which would have attracted youth like Sadeeq and others into organizations run by Zahran Hashim. Sadeeq was also able to attract many youths to his ideologies and organizations. These boys went under the radar of not only the authorities but also their families, with many not being aware of what their sons were being exposed to. Hence our final research question deals on the factors which led to these boys 'falling through the cracks'.

XI. THE IBRAHIM BROTHERS FROM MAWANELLA

According to the findings of the Easter Sunday Commission Report, Sadeeq studied at the Delgahagoda School and then at Zahira College, Mawanella in the mathematics stream (Tamil medium). He holds a BSc in Management from the University of Dublin, Ireland through the ICBT Campus in Kandy.

Sadeeq like many of the young men in Mawanella joined the Sri Lanka Jamaat-e-Islami Student Movement (SLJISM) early on and like many he attended their five-day course for youth skills development after his Ordinary Level examinations. Thereafter he attended the seven-day course after his Advanced Level Examinations. Interviews conducted in Mawanella revealed that these programs have been carried out for decades by the SLJISM and it was common for young girls and boys to attend these courses (though the courses were designed differently for each gender).

His association with the SLJI gave him an early introduction to certain radical Islamic ideologies and helped him gain access to a body of young followers who would later be easily influenced by his teachings.

Initially, as Sadeeq became an active member of the SLJISM, he took part in several social services projects like flood relief, 'shramadana' activities in his local area, etc.... He was duly rewarded for his commitment when the organization appointed him as the National Youth Organizer from 2013-2015.

In 2011, investigations show that he met another member, Ahamed Munshif who approached him about an opportunity to travel to Turkey through SLJI, implying that he would be given arms training in Syria. In 2014, the trip became a reality and he travelled to Turkey for two months. Through the Commission we know that Sadeeq did cross the Turkey-Syria border and underwent a 40-day training program which included "physical and tactical training including weapon training."

Around October 2014, Sadeeq returned to Sri Lanka and according to interviews, started approaching young Muslims in the SLJI youth program about the ideologies he learnt. In 2015, there seems to be a backtracking of stance amongst the senior SLJI as they learn of the death of Mohomed Muhushin Sarfas Nilam aka Abu Surai Seylani; the first Sri Lankan Muslim fighting in Syria. They approach Sadeeq and ask that he leave his post in their organization. At this time, we also know that his brother Shahid had also been radicalized and he along with his father Ibrahim Moulavi were removed from the organization.

Interviews conducted in Mawanella had sources reveal that the SLJI leadership did not inform the rest of the membership as to why Sadeeq and his family

were removed. Thus, giving the family the opportunity to appear as 'ones who were wronged'. Sadeeq made use of this opportunity to build his reputation and following among a selected group of youth he has access to through the training programs. During his time as the National Organizer, he had also cultivated a special program called SMART for youth he said he saw 'potential' in. These were in addition to the five-day courses conducted by SLJI. These young men would later attend his and Zahran's special training programs in Hingula and other areas.

According to the Easter Sunday Commission findings, the camp in Hingula had close to 30 participants. These were children due to sit for their O/L examination from Mawanella, Kadugannawa and Delgoda.

"The lectures were on the IS. The participants were shown a small child being killed by the IS. The Digana incident was also mentioned, and the participants instructed that if attacked they should also attack."

Sadeeq was also responsible for the Buddha statue attacks in Mawanella in December 2018, an early warning of what was to come the very next year.

Soon after the Easter Sunday attacks, Sadeeq and his brother Shahid were arrested by the TID. Their families were asked to remain in Mawanella under house arrest and are being watched by intelligence officers. But the question is what happened to those boys Shahid and Sadeeq managed to convince of jihad?

Whilst we know of only 30 that were directly connected to the classes, interviews on the ground show that many more were exposed to these ideologies. In May 2021, the TID arrested another youth from Mawanella, Mohamed Shahim (29) for having conducted classes on Zahran's brand of extremism in Oluvil and Muttur. Thus, the authors believe that the network Sadeeq and his group managed to 'inspire' in Mawanella is very much alive and widespread, and many in the Muslim community may not be aware of this threat.

Post Easter Sunday attacks, the police took strict action to arrest many of the boys who were closely associated with the Ibrahim brothers in Mawanella. This left the close-knit community in Mawanella in shock with many of the parents, neighbours, teachers, and community members often noting that "They did not know what their children were up to". One teacher said, "We just thought they were going to

the mosque, there was no harm in that so we did not look into it."

Many of these boys were arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act noting that they would not be let out anytime soon. The government has set guidelines for a new deradicalization program but the authors of this research note that there needs to be a wider understanding of the problem before any program can be effective on the ground. Deradicalization of religious extremists is a much more complex task involving the participation of all community stakeholders including the religious establishment of the country.

Understanding the paths to vulnerability for these boys will, we hope, will also allow for regulators to better understand and design effective deradicalization programs.

XII. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

A study done by Iffat Idris (2018) on the recruitment process of youth to jihad in Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, sheds some light into what might be going on in Sri Lanka as well.

In Bangladesh Idris notes that youth were an attractive target due to their lack of previous criminal record, giving extremist groups more operational freedom. Further the youth were also more tech savvy, and able to navigate cyberspace to reach radical material online virtually undetected. In Bangladesh it was also noted that the extremist groups targeted youth from a diverse set of backgrounds, from "madrasa students to upper middle-class youth at private universities".

This was also seen in Sri Lanka where Zahran was able to attract youth like Sadeeq but also more well to do youth from Colombo like Abdul Latheef Jameel Mohammad who set off the bomb at Tropical Inn Dehiwala on April 21, and Inshaf Ahmed Ibrahim and Ilham Ibrahim; the sons of a rich spice trader and one of the main financiers of the Easter Sunday attacks.

The reasons why such a diverse group of individuals found common ground with each other despite their various situations in life is explained in Idris's report as the youth in Bangladesh being frustrated with a lack of "satisfactory levels of education, health and well-being, employment, political participation and civic participation".

Further Idris noted, "Young people share the frustration and anger of ordinary citizens at the political situation, weak governance, corruption and

failure to uphold the rule of law. A growing number of Bangladeshis are disconnected from family and community, disenfranchised from the country's disproportionately divided wealth and resources, and resentful against the existing political practices and deteriorating law and order situation."

Further the overall persecution of Muslims around the world seems to have a great impact in convincing youth towards joining jihad. A youth who spoke to us about this in Mawanella explained by the Sadeeq brothers would frequently show them videos of atrocities being committed against Muslims in countries like Palestine and Syria to get them on board with the idea of 'jihad'. "He would often tell us that we as Muslims have to fight back and defend ourselves against these crimes," said the youth. This trans nationalist view not only helped attract local youth in Mawanella to the cause of Jihad but also to the idea of being part of the larger cause of the Caliphate.

Youth grievances

The focus group discussions held with young men helped us gain a preliminary understanding as to what may have motivated many of the young men to join Sadeeq and his cause.

Firstly, the fear of being 'vulnerable' to attack as they lived surrounded by Sinhalese villages has been something that has often preoccupied the psyche of Mawanella Muslims. Many interviewees reported that whenever a riot broke down, they would always 'expect' it to spill into Mawanella. The anti Halal campaign, burqa ban and campaign against Muslim businesses had a great impact on the minds of the youth. This helped convince many youth to join the cause espoused by Sadeeq and Zahran.

Ahmed (32), one of the youth described it as follows:

"After 2016-2017, we realized that things had changed in Mawanella. People started to say that we need to fight back after Digana and Aluthgama. That, we as a community were vulnerable. People split into various groups. We ignored them, no one looked into what was happening in their own Masjid"

More importantly, he noted that, "All the boys went very quiet. These were very 'good boys', 'innocent' and some even from wealthy families".

According to Ahmed, the SMART program was attended by a few students chosen by Sadeeq after O/Ls. The SMART program changed the boys and within 4-5 months, "they returned home with a beard

and changed personality." Many noted that these boys kept to themselves and only mixed with Sadeeq and his group of friends.

Further Sadeeq, many of the young men informed us, was a 'polite and charismatic individual," with an ability to convince the young. This greatly helped convert many followers onto his side.

Although mistrust about each community simmered among the youth in Mawanella, the researchers found that there was no safe space for them to openly express their worries or concerns. Each community, the Sinhalese as well as the Muslims, acted in silos, never finding common space to meet and quell their fears about the other.

Acting in Silos

Soon after the 2001 Mawanella riots, an organization called Foundation for Mutual Understanding (FMU) was formed. This was made up of community leaders from both the Muslim as well as the Sinhalese communities. They hoped that they would have regular meetings and events to come together and discuss any issues each might be having with the other. The aim was to prevent another riot such as that of 2002. It is noteworthy that there is no youth representation in this committee.

J. M Niwas, a teacher by profession is a founding member of the committee, he told us the researchers that in the early years they held many events but post 2008, there was a lull in activity. It was once again reactivated with the campaigns launched by the BBS in 2013-2014.

"This helped us successfully keep groups like the Sihala Raavaya and BBS at bay," he said.

Post Easter Sunday attacks, this group was once again called on to initiate an interfaith group with the involvement of key Buddhist monks in the area, to keep the peace in the area.

"In 2001 the issue was very local. Now it has become national," remarked Niwas.

He noted that they managed to act as a bridge between communities because the elders in the Muslim community still maintains strong ties with those in the Sinhalese community. Many of them had studied in school together and were able to appeal to personal relationships in times of distress. However younger Muslims and Sinhalese do not intermingle and it would be increasingly difficult for open debates and discussions. Mr. Niwas, noted that Muslims now mostly go to either Tamil or English

medium Muslim schools. There are also no social spaces for the youth of the two communities to mix.

"20 years ago, close to 50% of the student population in Mayurupada National School were Muslims. Now less than 10% attend it (due to both lack of interest and not getting admission into the school, girls do not attend due to the dress code)."

The generation which then studied in Tamil would also send their children to Tamil medium schools as they could then help with schoolwork.

"There is also a notion that if Muslims went to Sinhalese schools they would be 'wrongly influenced' and be 'less Muslim'," observed Niwas, adding, "Mawanella is located in a precarious balance. It can easily tilt either way."

This tilt depends on the kind of group a young man may fall into in Mawanella. According to Imad (27), it is very important for a man in Mawanella to belong to an Islamic 'sect' or 'movement'.

"You get isolated if you don't belong to any of them," he added.

Mawanella has provided an unusually fertile breeding ground for many of the Islamic movements in the country. Apart from the SLJI, the space is shared by organizations like the Thowheed Jamaat (and its many sub groups), Tabliq Jamaat, and other movements.

For the youth, these movements provide brotherhood and belonging, in addition to something to do, in a city which offers very 'little entertainment' or 'activity' for the young, said Zakir (26).

Najeeb (27) who runs his father's construction company and attended an international school in Kandy, joined the Tabliq Jamaat movement in his early 20s. He said he "found peace and brotherhood," with them. Soon after, he convinced his father to join the movement and they together would travel the country proselytizing the movement.

"I find this as an opportunity to help people understand what Islam is, to explain our religion to all," he said.

When the researchers asked Najeeb if he was worried about the future and if he had any future plans, he said, "Our time in the world is very short, I am working towards my hereafter."

It seemed that being part of movements such as these helped certain youth alleviate any fears they may have over their future economic or political survival. Thus not requiring them to be active participants in their wider social community, as they find 'escape' in the 'movement'.

Did the parents know?

According to the Easter Sunday commission reports, a majority of the youth who joined Zahran's group was from Mawanella. Over 30 young men from Mawanella have been arrested so far and are detained in various prisons. Given this scenario, the researchers also wanted to know how such a large number of youths went under the radar, unnoticed by their own families and the close-knit community in Mawanella.

M.Z.M. Ayub, the Secretary at the Masjidul Huda Mosque and a teacher at Zahira College said the arrests shocked them. He had taught some of those who had been arrested and saw many of them regularly at the mosque. However, he had found no reason for him to be concerned.

"The families of these boys definitely think it is wrong. They did not know this was happening to their sons. We thought they were learning Islam," he said.

Post attacks, the heads of the Jamaat-e-Islami have stopped all five day and seven-day courses. Mr Ayub noted that parents and community leaders have now become more vigilant of the movements of their children, but it is unsure whether they can detect the kind of extremist material the children may be exposed to.

XIII. CONCLUSIONS

We would like to note that the details uncovered thus far call for further investigation and we hope to continue with our research in future. However, from our preliminary research we find that a few recommendations can be made.

Firstly, as there is a general lack of understanding as to what 'religious extremism' is and its outwards manifestations, we find that the government needs to make the parents and community leaders aware of the outward manifestations of extremism. What these signs are can be decided upon by a panel of religious experts, representatives of civil society and government officials. Secondly there needs to be greater monitoring of the role played by religious organizations at educational institutes. Finally, there

needs to be more common avenues created for communities to come together.

Future research agenda

1. The authors plan to meet young women from Mawanella as NTJ has been interested in attracting a female cadre. Mawanella was an area chosen to have these special classes for women and a few of them have been arrested. We are interested in finding out what reasons attracted them to join Islamic militancy and whether these reasons were different from the boys.

2. Further research has to be done to understand what makes Mawanella Muslims vulnerable to extremist propaganda and recruitment.

3. More investigations need to be done about various Islamic movements and their educational establishments operating in Mawanella and the critical role they play in the Muslim community.

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Annex 1

General Questionnaire used for interviews

Questionnaire

1.   Please introduce yourselves to us (name, age, family background, and home town, school, employment)

2.   Muslim community has been under a lot of pressure by various elements in the last few years, sin your personal opinion since when do you think the targeting of the Muslims began?

3.   Have you ever experienced discrimination, based on your religion? Please describe in detail (including security forces)

4.   Has this changed your behaviour in any way? Are you hesitant to display symbols of your faith or are you more assertive in its showing? Are you worried about taking public transport? Are you worried about female family members?

5.   How important is your Muslim identity to you?

6.   How have things changed for you after the Easter Sunday attacks? Have you lost friends, etc..

7.   What do you think of the MMDA?

8.   Do you think that the Muslim community must change certain practices to better assimilate?

Women

1.   Do you think the experiences of young Muslims differ by gender? If so, how?

2.   Have things changed for you as a Muslim woman after April 21 attacks?

3.   Anti-Muslim sentiments are not new, have these changed the way you look at yourself?

4.   How does the choice of clothing affect your sense of identity?

5.   Are you involved in issues related to young people? MMDA for example?

6.   Do you feel that there are social mobility issues for young Muslims, especially women?

Religious education

1.   Where did you gain your religious education from?

2.   What are the other channels of receiving religious information?

3.   Do you participate in any community events?

Participation in political activity

•   Are you a member of a political party? Trade Union?

1.   Do you take part in any political protests?

2.   Do you belong any non-religious associations?

3.   Do you think the government has done enough to ensure the security of the Muslim community?

Challenges of being a Muslim youth

Education/Work/ Language

1.   Do you work/run a Muslim business? How has this affected you? And your views?

2.   Do you think education is important for social mobility?

3.   To what extent do you feel a sense of belonging in your- 1. Muslim community, 2. Wider non-Muslim community?

-What works to make you feel you belong? What works against this?

Countering Terrorism: Striking a Balance Between National Security and Human Rights

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Abstract— Domestic, as well as international audience, criticizes the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The provisions of PTA are regarded as discriminatory, breaching human rights law as well as fundamental rights. However, the purpose of PTA is to ensure national security by combating terrorism. Therefore, it is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of National Security and Human Rights. The research is library-based research, which is also known as doctrinal research. It has used existing sources to arrive at conclusions. Both primary sources and secondary sources are equipped. The paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the PTA. The Act itself has inconsistencies as well as lacunas, which is detrimental to national security. The paper addresses the drawbacks accordingly, proving the necessity of upholding national security whilst adhering to international standards and protecting human rights. Consequently, the paper has provided an array of recommendations.

Keywords— national security, human rights, terrorism

I. INTRODUCTION

The Prevention of Terrorism Act came into effect in 1979 as a temporary measure. 'Modelled on South Africa's apartheid-era legislation and laws that the British used against Irish militancy, the PTA became a permanent law in 1982.' Ever since enactment, Act received criticism over appreciation. The objective of the Act is 'to make temporary provision for the prevention of acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka, the prevention of unlawful activities of any individual, group of individuals, association, organization or body of persons within Sri Lanka or outside Sri Lanka and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.' The Act has strengths as well as weaknesses. Simply stating, Act obstructs terrorism and extremism by protecting national security. The laws relating to emergencies such as laws on detention and examination of suspects facilitates the justice process by paving the way to criminalize the acts of perpetrators. Nonetheless, there are controversial provisions in the Act, which is detrimental to human rights. These provisions have created unrest in the international audience. The often-cited claims by the countries are the vast powers bestowed on the minister, coerced confessions, the deprivation of the right to a fair trial and prolonged detention period.

II. METHODOLOGY

The research is doctrinal research, which is also known as a "knowledge building research". Research has been aided by primary sources as well as secondary sources. Primary sources such as domestic and international legislation and secondary sources such as books and journal articles are equipped.

III. DISCUSSION

A) Legal standards

1) International legal regime: Sri Lanka is a state party to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Both the conventions recognise the right to life. Article 4(1) of ICCPR states that 'Even when there is a state of emergency, where states may derogate from certain other rights, such derogation must be temporary and only what is strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency'. Therefore, the use of force should reciprocate to the threat posed by terrorists. As Sri Lanka is a country that has ratified the aforementioned conventions, the government is duty-bound not to breach the statutorily vested rights. This depicts the need to strike a balance between the conflicting interests. National security must be preserved in the meantime, human rights should be preserved abiding with international standards.

2) Domestic legal regime: The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the supreme Law of the country bestows plethora of

rights to its people. Article 11 is an absolute right, which cannot be infringed. It states that 'no person shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. Therefore, even a perpetrator, suspect, accomplice or bystander must not be subjected to torture during detention or at any time. Article 12, 13 (1), 13(2) and 14 are subjected to restrictions as stipulated in Article 15(7). Article 12 states on right to equality of all persons. Article 13(1) states that 'no person shall be arrested except according to the procedure established by law, any person arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest. Article 13 (2) states that 'every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be brought before the judge and shall not be held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty. Article 14 is on freedom of speech, assembly, association, occupation. Nonetheless, the mentioned rights are limited 'in the interest of national security, public order and the protection of public health or morality, or to secure due to recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or of the meeting the just requirement of the general welfare of a democratic society. This explicitly displays the significance of national security where fundamental rights will be restricted to preserve national security.

B) Strengths and weaknesses

1) Strengths: The problem arises whether PTA is exclusively adverse. In reality, PTA serves as the platform to penalise criminals and attain justice. This was seen during Easter Sunday Attack 2019 as well as during the war against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Act vests power in the police to search premises, seize goods and detain the suspects. The Act Penalizes terrorism deters terrorism, combats future terrorism and terrorist-related activities. It is significant to mention that Act has not defined Terrorism, some scholars argue on behalf of inclusion of the definition to the terrorism while some find it as limiting the scope of the Act. Irrespective of the prevalent debate, the Act is on condemnation of all acts of terrorism regardless of circumstances, forces that committed them, location, time, and method of execution.

In cases of Money Laundering as well as in terms of terrorist financing early detention of the perpetrator is essential. Even though detention law is subjected to controversy, there exists an array of advantages. Revealing the motive behind the crime, accomplices to the crime, mode of committing the

crime will be revealed by the suspect with time. Due to the complicated relationships with fellow criminals, suspects will seldom disclose the terror ties. Therefore, detention is imperative to examine the suspect and identify the web of violence. Nevertheless, the prolonged detention period of the PTA was subjected to criticism especially in the recent European Parliamentary Resolution. Declining the allegations against the PTA in whole is not a prudent choice. Special care and attention are needed to the premises of detention. Therefore, the place of detention must not be a harbour of violence where human rights as well as fundamental rights are contravened. Hence, detention centres must be free from police brutality. In addition, the government is duty-bound to ensure human rights.

2) Weaknesses: The PTA provides immunity for the government if it is deemed to have been acting in good faith or fulfilling an order under the Act. For that reason, if police in the detention centres act violently, but use the argument of performing duties perpetrators become a victim of violence and rendering justice becomes a failure. To put it simply, powers vested in the police must not be exploited.

Even though the law is specifically intended to prevent terrorism, many people with no connection to terrorism or terrorist groups or connection by coincidence can be arrested under the Act. The PTA is in favour of the police. Due to this, reason when there is a need to detain a person police tend to use the PTA. In such circumstances, all the assets and money of the suspects will be seized and travel bans will be imposed. Nevertheless, if the person is a suspect who was subject to prolonged detention without committing any offence, the damage done to the person will be irreparable. Therefore, investigation of the case, examination of witnesses, documents and evidence must be flawless.

As per the PTA, the Minister is given broad powers to make regulations. 'Violent extremist religious ideology Regulations No 01 of 2021 on March 2021 expanded the PTA allowing for two years of detention without trial for causing 'religious, racial, or communal disharmony or feelings of ill will between communities to be 'rehabilitated' at 'reintegration centres'. This restricts freedom of expression and association with no right of appeal in courts and therefore it is detrimental to human rights as well as civil liberty. Thus, it is crucial to ensure nonviolence in the detention centers and to strike a balance between conflicting interests.

C) Lessons learnt

1) LTTE

Sri Lanka endured a three-decade war with one of the world's notorious terrorist organizations LTTE, which is proscribed by many nations. Even aftermath of gaining peace there is a revival of violence. LTTE international networks, as well as LTTE sympathetic organisations, are alleging Sri Lanka of having committed a 'Tamil Genocide'. This allegation must not be taken trivially. It is important to combat the recent trend of the spread of terrorism in social media. The mechanism to address such an issue is by way of PTA. The recent arrest cases of youth spreading hate speech via Tik Tok, Facebook are a fine example of the necessity of PTA. It is crystalline that Individual liberty is important; however, association, engagement and assembly should not promote violence, terrorism and extremist ideologies.

2) Easter Sunday Attack 2019:

'Easter Sunday's devastating jihadist bombings killed more than 250 and injured roughly twice as many'. The attack was a huge security failure in Sri Lanka, which resulted in an irreparable damage. This affirmed the necessity of having strict national security laws. Relaxation of rules relating to national security became a mockery with the Easter Sunday attack. It also proved that violence could be reoccurred. Islamist extremism is an emerging threat in the world. Sri Lanka being a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious country is vulnerable to violence. Therefore, national security must not be traded at any cost. The burden is on the government to strike a balance between conflicting interests whilst abiding with international standards.

3) The European Parliament resolution

The European Parliament resolution of 10th June 2021 for Sri Lanka, in particular, the arrests under the PTA (2021/2748(RSP)) was passed with an overwhelming majority. The European parliamentary resolution warned against the removal of Generalised System of Preferences Plus (GSP+). GSP+ removes imports duties from products coming into the European Union market from vulnerable developing countries. Irrespective of the fact the resolution is not binding we cannot exclusively negate its impact. In reality, it is authoritative. The loss of GSP+ will be injurious to Sri Lanka's economy. For that reason, Sri Lanka cannot take the warning trivially. National Security is paramount; therefore as a sovereign country

imposing strict laws is essential at times. However, the challenge lies in balancing human rights with national security whilst adhering to the international standards. It is important to consider amending discriminatory as well as arbitrary provisions in the PTA for the betterment of human rights.

IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed it is clear that Act has both flaws as well as strengths. Passive acceptance of allegations by other countries will not be a prudent choice. However, the way towards success is accepting flaws and mending mistakes. When paying attention to other countries it is evident that there are countries with strict national security laws. Switzerland is such a country with wide powers vested in the police. The rationale behind imposing strict rules is to ensure the safety of the majority of citizens. PTA's rigidity became the mechanism to implement laws and to penalize perpetrators during times of terror in Sri Lanka. It is due to the Act, Easter Sunday perpetrators as well LTTE terrorists were imprisoned. The Act paved the way to detain and investigate extremists who were a threat to national security. Therefore, repealing the Act is futile as well as inappropriate. Nevertheless, it is important to accept the bitter truth, which is, Act has provisions, which needs to be revisited imminently. For example, rights including the right to a fair trial must be addressed leading to an effective remedy, access to health care and access to loved ones must not be taken as insignificant requests. On the other hand, Act must include mechanisms to identify and counter modern threats.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Prevention of terrorism cannot be achieved overnight; it is a lifelong challenge that is subjected to change. Terrorists change their patterns as well as strategies to spread violence and extremism. Therefore, imminent steps must be taken to prevent offences.

1) *Revisiting provisions:* The Act does not cover 'Civilian deaths' it only covers special personnel. This is a major lacuna in the Act. It is pivotal to prevent coerced confessions. A threat, intimidation, violence must not be entertained to elucidate confessions as it breaches human rights and international standards.

2) *Cyber command:* Threat patterns should be constantly monitored to prevent threats by

foreseeing them. For this, it is essential to be vigilant 24/7. At present context, the presence of security personnel and intelligence service provides a remarkable role. Yet, in modern-day warfare, social media is used as a platform to promote terrorism and extremism. By examining hate speech, false news and misinformation disseminated online, the government can prevent violence beforehand by notifying relevant authorities. Cyber command with the affiliation of the Ministry of Defence and relevant ministries can counter threats by presenting counter-narratives as well as impeding upcoming physical violence to preserve national security. Therefore, it is essential to respond to novel trends of terrorism.

3) Interagency platform: It is pivotal to share knowledge and expertise between ministries as well as institutes. Furthermore, maintaining a repository of information to counter-violence will be a smart move. Seeking assistance from foreign countries, accessing knowledge and human resources will aid the security process. The platform must go beyond exchanging knowledge and it should facilitate training as well as research and development leading to grooming of a responsible and capable officer who is an investment to the nation.

4) Rehabilitation process: Penalizing the terrorist or the religious extremists who incited hatred and violence will not end the vicious cycle of terror. It is important to take a step beyond. Reintegration of perpetrators into society is imperative. Therefore, perpetrators must be directed to rehabilitation. It is also crucial to ensure that rehabilitation centres are free from torture. One of the significant factors is the need for a follow-up mechanism to ensure that the ex-terrorist or the extremist is de-radicalised.

5) Detention centres: The PTA must have assurance, that detention centres are not a harbour to share information and tactics of terrorism and radicalize themselves, nor should it be a place where perpetrators are abused. There must be a monitoring mechanism to guarantee nonviolence. As police are bestowed with wide powers, it is crucial to ensure that police will not exploit the powers and infringe the rights of the criminals.

6) Protection of human rights whilst upholding national security: The major challenge the government is posed with, is balancing the conflicting interests. National security is essential and should not be traded at any cost; on the other hand, in the name of national security human rights must not be violated. The government needs to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests without derogating any of the concerns while adhering to international standards.

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Building a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka

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Abstract- The aim of this research paper is to explore the novel interpretations for building a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka. The Virtual Arms Room, as a battle learning system, provides secure, distributed version control and data management empowered by AI on cloud platforms. The research discusses the importance of developing demanding interpretations and vital concepts to build a Virtual Military Force. The study was conducted in a qualitative approach in reviewing of 64 research papers by meta-synthesis method followed by Mata - Thematic Synthesis and Critical Interpretive Analysis. It reveals that, Virtual military capabilities will ensure that the Army is gained the competitive advantage to win the real wars over its contemporary adversaries. The results also suggest synergistic effects of building a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka is important due to it guarantees the national interest, freedom and the preservation of our way of life, formidable for future. Moreover, it demonstrates that Virtual War is the more strategic, enduring and powerful form of conflict as it is capable of creating affective overmatch, which enables the exploitation of human cognitive behaviour. This paper analyses various concepts and develop novel interpretations future scopes of significant as the practical application that vital to build a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka.

Keywords— virtual, digital, war, military, weapons, learning, training, synthetic-immunity, artificial intelligence, machine learning

I. INTRODUCTION

The human affairs have grown over past three centuries vibrantly with the invention of the internet and world wide web and its impact on virtual revelation in recent past (Avinadav, Chernonog and Khmelnitsky, 2021). Its effect on developing a massive data transaction over the big data annualizing, high-tech heuristics and internet of things (IOT) forces the mankind to learn, communicate, and decision make under the phenomenon global technology structure (Haubenwaller and Vandikas, 2015). Furthermore, the ungoverned flow of mega-data is compelling the world's data management giants, primarily the US andChina to race in becoming the new world Super Powers (Wang and Gao, 2021). Incidentally, the global virtual colonization directs the tech giants to compete themselves to power lift in data collection and processing powers to digitally weaponized to deter the geo-political influences in the behaviour of world affairs. Meanwhile, the new phenomenon empowers with the freedom of action to state actors to outmanoeuvre the competitive political advantage while indirectly enable non state actors to create fraud and deep fakes (Kun, Tong and Xiaodan, 2019), bymanipulation of information related to millions of connected humankind around the world.

The goal of this paper is to present Virtual Military and its learning concepts that can help the Sri Lanka Military to win the real war notwithstanding for a primarily designed ideal war. Winning the real war will guarantee the nationalinterest, freedom and the preservation of our way of life, formidable for future. The profound definition of Virtual War is: use power of invisible efficacy to direct human behaviour for profit or positional advantage. This is signified by the global efforts taken by the states and mass scale high tech non state actors (informational enterprises) over other states actors and adversaries over strategical deception weapons and operations over past three centuries. Meanwhile, the US and China and their tech giants possess a large scale virtual combat power (Instrumenting the national power in informational strategy) that had developed in bond of massive civilian technology enterprises in

compared to other states. These realities are producing security threats in global economic, social, governance. Likewise, the Middle Kingdom is exercising an informal means of state control through the digital enforcement of acceptable cultural norms and values in example as, is using biometric scanning to digitally grade its citizens and to gain state social control. Besides, it governs social standards citizen and rewards or punishments accordingly to achieve global social control, through the enforcement of its centralized digital societal parameters and effect to digital monetary transactions, global currency in future by authoring monetary networks to indirectly achieve the global social control end game they desire (Liu, Wang and Woo, 2019).

Figure 1. Virtual Primacy over Military Domains

Source: Author

A. The Nature of Warfare

According to Clausewitz, the nature of warfare today is evolved with the experience of what human consisted with primordial violence, hatred, and enmity and it constantly evolves (Waldman, 2014). The westernized military culture has historically taken an direct approach on application of military power but the nature of warfare changes quickly and indirectly as per the common agreement of the military practitioners. Similarly, adversaries to a nation use indirect approach of military power application in many forms. This confirms that a military not to see the real war in direct sights and demands themselves to prepare for engagement that go beyond the staff college's doctrines (Angstrom and Widen, 2018). Beyond, it makes a platform for leaders and soldiers to make decisions and prompt action in time and space, at the inputs assisted by Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI &

ML) (Pennington, 1988). The winners of the real war are determined by the accuracy and reliability provided to information with above technological advancements.

The traditional warfare was based on what things physically seen on battle space, but the modern warfare has created every citizen a virtual fighter who are vulnerable through use of internet is fixed to a (JSTOR, 2021; US Army Publication, 2021; Moving ahead in the virtual battlespace, 2021) Virtual Weapon System. A person's location, identification, monetary and intellectual property are threatened for a potential attack on cyber space. In instance, virtual battle space is now earmarked homes, commercial data centres, offices complexes as vulnerable points.

B. B.   Ideal War Vs Real War

The "On War" of Clausewitz explains, that "Ideal war - philosophical abstraction - a logical fantasy" (Waldman, 2014). Modern ideal - attrition warfare as what militaries are employed to fight. Contrariwise, Clausewitz describes that real war is constrained by political motives and tactical ground limitations of human nature, time and space (US Cyber Directive, 2011) where many militaries are dislike to be fought with. Any military force that wish to fight a real war ned a different learning system and to be equipped with a new radical weapon system.

The Sri Lanka Military Force is confidence at projecting kinetic military operations, yet another portion of the military is capable of employing informational combat power. The projection of equal levels of competencies will only be possible to fight a real war in Sri Lankan soil. The current binary military should focus to recruit and train a potentially blended military force for Sri Lanka that holds soldiers who are able to operate both kinetic and virtual weaponries, as they manoeuvre in physical and virtual battlefields when confronting with adversaries of Sri Lanka. Virtual warfare sets (DCDC, 2014) conditions for a successful physical war. Virtual War is becoming more strategic by providing an overwhelming endurance for the force projection in capable of exploiting the human cognitive behaviour that enduring strategic value while, retaining the prominence of temporal tactical effects (Moving in VB, 2021) of physical war, that still eminence over virtual war in the context.

C. Art of Military Learning in Modern Warfare

Militaries need to timely change its within learning strategies with the excellence and effectiveness in military learning systems to dynamically adjust learning systems tocontrol the competitive advantage. Reconceptualising the art of learning when the enemy at gate is dare to win wars. Moreover, War on the Rocks, (2021) and Crivellaro and Leavenworth (2013) mention the militaries employ thekinetic weapons for each spectrum of war, even under realization of possible negative outcomes. The militaries and national allies must re-imagine the learning strategies in changing the functions, forms and logics of modern warfare.

The authority, power, decision making, and mission/task oriented planning are mechanics of a military learning system Bynum (2013) and Labib (2016) which have got challenged due to technological advancements in military and commarcialy that hierarchical armies struggles to remain sustainable, mission command and decision-making increase the military values and norms.


Figure 2. Virtual Military Domination

Source: Author

1) The Triple Loop Military Learning Solutions

The Military uses a single and double loop military learning strategy that be inherent in triple loop military learning system (Bynum, 2013 and Labib, 2016). Single circle learning portrays the sort of exercises that take put when the objective is to fix technical issues inside the current context. The Single loop military learning ensures militaries do right things relative to assigned military tasks under existing conditions and standards Bynum (2013) and Labib (2016). The hypothesis behind the single loop military learning is to make efficiencies but not to organization transformation. Double loop military learningsystem ensures that, organizations are doing

the correct things with a changing form within the existing organization paradigm. As Bynum (2013) and Labib (2016) argues the Triple loop military learning system marks a vital change forms within and externally in any of the existing organization paradigm, by implementation of reborn governing mechanics and principles for organizational sustainability in long run. The Triple loop military learning is premeditated to unravel complex versatile issue circumstances and to form progressive organizational change.

2) Triple Loop Military Learning Solutions - Model Example

Figure 3 illustrates how, the Sri Lanka Military stands inrelation to its military learning theories, since the independence. Mainly, the Sri Lanka Military employed UK defence doctrines against the terrorism in Sri Lanka. Itincluded assigned military tasks under existing standards for periodical conditions to warfighting against terrorism in single loop military learning. The humanitarian war approach made vast different in learning strategy by reframing the logics of conducting of warfare and application of COIN Doctrine and indigenous tactics developed within the militaries. This is an example of double loop learning where the Sri Lanka Military changeddecisiveness of winning the war. The Military began to use information and cyber combat space, to protect the politicalinterests of warfighting as a nation. Winning the "Humanitarian War" highlighted the significance of triple loop military learning in "Real War" made the Sri Lanka Military, to deal with multifarious solving of problems demands by a Virtual War.

D. Scope and Significance of the Study

National Security, Stability and Development can be achieved by an effective and efficient military modernization of a country. As a main entity of Sri Lankangovernment, Sri Lanka Armed forces also faces the challenge of playing a major role in ensure national growthand security in an innovative way. Sri Lanka Military must re-imagine on changing the forms, functions and logics of warfare (Labib, 2016) in order to learn and adapt in advance to adversaries. Virtual Warfare has become more strategical in fields of military capability to apply mixed paradigms of war to realize of adversaries' acts in mixed (physical/virtual) battlefields (Kearns, 2015). Modernizingof Sri Lanka army that struggles to remain sustainable needs firm decisions to cater virtual military paradigm in comparing to contemporary militaries. The modernization of the military in to a sub section of

virtual military wouldrequire a series of concepts and frameworks in a theoretical background to find the feasibility of appling such innovationas for Sri Lanka Armed forces in effect to National Security, Stability and Development. How does the Sri Lanka Armed Forces to decide when modernizing a military to a virtual spectrum in its feasibility and effectiveness? This study is aimed for unveiling such theoretical concepts should involve in Building a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka.


Figure 3. Triple Loop Learning Solution for Sri Lanka Military

Source: Author

II. METHODOLOGY

Building a virtual military is a strategic long-term decision to an organization that requires high-level evidence for research and knowledge transfer. Therefore, authorsworked on three specific objectives to: (1) theory building;(2) theory explication; and (3) theory development based on meta-synthesis method and followed by Mata - Thematic Synthesis and Critical Interpretive Analysis. Thetheories explore the main conceptual factors that Sri LankaArmed forces must address to decide on modernization towards virtual military. Building a virtual military should process includes reconceptualising of the findings and theninterprets them to create new insights that may include generating new theories, developing conceptual models, identifying gaps in research, adding breadth of understandings to existing knowledge, providing evidence to current state of knowledge, etc. A whimsical decision tomove to the virtual military will ensures pathway for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka.

A. Analyse the literature by Meta-synthesis method

The aim of this research is to practise a meta-synthesis method for analysis and synthesis of previous published studies and theories for a virtual military concept in building for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka. Meta-synthesis attempts to integrate results from several different but inter-related qualitative studies. The technique has an interpretive, rather than aggregating, intent, in contrast to meta-analysis of quantitative studies. Literature on Virtual, Digital, War, Military, Weapons,Learning, Training, Synthetic - Immunity, Artificial intelligence/ Machine learning related papers were searched and reviewed. For develop this theoretical concept,authors reviewed 64 research papers from published journals, concept papers and conference proceedings. The virtual military concept extracted from these papers are classified to related sub-categories and categories. Then, the theoretical and conceptual substantial for a virtual military are developed. It includes four main concepts engaged with virtual military in a sub-category. By providing a systematic approach for researchers, meta- synthesis method explores new and essential concepts through synthesizing qualitative research. Meta synthesis method creates a comprehensive and wide spread viewtoward the problems in addition to promote the current knowledge. It also is a method of reinterpreting and reshaping existing qualitative findings (McClean and Shaw, 2005). A qualitative meta-synthesis is a technique that combines results from a variety of studies with a common theme. Per se, —The sample for a meta-synthesis, then, is made up of individual qualitative studies selected on the basis of their relevance to a specific research questionposed by the synthesis (Zimmer, 2006).

III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Using Meta-synthesis analysis followed by Mata - Thematic Synthesis and Critical Interpretive Analysis:

JSTOR (2021), US Army Publication (2021), Movingin VB (2021) states that modern warfare has created every citizen is vulnerable to combat in a virtual battlefield whenor once connected to internet to be potentially attacked by virtual weapons. Similarly, some authors such as Gen E- Dempsey (2013); U.S. Army, (2015) streamline the contribution of virtual military to a successful accomplishment of Virtual-Military Mission-Essential Task-Lists assigned to a unit. In early search, based on keywords we found 478 related articles. After investigating the title, it is determined that most of them are related to other research fields of cloud computing and 163 articles are selected for review. After studying the abstracts, 100 articles are chosen for full content review. After a full review of content, 36 articles are rejected and finally 64 articles are obtained for in Meta-synthesis

analysis (see Table 1 for major synthesis). The number of selected paperswith separate years of publishing, relevant databases and search engines and also the process of searching and selecting appropriate articles are shown in (see Table 1 formajor synthesis). The major interpretations models areshown as figure 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.

A. *Meta-synthesis analysis on Building a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lanka*

1) *Statistical Data Analysis from the Questionnaire.*

Table 1. Meta-synthesis analysis – Interpretations.

Authors	Virtual Military Paradigm
JSTOR, 2021; US Army Publication, 2021; Moving in VB, 2021	The traditional warfare was based on what things physically seen on battle space, but the modern warfare has created anyone a virtual fighter in internet with digital weaponry systems
(DCDC,2014)	Virtual war strategies design required conditions in physical war
Rocks on War, (2021) and Crivellaro and Leavenworth (2013)	The Military is apply kinetic weaponseven by knowing the negative results
Bynum, (2013) and Labib, (2016)	The Triple loop military learning makeover possibilities in and out of an organization with new governing principle for sustainability
JSTOR (2019); Ichimasa etal., (2011)	The VMAR is a classified and clouded service to facilitate military learning and management systems with virtual military weapons that required for military use
Gen E Dempsey (2013); U.S. Army, (2015)	The availability of an grands options of machines and information platforms accomplishes Virtual Military Mission-Essential Task-Lists
FM, (2003); Kearns, (2015)	These VAR services learn in advancing on categorizing, interrogating and indexing the identified, existing and new virtual military weapon systems
Thomas and Ziring, (2015); Warren,(2016)	Unclassified/ Classified VMAR networks will enable users to access and use information/data that support projected Virtual Militaries under authorized protocols across security networks
US Army,(2019); Synthatic Biology; Wassung,US MoD, (2015)	The Synthetic Battle Immunity System(SBIS) is a concept to protect men in Virtual Warfare which designed as human immune system
Hannay etal., (2015); Angstrom and Widen, (2018)	The VAR's cloud services provides conditions to train virtual tactical manoeuvres in virtual military training ranges in global proximity avatars

Source: Authors

2) *Mata - Thematic Synthesis.*

The research is re-synthesized to generate high-level evidence for research and knowledge transfer in several approaches developed to synthesize qualitative studies by meta-ethnography and qualitative cross-case analysisfollowed by thematic synthesis.

3) *Critical Interpretive Analysis.*

The authors aimed to move beyond summaries and to offernovel interpretations of findings from primary studies in meta-synthesis. It is a method for integrating the results of(phenomenological) studies by understanding the existing knowledge in nature of qualitative meta-syntheses are exploratory-descriptive an interpretative, broaden the understanding of a phenomenon and associations with current interpretations postulations through integration of several inter-related qualitative emphyrical findings.

B. *Building a Virtual Military Force for Armed ForcesSri Lanka based on complementary findings*

1) *Virtual Military Arms Room for Sri Lankan Military Force*

The firm confidence on the information as a weapon in battle space domains the Sri Lanka Military now experience a paradigm shift. The research introduces the vital concept of designing a "Virtual Military Arms Room"(VMAR) to cater new military learning challenge. The VMAR is the centre component bundle of any Virtual Military Force (Ichimasa et al., 2011) and makes a new military learning system to support any soldiers' survivability in actual battlefield. The study identifies that, the VMAR is a classified, cloud hosted information software system to host connections to access of military learning and management of military virtual weapon bundles (A Case against Virtual Nuclear Testing on JSTOR,2019; Ichimasa et al., 2011) which provides the backbone services to host networks, security and analytics, developer solutions and AL/ML services that progress to design, categorize and employ in virtual battlefield of Sri Lankan military context.

Software management and extreme data processing are latest weaponry that virtual soldiers could employ on battles. The results of the study are discussed that, the bulkinformation flow of military only will not win wars but themilitary men should be able to perform digitally assisted for search and learn computer code inventories, platforms and data servers to accomplish of missions effectively. The

study identifies that, developing a military man demand end learning protocols to create synthetic battle immunity of modern warfare to access in securely via the VMAR (USArmy, 2019) and create discovery searches via revelation looks through digitalized colleagues fuelled by AI integrations to search the most validated digitalized military weaponries to employ.

All levels of Sri Lankan military commanders should integrate tactical capabilities could effectively influence mixed Warfields. As stated by Gen E Dempsey (2013); U.S. Army, (2015) the availability of an array of IOT and information platforms in accomplishment of Virtual- Military Mission-Essential Task-Lists of units. The study identifies that, the new domain in Virtual War Drills can be developed through by executing digital functions, using daily by Soldiers. Operating in cross-domain virtual environment is essential for each Service sub units for determine to operate virtual military weaponry in future (Gen E Dempsey (2013).

2) Digital Military Weapon Rack for Sri Lankan Military Force

The soldiers' immediate information support requirement is enabled though a Digital Military Weapon Racks (DMWRs) by an automated search using software system and data of AI/ML. As a result, in each task is executed by AI assisted environment with deep learning and voice command algorithms. As mentioned by (FM, 2003; Kearns, 2015) these VMAR services advances in categorizing and indexing of the available and new virtual weapons with. Soldiers' wearable devices access the virtual scenarios via command, keyboard to receive AI assisted recommendations for employable virtual weapons. To emphasize, DMWRs use an UI to automatically categorize virtual military weapons in the VMAR (Kearns, 2015). The findings of the study are discussed that; it uses the same mechanism of automated decision-making as ongoing competition of machine assistant capabilities in web based retail shopping enterprises.

Moreover, Thomas and Ziring, (2015); Warren, (2016) describe that Unclassified/Classified VMAR systems to network users with information/data that integrates the future Virtual Militaries under authorized protocols across security networks. Advancement of security platforms withAI services will dominate the use of ML and cloud infrastructures in time and space up to mile-seconds in creating conditions of a Strategic authoritative for future Virtual Militaries to manoeuvre decisively on virtual battlefields.

3) Synthetic Battle Immunity System (SBIS)

The Synthetic Battle Immunity System (SBIS) is a concept in protecting men in Virtual Battlefield in designed parameters of human immune system. (US Army, 2019; Synthatic Biology; Wassung MoD, 2015). The study identifies that, SSIS is a construct of three-layer protection system conceptually bears three digital layers of battle protection for combat survivability in modern battlefields (Labib, 2016). The first layer is an Innate Immunity that endure digital external barriers of defence vulnerabilities used to locate and to target a combatant. The Active Battle Immunity (medium layer of protection) is designed via AI/ML and delivers digital viruses to hinder threat detection possibilities and distract targeting systems ofadversaries in the means of EW and electromagnetic fieldsand imagery systems - for physical contractions (US Army,2019). The research also lend support to findings, The Passive Battle Immunity is capable to generated information via external sources and defensive malware from externalities for military specific specific duration vulnerability of Soldiers. The study identifies that the periodical advancement of the SBIS, equipmenting and training is a military capability requirement of modern battlefields today (Kearns, 2015).

4) Training Sri Lankan Virtual Militaries

Sri Lankan military commanders can project training atmospheres for real soldiers in "Net-Wars" programs by using "Remote Interactive Military Training". According to Hannay et al., (2015); Angstrom and Widen, (2018) the VAR's cloud accessibility facilitate trainers to project virtual military manoeuvre in global arena. Therefore, the training engagements can be developed and practiced in virtual systems that incorporate different command levels in mission scenarios (US Army, 2019). Undoubtedly, offline servers to be used for virtual military training exercises in fair cost by using computer models in cloud. New digitally capable weapons are emerged they can be exercised while categorized by VMAR, for future employability (Ichimasa et al., 2011). The research also lend support to findings, Information System engineers have an array of choices in term of industrial AI platforms that can be used to develop and train VMARs as; "Google Artificial Intelligent, SageMaker (Amazon), Microsoft Artificial Intelligent framework and BlueMix (IBM)''. The study identifies that the AI

platforms continues to advanced by commercial Information Analysis market and VMAR provides a virtual military force with options invent and use in virtual military weapon inventories. Finally, study contribute future research possibilities in novel interpretations to designing a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability and Development of Sri Lankaby considering the factors resulted in this study.

IV.   DISCUSSION

This primary theoretical framework is constructed directly based on the extracted concepts, sub-categories and categories. It could be noted in order to avoid probable misguiding, it seems better that the readers should first consider the primary research design. Then, we improve theory development based on meta-synthesis method followed by Mata - Thematic Synthesis and Critical Interpretive Analysis. Based on complementary findings and add novel interpretations (categories. Finally, we clarify reconceptualization of virtual military in a systematic approach for researchers, meta-synthesis method explores new and essential concepts through synthesizing qualitative research. Theory building for Metasynthesis method creates a comprehensive and wide spreadview toward the problems in addition to promote the current knowledge.

Its paramount important to draw an executive analysis of key research findings related to building a virtual military with the data illustrated in data presentation. The results ofthe study are discussed related to the factors effecting the   National Security, Stability and Development can be achieved by an effective and efficient military modernization of Sri Lanka and to bring out basic conceptual interpretations related to the study. The study was basically charged with the modernization of the military in to a sub section of virtual military would require a series of concepts and frameworks in a phenomenologicalbackground which is feasible for Sri Lanka Armed forces in aimed for unveiling such phenomenological concepts should involve in Building a Virtual Military Force.

Figure 4. Virtual Modernization for Sri Lanka Military

Source: Author

V.   CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the character of the warfare and its effects on the quality of life of human evolves with the rapidly changing technology. What seen on battlefield is empowered with the information not seen to link the knowledge on indirectly employed combined military weapons in time and space of virtual battlefield manoeuvre capabilities of adversaries. Maintaining of the own freedom of action to retain the military superiority, the Reconceptualising the art of military learning encountering adversaries, with the potentials of critical paradigm of AI/ML to win real wars. The findings of the study are discussed that, train and employ a new versatile Sri Lanka Military Force that able to fight with multi weaponry (kinetic and virtual) in any domain of war, as a challenge in front of Sri Lanka Military Force.

This study investigated the factors that, the VMAR innovates new concepts and extractions of industrial best functions/practices to advancement of military capabilitiesto fight modern battles with virtual assets in several fields as, digital imagery, virtual avatars, composite computing, vocal/language processing, ML/AL, VR, military digital modelling, simulation and big data handling (Ichimasa et al., 2011). The Triple loop military learning is pathway of wining "Real War" that Sri Lanka military require to generate with new governing strategies, in/out of Warfield paradigm, in addressing the complex requirements integralwith Virtual that had kept a huge leap in tech sector. Finally, study contribute future research possibilities in novel interpretations to designing a Virtual Military Force for National Security, Stability

and Development of Sri Lanka by considering the factors resulted in this study.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SPECIFIC SYMBOLS

The Synthetic Battle Immunity System (SBIS)Digital Military Weapon Racks (DMWRs) Virtual Military Arms Room (VMAR)

Artificial Intelligent/ Machine Learning (AL/ML)

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Use of Visual Media by LTTE Front Organisations to Influence Post-war Sri Lanka

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Abstract— In May 2009, following a thirty-year armed conflict, Sri Lanka's territorial integrity was restored. However, the LTTE International Network's information warfare against Sri Lanka has not yet ended, and theLTTE continues to engage in cyber-hostilities and cyber- information warfare. The true objective of suchoperations is to radicalize the minds of people, particularly young people who have not yet seen the ravages of war and are therefore susceptible to manipulation. Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine the patterns of visualizing utilized by theInternational network of LTTE, which are the front organizations to influence communities and foster misconceptions. The study shall be conducted as Doctrinal research. Data shall be obtained through primary and secondary resources and shall be analyzed qualitatively. To be more specific, open-source material found on social media, printed and visual media shall be utilized in gathering the requisite data. The principal objectives of conducting this study are as follows. Firstly, the paper shall explore how disinformation that is disseminated through visual media affect international communities and radicalize youths. Secondly, this shall examine the potential consequences of radicalization through the media, which might degrade the community's tranquil existence now and in the future. Finally, the paper shall address the legal implications of using visual media as a medium of communication. Concerning international law, the author shall provide recommendations on several elements of strategic policymaking.

Keywords— LTTE; Visual Media; Radicalization; Second Generation; Tamil Diaspora

I. INTRODUCTION

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, sabotaged the country's progress via a civil war, separatism, and terrorism. Even though SriLankan security forces defeated the LTTE in 2009, separatist ideology remained. Pro-LTTE Tamils have moved and settled in a variety of countries, forming several diasporic Tamil groups to continue to manifest andcarry out the campaign for a separate state. The Global Tamil Forum, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, and the British Tamil Forum are among the LTTE Front organizations advocating for an Eelam State. The groups disseminate radical ideologies as well as ex-combatants seeking political asylum from the resurgent LTTE conflict. The Tamil National Alliance and Sri Lankan Tamils are being used by LTTE worldwide networks to push for a separate Eelam state, which wouldchallenge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The international community's propaganda is systematic and widespread, and it has succeeded in persuading international organizations like the UNHCR to forward a resolution on falsely alleged war crimes by Sri Lankan security forces, as well as questions about GSP+, by citing key provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which has been condemned to exert force and discredit Sri Lanka's government. To spread its message, the terrorist cell, which was well-equipped in terms of technology and expertise, used all available avenues. To incite hate for Sinhalese, gain international sympathy, and recruit preachers for its message, social media and other visual media channels have been employed. This has resulted in the radicalization of Tamil youth in the worldwide society as well as locally, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

Visual propaganda's efficacy has always been a trend that has always been successful. In statements like "a picture is worth a thousand words," the power of pictures is assumed. Images are more emotionally vivid and responses to visuals are more quick and strong than text responses because humans absorb pictures faster than words(Winkler and Dauber, 2014). When the sound and visual tracks of a movie convey contradicting information in experimental settings, for example, viewers pay more attention to

the visual(Winkler and Dauber, 2014). This is due to their perception of photographs as reliable recordings that allow them to "experience" news events even if they are not physically present. Images also attract attention because viewers process the intricate visual detail of images in real time rather than using the more difficult, sequential technique required to understand verbal information(Winkler and Dauber, 2014). Furthermore, viewers are drawn to visual pictures because they elicit emotional responses, especially when they portray violence, disfigured bodies, or war losses(Winkler and Dauber, 2014).

Through principles such as those governing photographic evidence, the law recognizes the importance and need for visual pictures. The legislation recognizes that photographs require further protection and monitoring. Visual propaganda is a harmful weapon for generating hostility and unjustified emotional responses in weak people, according to psychological and neurological studies. Furthermore, international compassion for Tamils has now become a benefit for these front organizations.

As a country with many ethnicities, it has made steps toward reconciliation by creating a commission proposed to international organizations by post-war rapporteurs. To promote peaceful cohabitation, the government should encourage all ethnic groups to conceive of Sri Lanka as one nation.

II.   DISCUSSION

A.   Disinformation

Disinformation is frequently defined in terms of intent, which is difficult to determine when it is created by an anonymous person. According to Jack (2017), disinformation is "information that is intentionally incorrect or misleading," whereas, for observers, the most difficult part of determining intent is differentiating a person expressing valid ideas from someone spreadingincorrect information on purpose.

B.   Radicalization

The term "radicalization" has been the attention of national security services. In academic circles all around the world, radicalization has become a controversial issue.There is little agreement on what radicalization is and howit should be understood and modelled as a result of the rising multidisciplinary academic interest in it (Schmid, 2013). The first is focused on identifying what defines radicalization

when it comes to radicalization's features. While it was often known as "what happens before the bomb goes off," more recent research has cast doubt on the claimed direct relationship between radicalization processes and violent terrorist behaviour, claiming that radicalization is more than just a forerunner to violent activities. The contrast between cognitive/attitudinal radicalization and behavioural radicalization has been regarded as the most important so far. This is a crucial distinction since an increasing number of scholars believe that radicalization is first and foremost a cognitive process(Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd, & Hasisi, 2019). They describe radicalization as "the social and psychological process of increasingly feeling devotion to extremist political or religious ideas." Although radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, it is one of several risk factors that must exist‖ (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 279).

As a result of the visual media, more opportunities for radicalization have developed. According to studies, the Visual Media on the internet acts as a catalyst for radicalization, breaking down traditional barriers. Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, by Gabriel Weimann, counts and analyzes the websites of terrorist organisations. In his research, Weimann notes the rise of extremist websites. According to him, virtually all terrorist groups had established an online presence by the end of 1999.

The internet's reach has broken down geographical barriers, bringing individuals from all over the world together in the virtual world. These sorts of internet resources, according to Ines von Behr, a senior analyst at RAND Europe, have increased the likelihood of instilling extreme ideas in individuals because of their attractive contents. As a result, Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt of the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division believe that radicalization on the internet isn't intrinsically different from what occurs in more private and less visible settings. In addition, the internet's Visual Media enhances the potential for self-radicalization.

C.   Visual Media and Cognitive Radicalization of the Youth

It is essential to explore the link between extremist visualsand cognitive radicalization. Furthermore, in the context of growing global terrorism, evidence exists to display that visual media plays a critical role in various parts of the radicalization process. Exposure to violent media is a major risk factor,

according to Wolfowicz et al (2019). The most pressing issue following a terrorist incident is when, where, and how the individual become radicalized. As soon as it becomes obvious that the perpetrators left substantial digital imprints on social media, government authorities, national security services, and the news media alike tend to assert a direct involvement of media and cyberspace in the perpetrator's radicalization process (Frissen, 2021). Young people are driven to extreme views to help them make sense of the world, hence age is also a key factor in radicalization (Frissen, 2021).According to political media expert Doris Graber, pure verbal analyses not only ignore the information contained in visuals and nonverbal sounds but also fail to understand verbal content accurately since it is altered by its conjunction with visual signals. Understanding how to assess visual images can assist individuals to avoid making erroneous or misleading assessments of the content of extremist/terrorist internet media campaigns.

Visual images not only capture the attention of viewers but also serve to widen the target demographic for media campaign messaging. Younger or illiterate audience members who lack the requisite reading skills to grasp textual material might be captivated by images. Understanding visual messaging strategies is essential for comprehending the full extent of what terrorist and other extremist groups are communicating online, especially because many of them target audiences in countries with large youth populations and high illiteracy rates.

A newly developed scholarly concept in the process of Radicalization is ‗Bedroom Radicals'. According to Ahmed and George (2016), if the youth did not have access to extremist materials on the internet, which are watched alone in protected settings like one's own bedroom, a seemingly normal individual would never have radicalized. A notable example of this situation is the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, who are accused of being responsible for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. According to Williams (2015), the brothers were ardent readers of Al Qaeda's publication "Inspire," which claimed to promote Jihadist propaganda which is alleged to have radicalized them. The brothers built their explosives entirely from instructions found in an Inspire article titled "How to Make a Bomb in Your Mom's Kitchen."

Moreover, Cognitive radicalization, as identified by Bandura (2004) and Weiman (2008), is not a technique reserved only for mentally ill or insane individuals, but also ordinary individuals (Jones, 2008). In that sense, it appears to be difficult to explain how a normal person may get radicalized and eventually engage in a somewhat shocking act if there is no allegation of insanity linked to the person (Frissen, 2021). However, Bandura (2004) examined the idea of moral disengagement, which has been proposed as a key psychological process with a connection to the problem at hand, to better understand the link in such settings. Conduct that injures, damage, or even kills other people is almost unanimously regarded as cruel and hence as a breach of these moral standards.When moral standards are violated, the self-regulatory mechanism steps in, either through self-sanctioning or self-justification processes (Frissen, 2021).

D. Radicalization and the Second Generation Tamil Diaspora

National Security concerns related to the Tamil Diaspora in line with the research on ―radicalization from outside‖ (Romanos, 2014), established the various means by which terrorist groups, their supporters can diffuse terrorist ideology, facilitate radicalization to violence, and recruit in Western nations often disseminated from diaspora communities.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion regarding whether immigrants and diaspora groups are more likely to sympathize with terrorist organizations and commit violence on their behalf (Thompson and Bucerius,2017). One of the most recent analyses of extremist organizations' visual propaganda efforts is Neville Bolt's The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries. Bolt examines radicals' use of "propaganda of the deed" (POTD), a term he coined to describe acts of violence orchestrated to generate media events for the aim of societal reform or revolution. According to him, terrorist organizations use images of assaults as a "means of creating memory through the fracture of time and the manipulation of the grievance narrative."

These concerns have grown in the aftermath of the CharlieHebdo, Paris, Belgium, and Orlando attacks, as well as an apparent increase in the number of 1.5, 2nd, and 3rd generation immigrants who become radicalized and self- proclaim as ‗Freedom Fighters' (Thompson and Bucerius,2017). As a result, Canadian diaspora groupsmay become radicalized in the pursuit of vengeance or justice for homeland-related disputes (Thompson and Bucerius, 2017). As

Silke (2008) points out, -It has long been recognized that for most terrorists a key motivation for joining a terrorist organization ultimately revolves around a desire for revenge.‖ The discussion findings of Thompson and Bucerius's (2017) study, which included 50 participants from the Second Generation Tamil Diaspora, corroborate this aspect. Even the most problematic practices used by the LTTE during the conflict, such as forcefully enlisting children as soldiers and using civilians as shields during the hostilities, were justified by all survey participants using the notion that "all is fair in love and war," according to the findings.

The Tamil diaspora, as well as the political venues for second-generation involvement, are expanding across Europe. The majority of the Tamil Diaspora's second generation is composed of Tamil youth between the ages of 18 and 30. Second Generation Diaspora was either bornin Europe or had arrived in the 1990s as children under ten. (McDowell, 1996). Young males of 16–25 have been identified as one of the most vulnerable age groups for violent radicalization (1999, Hudson). Many of the young Tamil Canadians who took part in the May 2009 demonstrations and subsequent community activities are

1.5 or 2nd generation immigrants who have never visited or have not been to Sri Lanka in years.

The fast growing second-generation movement dedicated to achieving Tamil Eelam is fuelled by two factors (1) Despite a perceived lack of interest from their "new homes" in Europe, this generation's dual perceptions of belonging, both to European Communities and to the Tamil "race," and (2) how a specific politics of affect altered second-generation identities, combined to makethem want to embrace their Tamil "roots" and get involved in politics (Hess and Koff, 2014). As a result, these second-generation activists focused their efforts on engaging with their host community and taking international action (Hess and Koff, 2014) which resulted in the emergence of a new form of Tamil activism in Europe, one that is strongly rooted in and linked to the host nation.

In the past few years, the use of Visual Media in propagating the Radicalised agendas of the second generation of Tamil Diaspora has been on the rise. It is commonly noticed that different types of LTTE visualmedia are proactively sought and consumed by the second generation Tamils in Europe such as different platforms ofSocial Media, News Papers, and

Television etc. across Europe. For example, Issue of 30 Minuten, a visual media (newspaper) dedicated to the promotion of the Tamil Diaspora Propaganda, marked the entry of the second generation in European Tamil diaspora politics (Hess and Korf, 2014). While supporting a separate state of Tamil Eelam, the generation thrived on the introduction of new methods of mobilization and avenues of communication to disseminate radicalised ideologies into the communities worldwide (Hess and Koff, 2014). This method of Visual Media Radicalization by LTTE second generation is often utilised as a means of gaining a sympathizing eye forcarrying out violent political propaganda (Hess and Koff, 2014). The use of Visual Media as a technique of radicalization is motivated by several factors. To begin with, it aims to strengthen a sense of diaspora among other sectors of young and well-educated Tamils who are struggling to establish how to effectively represent the Tamil component of their identity. It invites future generations of Tamils to rearticulate their Tamil ancestors.Secondly, the goal is to depict the Sri Lankan army as a perpetrator of grave human rights breaches to the world community. Thirdly, to keep an eye on the prospect of forming a separate Tamil Eelam state. (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010). Hence, Members of the second generation are more prepared for diaspora activities than those of the first due to their language skills, high education, and trust in the European environment. Because they were poorly educated and had a low socioeconomic position in various European nations, the first generation's involvement was largely restricted to providing financial and political aid tothe LTTE.

E. Tamil Diaspora's Visual Media Strategies for Radicalization

Films, documentaries, and social media posts have all helped to raise awareness of sympathizers' and the global community's breaking point. Children, the elderly, and the impoverished are among the techniques employed. Persuasion is an important part of media and social media communication. It is most often done out through disseminating false information and postings that reveal their true intentions. It is indeed possible to persuade people by argument, entreaty, or example. It is obvious that disseminating false information leads to persuasion and, as a result, popularity. Psycho Visualization, or the ability to construct mental images to help focus one's attention on a goal, is easily achieved by articles andphotos that provide little information but

have internal context, allowing the individual to deduce a lot.

The Tamil Diaspora is responsible for the creation of the Tamil Television Network, a television network broadcasting in Europe, Sri Lanka, and South India. Even though the TTN has been outlawed by the French government, alternative stations such as GTV and Madhuram have been established. The LTTE used theDeepam television network as a means of generating funds. Their primary goal was to disseminate their harsh propaganda. Furthermore, the usage of voice cuts and retweeting instil in the viewer's mind, which is aided by repetition. Repetition, or watching the films over and again, reinforces actions and improves memory. A prerequisite in controlling behaviour is the capacity to remember directly prior needs. One of the first things that are noticeable among the LTTE videos is the undeniable quality in which they are shot, edited, and produced. Each video begins with a display of the LTTE Media Center's dynamic logo animation, suggesting a certain level of professionalism and legitimacy. The editors of the videos have a keen understanding of what makes for effective, engaging, and emotionally manipulative media, borrowing many stylistic cues from documentaries and music videos. These channels were installed for well-thought reasons by the pro-LTTE diaspora and Nediyawan(Perera, 2016). Nediyawan has established a slew of overseas Tamil television networks to continue the aggressive propaganda in Europe and internationally (Ministry of Defence Sri Lanka, 2015). This group supports the idea of a separate state for Tamils rather than the concept of identifying as Sri Lankans (Perera, 2016).

The whole issue of 30 Minuten, German Magazine was devoted to the radicalization of the Tamil Diaspora's incoming younger generation. This newspaper, like any other, had reporting, interviews, and commentary. It also transmitted a particular type of Tamil political discourse created by LTTE propaganda to the more experienced reader. The video films broadcasted are most likely intended to appeal to a younger audience by expressing pride. To boost viewers' pride in terrorist groups, graphic films of terrorist organizations executing terrible acts of violence are broadcast. In LTTE films, displays of violence were frequently utilized to emphasize the operations of the Sri Lankan security forces during the conflict. Photos and pictures of wounded, injured, anddying children are mixed with shots of "enemy" leaders in Blood for Blood. Military and political

officials are blamed for the violence, with the suggestion that their actions are to blame. "Our children were killed, and our sisters were mercilessly raped and butchered," the narratoradds as horrible images of young corpses fly across the screen. The LTTE utilized threats to intimidate its opponents. By repeatedly threatening and insulting their militarily superior enemies, LTTE cader members are shown to be consistently brave and unafraid. Many of the films featured threats with various degrees of precision and intent.

The radicalization of visual media was also apparent on social media sites. Whenever there was a demonstration inJaffna, social media was inundated with images of people wearing masks and black headbands, as well as praise for the demonstrators' bravery, unity, and solidarity. Similarly, there was an inflow of songs praising the protestors on the music streaming platformSpotify. Throughout the digital commotion, posts using the hashtags #tamileelam and #eelam were shared to raise awareness about the demonstration and, more broadly, about the Tamils' right to self-determination. However, Instagram abruptly prohibited these hashtags, and individuals representing the diaspora were confronted with a message from Instagram that stated, "Your post violates our community rules." Second Generation also went to Twitter to urge sites to lift the hashtag restriction, with one user asking, "Is #TamilEeelam tag not permitted on social media?" (Kannan, 2021). Projecting immediacy on Twitter by sharing many tweets and a sense of being present is required for "focus of attention. It is important to portray immediacy on Twitter by publishing a big number of tweets and a sensation of being there to achieve "focus of attention" which is what the Tamil Diaspora has been continuously doing.

Furthermore, an Instagram campaign with the tagline "I am a Tamil and the genocide is a part of my identity" was recently launched. In response to that, the Tamil Diaspora started the viral "I am Tamil" campaign, which received hundreds of messages from across the world and increasedawareness of the genocide, as well as supporting Bill 104, which would allow for a Tamil Genocide Education Week. -Tired of seeing the -paradise island‖ when you click on the #SriLanka hashtag?‖ said Pirathanya A in the original post description. Diaspora Tamils shared a selfie with the statement "I am Tamil, and genocide is a part of my identity," along with remarks addressing various elements of Tamil identity and

genocide. Hundreds of posts were created as a consequence of this campaign, as well as shares and re-shares on other platforms. Sri Lanka's envoy to Germany, Unambuwe, spoke on behalf of the Foreign Ministry, saying, "These things must be constantly monitored and opposed." You need a cyber-counter-terrorism task force to keep an eye on these efforts in Europe‖.

The use of media by these front groups indicates that they are aware of basic psychological concepts. These psychological concepts, which have been changed andapplied to pictures, graphics, and music via technology, have an impact on perception, which in turn has an impacton behaviour. Each theory is complex, needs in-depth examination, and is a continuing research subject.

F. Duty of foreign legislatures in adhering to the international laws in countering radicalization.

The Human Rights Committee explains the concerns as follows: -There is a pattern in international law which emphasizes the mutuality between freedom of expression and protection against hate speech. Recent documents such as the Human Rights Committee General Comment and the Rabat Plan of Action have repeatedly done this. The latter gives an overview: Under international human rights standards, which are to guide legislation at the national level, expression labelled as —hate speech‖ can be restricted under articles 18 and 19 of the ICCPR on different grounds, including respect for the rights of others, public order, or even sometimes national security. States are also obliged to -prohibit‖ expression that amounts to -incitement‖ to discrimination, hostility or violence (under article 20.2 of the ICCPR and, under some different conditions, also under article 4 of the ICERD‖. Moreover, The Johannesburg Principles On National Security, Freedom Of Expression And Access To Information Principles are based on international and regional law and standards relating to the protection of human rights, evolving state practise, and the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. These Principles acknowledge the enduring applicability of the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms In a State of Emergency. As a preliminary comment, it should be notedthat no explicit and consensual definition of -radicalizing content‖ (or -radicalization‖) can be

found in existing international legal instruments despite the significant number of such instruments dealing with terrorism and other related concepts and despite various resolutions and extensive literature on the subject. Notwithstanding this lack of definition, the term is employed not only in treaties but also in domestic laws for instance in Labor Law and Penal Law. The Terrorism Act of 2006 of the United Kingdom, Section 2 makes it a criminal offence to encourage terrorism (as defined in the Terrorism Act of 2000) by directly or indirectly inciting or encouraging others to commit acts of terrorism. This includes an offence of "glorification" of terror - people who "praise or celebrate" terrorism in a way that may encourage others to commit a terrorist act. The government's definition of

-radicalization‖ as applied in the Prevent Strategy reads:

-radicalization is the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.‖

Under Section 130 of the German Criminal Code, criminal liability occurs where the offender, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origins, against segments of the population or individuals because they belong to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them. This includes publishing radicalization content on the internet (—Volksverhetzung‖). If the person publishing the content uses propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations this may, in addition, constitute an offence under Section 86 or Section 86a (Using symbols of unconstitutional organizations) of the Criminal Code. Other provisions of the Criminal Code relevant for the prosecution of hate speech are Section 185 and Section 111 (Public incitement to crime) under which anyone who publicly, in a meeting or through the dissemination of written materials (including audio-visual media) incitesthe commission of an unlawful act, shall be held liable as an abettor to that act; Section 130a (Attempting to cause the commission of offences using publication) under which anyone who disseminates, publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes accessible written material (including audio-visual media) capable of serving as an instruction for certain severe unlawful acts and intendedby its content to encourage or cause others to commit one

of those acts, shall be liable. The same applies to anyone who disseminates or makes publicly available suchmaterial to encourage or cause others to commit such an act; Section 140 (Rewarding and approving of offences) under which anyone who 1. rewards or 2. publicly, in a meeting or through the dissemination of written materials (including audio-visual media), and in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace, approves of one of the certain severe unlawful acts after it has been committed or attempted, shall be liable; Section 241 para 1 (Threatening the commission of a felony) under which anyone who threatens a person with the commission of a felony against him or a person close to him shall be liable.

Sri Lanka's press authorities follow the Code of Professional Practice (Code of Ethics) of The Editors along with Johannesburg principles. In terms of countering terrorism Prevention of terrorism act is effective to bring perpetrators to justice by enforcing domestically and extraterritorially.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The foreign ministry and the ministry of justice must collaborate with intelligence agencies and think tanks to combat propaganda that relies heavily on graphical and visual effects to radicalize people and spread disinformation throughout the world, attempting to pass off false news as real news. If the manipulation of the world public and international organizations, as well asthe radicalization of Tamil people, is successful, it will result in much more negative consequences. As a result, proactive propaganda detection, corporations with extraterritorial jurisdictions in countering fake news and other interpretative contextual visuals, exerting force on regulating universal jurisdiction in bringing purported to justice, and preventing information warfare that will destroy countries' economies must all be instigated, as the Eelam movement is currently advocating globally.

IV. CONCLUSION

Given the differences in definitions, cultural traditions andregulatory approaches to "radicalizing content" clashes over jurisdiction are bound to increase as a consequenceof the growing impact of the use of Visual Media radicalization. The paper directs to Many reasons to explain why the Tamil Diaspora turn to the use of Visual Media for Radicalization propaganda. Terrorist groups and the Diaspora in Europe alike find the Visual Medium to be a relatively convenient and effective means of

delivery for their communications. The paper concludes the direct existence of the nexus between terrorist visuals and cognitive radicalization. this cognitive Radicalizationpropaganda of the European Tamil Diaspora has mainly targeted the incoming Second generation of Tamil youth between the age groups of 18-30. Furthermore, it has beenestablished that in the global context, evidence exists to display that visual media plays a critical role in various parts of the radicalization process. The government must resist the Tamil diaspora's cyber and propaganda operations. Information and cyber-security are a must-have for all countries in today's networking environment. The government must undertake a campaign to capture thehearts and minds of Tamils since Sri Lanka is politically divided along ethnic lines. Even though most individuals recognize the importance of addressing racial, ethnic, and religious differences, the government must continue toengage with extremist organizations of all ethnicities to avert violence and restore peace to the country.

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Effects of Digital Technologies on Health Service Delivery and Quality Management in Sri Lankan Health Care Systems

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Abstract- Quality of health service in accordance with professional standards and client expectations is important and the first step for it is a quality improvement in existing health service. The main purpose of this study was to get an idea about the quality healthcare attributes and its effectiveness with regards to the traditional systems in health care in Sri Lanka. Further, discuss and analyse the quality attributes of digital health systems in Sri Lanka. Higher healthcare quality results in satisfaction for the clients specially patients, community other stakeholders like health sector employees, health suppliers, and better performance for the health-related organisations. During the Covid-19 global pandemic situation, the usability of digital health facilities increased as a spike to overcome the problem of reaching doctors physically. If the quality of healthcare services improves, costs decrease, productivity increases and better service would be available for clients, which in turn enhances organisational performance and provides long-term working relationships for employees and suppliers. This study was carried out through the administration of a questionnaire addressed to 385 walk-in patients in Sri Lanka during the time period of 15th January 2021 to 15th February 2021. Data were analysed using the descriptive statistical method. The findings replicate positive feedbacks to engage with new digital platforms in the global pandemic situation. Moreover, the findings above affirm the lack of reaching the digital infrastructure, insufficient skills and technical knowledge in dealing with e digital innovations as well as new applications, it is impossible to successfully adopt digital health resources in health care delivery in order to improve the effectiveness and quality of the existing system.

Keywords— digital health systems, quality, effectiveness

I. INTRODUCTION

Quality, because of its subjective nature and intangible characteristics, is difficult to define. (De Messenger, J., et al ,2008). Healthcare service quality is even more difficult to describe and measure than in other sectors. The increase of the usage of digital platforms particularly during global pandemic time redirect Sri Lankans to get adopt digital platforms among general practitioners is to get contact to the health services for the citizens in real time. Digital platforms like mobile, web applications, online meetings with doctors have a better-quality level of patient's satisfaction, quality of life, safety and an outcome like the effectiveness of services.

The complex nature of healthcare practices, the presence of many contributors with different interests in healthcare delivery and ethical considerations add to the difficulty of improving the quality of existing healthcare applications (Miller, A.C., 2006). The development of web or mobile based health systems benefits and report medical experts in both developing and advanced countries with innovative levels. Undoubtedly, digital health platforms contributed to improve the quality of every sector in human life. The improved usage of digital and cloud-based resources in organizations has supported to improve the information level of the patients Goel, S. (2014).

Nowadays, Patients have the unintended of ability to the visual view of the health status by using computers and smart devices. The decrease of medical and health related errors influences on holistically improving the quality of healthcare products and patients' wellbeing. Other structures engaged with of quality attributes of health sectors are effectiveness, affordability and rapid development of existing health systems. They are fundamental attributes in guaranteeing national's welfare and improvement of a country as well. These

better-quality productivities, possibility to result in enhanced health care employee morale and continuous maintenance. Evidence proposes that e-health tools use with modern technology have a positive effect on users and their health (Rodrigues, J. 2014). Thus, users of digital web applications are more tending to structured and improved supportive abilities, and with machine learning behavioural analysis outcomes, as compared to the traditional way of procedures in the same health facility.

Health care stakeholders, medical professionals face challenges by lack of knowledge and utilization of digital platforms in day to day activities in conducting automotive approach. This is due to several factors such as not being integrated with IT related fields and industries due to lack of knowledge expertise in both medical and IT fields such as medical business analytics, Bioinformatic specialists, medical system developers and medical quality assurances engineers.

A.   Scope and Significance of the Study

The recent increasing burden of health care specially during the ongoing Covid 19 pandemic situation cost has been regarded as the primary contemporary issue affecting the health care industry in every nation of the world. According to the world health organization, the healthcare sectors and hospitals that using systematic cloud or data centre-based applications in fully automotive health systems have been able to reduce organizational operational cost and other costs associated with traditional methods.

As of the world bank reports, in 2019 Sri Lanka provide 100% access or facilitate to electricity. Without an electricity facility, it is impossible to successfully adopt digital and e-resource strategies. Another factor to improve the quality of health care e systems is the reliable internet facilities and connections. Therefore, besides the electricity rural areas should improve by the connectivity to central health systems with internet connections. In addition, electricity and internet facilities can enhance social connectivity, social awareness through the shared experiences of SMS alerts, television broadcasting, use of popular digital social applications. Therefore, digital devices play a major role in the quality of health care systems worldwide. According to the digital data report 2019, Sri Lanka has 31.80 million mobile phone usage, which indicates a good number to increase the adaptability of health care applications among them.

Digital infrastructure relevantly touches the adoption basic of health care applications such as basic knowledge of e-channelling, basic video conference knowledge, hands on experience with the report, document sharing and monitoring make the task of adoption into e-health facilities fast and more effective with the general public. The basic adoption got increased rapidly due to the ongoing global pandemic situation which led the authorities to improve the quality of the services day by day. Therefore, the scope of this study is to identify the effects of Digital Technologies on health service delivery in existing systems and areas to be improved in the quality management in Sri Lankan Health Care Systems (Greenwood, D., Khajeh-Hosseini, A., Smith, J., Sommerville, I., 2010).

B.   Research Problem

Is there any effect on digital health services and quality management in Sri Lankan Health care systems? This research contributes significantly to the understanding of the gaps in the existing digital health systems to deliver effective health care to the people of Sri Lanka where had rapid growth during the pandemic situation and new normal trends. During Covid 19 situation online health care facilities had revolutionary and remarkable growth compared to the last decade. With these changes, the quality of systems and infrastructures had raise problems to be addressed in a systematic way. This research will help to facilitate innovative patient, doctors' other stakeholders' rapport and conversely lead to better care outcomes and communications among them.

C.   Research Question

1) What is the existing knowledge about the digital health facilities of Sri Lankan people?

2) How effective, efficient and usefulness of the digital health facilities?

3) factors to be improved to sustain the quality of digital applications and the digital services?

D.   Research Objective

The use of digital platforms in healthcare is growing rapidly within Sri Lanka. The aim of this study is an evaluation of the present digital platform usage and knowledge, the potential of modern web or mobile applications for health reasons, and quality management aspects regarding the use of digital health applications to improve the usability of digital applications in health care systems.

E. Limitations

This research was conducted to capture digital health infrastructure and its quality. Therefore, the data was collected from stakeholders in government hospitals only. No private hospitals were conducted for the research. Data was collected based on the available platforms and mainly focused on their quality usability and stakeholder's IT knowledge and no economic factors such as household income, savings, other incomes, monthly expenditures were considered in this research.

F. Ethical Considerations

The personal data of the participants was not recorded in the research. Hence the reference code for each participant is generated during data recording. Further the questioner is designed to extract only relevant information required by the conceptual framework and operationalisation of the study.

II. METHODOLOGY

This descriptive quantitative based & Explanatory research design was carried out through the administration of a questionnaire addressed to 385 walk-in participants in the Out-Patient Department (OPD), Inpatient(ward) Services, Surgery, Maternal services, Clinical and Specialist sections like Skin Services, Scan department, Gynaecology, department X-ray and, Public Health Services of a selected government and private hospitals in Sri Lanka.


Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
Source: Authors

The research approach is purely quantitative with a questionnaire survey method. The questionnaire

was composed of main four parts further describes in Figure 2 of the conceptual framework.

- Sociodemographic data.

- The present use of digital platforms/application systems in everyday life and for health reasons.

- Estimated potential of eHealth for cross sectoral online patient-physician communication.

Explanatory research design is about when the researcher identifies the relationship, or the linkage of identified variables below.

- Existing computer literacy

- Existing Internet & devices

- Availability of digital health application

- Usage of e-health applications

- Time & Reliability for the responses

In this case, researcher has identified a clear correlation between each variable under digital health and traditional health. Therefore, the conceptual framework is designed to identify the relationship between dependent and independent variables.

A. Formulation of research hypotheses

1) H1a: Digital e-health applications positively impact health care systems in Sri Lanka.

2) H1o: Digital e-health applications do not positively impact health care systems in Sri Lanka.

B. Sample Population

The population for the proposed study was selected by government and private hospitals distributed in nine provinces including Western Province, Central Province, Southern Province, Uva Province, Sabaragamuwa Province, North Western Province, North Central Province, Northern Province and Eastern Province.

385 participants were randomly selected from major hospital departments as mentioned from major units, including Out-Patient Department (OPD), Inpatient(ward) Services, Surgery, Maternal services, Clinical and Specialist Services, Skin etc. However, to have a reliable and manageable size, the sample size of 385 Based on a priori power analysis by G*Power, using the parameters of Confidence Level in 95% Confidence Interval 5% Population consider as a number of adults in Sri Lanka 17600372 according to world bank reports.

C.   Data collection and Time Frame

Data collection was done via the questionnaire from 15th January 2021 to 15th February 2021 that was designed to capture useful characteristics with open ended and some closed ended questions sketched in the questionnaire used to collect and analyse data for the study.

The designed questionnaires were divided into four main sections where section A confined questions which related to sociodemographic data that the public details of stakeholders such as background data of the random respondents. In section B contained the research objectives related to questions of the study like present use of digital systems in everyday life for health care and section C about the estimated potential of eHealth for cross sectoral online patient-physician communication. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS software (IBM Corp., USA).

D.   Data Processing
The main tool for the data collection was the structured questionnaires. The close ended positive questions were designed with five-point Likert scale in order to examine how strongly factors are agreed or disagreed according to Sekaran and Bougie (2013). The data collected by translated Sinhala questionnaire was distributed among the selected sample of weapon training instructors. The collected primary data were initially processed manually by using a simple random sample method. That process included the data coding, classification, numbering and editing of the total solution. Then a master worksheet was prepared using SPSS 21. Table 3.1 contains the weighted value distributed among survey questions.

III. RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive data analysis conduct to identify the user's idea about the digital based health care applications use in Sri Lanka. Correlation analysis was conducted to identify the variables in this study. The researcher has identified traditional health care facilities and e-health facilities practices under five variable dimensions in the form of health care stakeholders.


Figure 2. Gender
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Figure 3. Age Distribution
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

There 52% random participants were female and 48% were males from a total of 385 total participants indicate in the Figure 2 and the majority was female participants.

Age distribution was spared from 18 to 25, 25 to 35, 35 to 45, 45 to 55 & 55 above results as the Figure 3. The majority were between the age of 25 to 35 age group. Sri Lanka as having more affordable telecommunication facilities compared to the south Asian countries.


Figure 4. Internet Facilities with Smart Mobile Device
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Usage of Digital media for health information

Figure 5. Usage of Digital Media for Health
Information
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Willingness to use digital media for health Information

Figure 7. Willingness to Use Digital Media for
Health Information

Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Among those 385 random participants, 78% of participants had at least a smartphone with internet facilities in Sri Lanka as indicated in Figure 4.

Among those 385 participants, 53% of participants use digital media for health-related activities. Therefore, they use internet facilities or any digital media for their day to day health care applications such as booking a doctor via online appointment, reading and watching videos related to health care systems, accessing medical reports via online platforms, using video conferences for getting pieces of advice and communication with doctors and medical staff describes according to the Figure 5.

Among the participants, 57% of the majority have the willingness to use digital based information systems instead of traditional health care systems for their health-related activities describes in the Figure 7.

This indicates people have the willingness to learn new platforms, discover the fast-reliable accessibility to medical staff for quick advice, reduce the time duration getting for waiting for inspection of the medical party in traditional ways by using digital health care systems according to Figure 7. Most of them have a positive impact of learn about new digital platforms and use them for their medical related activities.

**Digital Application Usage for Healthcare**

Figure 6. Digital Application Usage for Healthcare
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Therefore, 51% have installed specific digital applications in their smart device or laptop installed for day to day health care related systems as mentioned in the Figure 6. These applications were developed by some service provides from private hospitals, network facility providers and maybe from third party software companies with the ability to give single sign on facilities to interconnect with hospitals and stakeholders.

**Satisfaction level of Share reports via digtal media**

Figure 8. Satisfaction Level of Share Reports via
Digital Media
Source: Advanced Excel – Authors

According to Figure 8, the Majority of participants agree with the method of share medical laboratory reports, Xray's, ECG, scans, mammography reports via online method. Therefore, they don't want to wait until the report's release from laboratories and collect them manually. They can access their personal medical account from anywhere when the hospital system release or upload relevant reports to relevant accounts or for their personal emails. This is a well known facility using by most of the private hospitals in Sri Lanka meantime.


Figure 9. Experience in Accessing Digital health facility
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

Among the 385 participants, 80% of the majority has accessed digital health facility from private hospitals, 17% from government hospitals and 3% never had these facilities experienced in their life. These results indicate there should be rapid development in the government health care system to engage with information technology and digital media to develop e health care system for direct engagement with the local public in Sri Lanka for the effectiveness and efficiency of the local public indicate in the Figure 9.


Figure 10. Satisfaction about Existing E-Health Services
Source: Advanced Excel - Authors

There is a majority of unsatisfaction among the local public about the existing e health services in Sri Lanka as describes in the Figure 10. Among the participants, there were only 85 participants agree with the existing e-health services and only 30 people had strong satisfactory level about health service.

Pearson correlation was considered in the analysis of correlation under this section. The following table shows the correlation digital health facilities with the improvement of the existing health care system in Sri Lanka that indicate the results in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Meta-synthesis analysis – Theorizations.

Correlations			
(a)		(b)	(c)
		Simulator training is effective	Supplement to get practical experience and interesting
Usage of Digital platforms for health care systems	Pearson Correlation	1	.463**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0
	N	385	385
Improving the quality & effectiveness of health care systems	Pearson Correlation	.463**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	
	N	385	385
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

Source: SPSS - Authors

As per the following correlation, the output shows that there was a negative correlation between usage of digital platforms for health care systems with the Improving the quality & effectiveness of health care systems have not affected the existing traditional health care system.

Therefore, the researcher has identified Usage of Digital platforms do not affect the existing traditional health care system per the survey results in this time period. Correlation output shows that there was a negative correlation between Digital platforms for health care systems and Improving the quality & effectiveness of health care systems. Therefore, the researcher can come to the conclusion that existing digital platforms are effective than traditional health care systems and the null hypotheses getting rejected and the H1a hypotheses getting prove as Digital e-health applications positively impact health care systems in Sri Lanka On the other improve the digital practical experience in e-health and interesting of giving knowledge were positively

correlated with the effectiveness of existing health care system in Sri Lanka.

IV. DISCUSSION

The research goal is to evaluate and understand the existing digital health facilities in Sri Lanka and get an idea about the public satisfaction and ideas to improve healthcare distribution in future. This study supposes practical to evaluate the overall impact and power of digital systems related to health facility delivery. The future benefits and facilities that estimates to achieve in Sri Lanka. The improvements of the current Sri Lankan hospital systems as an entity or department could be gain attributed to several renovations and combined with digital makeovers.

The research results and findings indicate the significant influence of the current Sri Lankan health system. From that results included workload reduction among healthcare stakeholders, decrease time consuming or waiting time of patience, minimized errors or bugs which engaged with the paper-based manual or traditional records-keeping system. Further researchers recognised that clients time searching for misplaced stakeholders, client records and files and folders amount decreased because of the unique repository location in cloud or data centre offered by the digital health system. The implemented digital health system provides up-to-date transparent records keeping facilities to the public. The healthcare delivery can be improved by the idea of centralizing common cloud location or data centre for hospital records to exchange medical data within local hospitals with help of central repository access.

V. CONCLUSION

Therefore, conclusions related to digital health care systems should be designed cautiously considered for large scale migration and rapid adoption of the change in Sri Lanka. From the mentioned findings above, the study indicates recommends the following:

- Software applications should be developing more user-friendly to use by all ages/ different educational backgrounds of public people in Sri Lanka.

- The Software systems should integrate value added functions like video conferencing automated reports, patient SMS alerts and prompts.

- Explore alternative facilities like training and awareness to learn more about using the health applications.

- Ministry of Health articulates relevant policies to provide the structures for implementation in health care institutions in Sri Lanka.

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Pragmatic Response for Maritime-Air Security, a Way Forward: A Conceptual Framework from a Strategic Aerial Perspective

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Abstract– The underlying concept of airpower is an ability of a nation to achieve its objectives and secure its interests through the means of air and associated capabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a weak economy thus making Sri Lanka vulnerable to different security and sustainable development challenges. This situation will continue until the world is completely recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sri Lanka has a greater blue economic potential considering its huge oceanic resources compared to the land area which is yet to be exploited. In new normal conditions, the exploitation of natural treasure inherited in our seas would be a great benefit for the developing economy of the Island nation. Already the geostrategic advantage and marine resources of Sri Lanka are being utilized by various state and non-state actors in the region and extra-region. Hence the development of maritime security structure through an integrated system comprising all aerial and maritime stakeholders would be of utmost importance in future exploitation of these sea frontiers whilst ensuring national security. Hence as a remedy smart, stretched re-fleeting of assets, formulation of the conceptual maritime-air command structure, and conduct of joint training was recommended to address maritime security challenges Sri Lanka is facing at present in order to conduct effective and efficient maritime-air operations in the future.

Key words— Airpower, Maritime-air operations, National security

I. INTRODUCTION

The underlying concept of airpower is an ability of a nation to achieve its objectives and secure its interests through the means of air and associated capabilities. Based on this philosophy use of airpower has expanded across many disciplines apart from the primary war waging capability.

"Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven seas in twenty first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters."

-Admiral Alfred Thyer Mahan-

Maritime territory of Sri Lanka, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) expands up to 200 Nautical Miles (nm) from the base line as of now. Proposals are made to claim further under the special provision in United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS,1982) which will result approximately 1,713,426 km^2 which is equal to approximately 26 times of the land mass of the Island.


Figure 1. Extent of present EEZ and proposed claim

Source: Blue Economy: Prospects and Challenges for Sri Lanka BCIS Signature Seminar-2017

Sri Lanka is an Island nation located in a geo-strategically vital place plenteously surrounded by variety of natural marine resources. We are yet to unleash our true maritime potentials in order to draw the benefits out of it. The geo- strategic advantage to become a maritime hub has been exploited by non-state actors for criminal purposes and state actors to play their political ballgame.

An Inductive approach was followed to find means to the observed gap. During the exploratory qualitative study researchers have followed interpretivism as the philosophy whilst encompassing grounded theory strategy as the strategy. Cross sectional time horizon was employed as the time horizon and collection of primary data was conducted mainly through interviewing professional respondents from maritime and aerial operators from Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), Sri Lanka Coast Guards (SLCG) and Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). Secondary data was collected through publications by SLAF and SLN regional / global counterparts. Data collection and analysis has been the technique.

II. AIM

Aim of this paper is to discuss a pragmatic response for establishing maritime-air security through amalgamation of responsive elements and to propose recommendations to formulate a conceptual framework for an integrated maritime-air command structure.

III. MARITIME-AIR OPERATIONS

Scope of this paper is limited for the maritime-air operations categorically Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Search and Rescue (SAR). Security of the maritime region is assured by being vigilant through effective ISR while safety of the region could be assured by better preparedness for SAR.

A. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Intelligence: Intelligence is information along with applied judgement for a desired elucidation in order to produce a possible proposition and for initiating an appropriate response. Intelligence is an important component of national power and a fundamental element in decision making.

Surveillance: Surveillance is systematic, repetitive gathering of information by photographic, radar, infra red, electronic, acoustic or visual means. Information gained from surveillance would normally be used for strategic decision making.

Reconnaissance (Recce): Recce is observation of specific targets, interests and areas by visual/photo observation or other detection methods to gain information about specific activities or resources.

ISR play a vital role both in conflict situation and peacetime. Sri Lanka has a land area approximately 65,600km². Further, has a territorial sea of 12 nm from the shore, a Contiguous Zone of 24 nm from the shore and EEZ of 200 nm from the base line. National interest includes to ensure that these areas are not exploited by external parties and that the treasures that are held within are preserved for the benefit of the nation. This requires constant vigilance, periodic and routine surveillance as well as recce deliberately planned in achieving defined objectives.

Strategic and tactical aerospace surveillance and recce operations over Sri Lankan territory is one of SLAF core competencies. This is a task that the SLAF is geared to meet and fulfils with pride and commitment (SLAF, 2021). SLAF has a dedicated maritime squadron for this particular task which was established way back in 1971 and had to be discontinued in 1993 due to various operational constrains. After eradication of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) terrorism the requirement of maritime surveillance and recce operations has transformed to monitor and counter criminal maritime activities.

These activities have direct and indirect as well as short-term and long-term consequences on security, safety, economy and image of the country. Sri Lanka is becoming a maritime nation with the exploitation of its maritime frontiers gradually. Blue economic potential of the country has been highlighted in many academic and economic forums in recent past. Different terms such as blue economy, blue growth, and the ocean economy defines the overall concept of conservation and sustainable management of oceans through sustainable ocean and ocean resource use (Kumara, 2017).

Figure 2. Areas of use under Blue Economy

Source: Blue Economy: Prospects and Challenges for Sri Lanka BCIS Signature Seminar-2017

For such a journey, illegal maritime activities can exert negative impact which would slow down or cripple down the development process. The non-state actors engaged in these illegal ventures becomes powerful where they can influence the governing mechanisms in their favor. Columbia, Mexico, Somalia are examples where illegal non-state actors have a greater influence upon the governing mechanisms. Hence these illegal activities must be contained and mitigate as much as possible to avert the negative consequences upon the state.

Most prominent illegal activities occurring in Sri Lankan seas are as follows which this paper intend to discuss.

- Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing

- Illegal trafficking

- Piracy armed robbery and maritime terrorism on commercial shipping

- Maritime pollution

1)   Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing: IUU fishing brings both short term and long-term consequences for a state concerned. IUU fishing undermines state efforts of conservating and managing fish stocks hindering the progress towards meeting long-term sustainability and responsibility. IUU fishing targets vulnerable stocks, threatens marine biodiversity, food security of the relevant communities and livelihoods of those involved in the sector. Fishermen from neighboring countries approaches at night specially towards Manner basin of Sri Lanka. IUU fishing remains one of the greatest threats to marine ecosystems due to its ability to undermine national and regional efforts to manage fisheries sustainably as well as endeavors to conserve marine management regimes, in particular those of developing countries lacking the capacity and resources for effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) (UN, 2021).

Sufficient resources are not employed to enforce an effective and efficient mechanism by the authorities to control IUU fishing across International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). SLAF and SLN have key roles to play resolving this issue.


Figure 3: Statistics of IUU fishing apprehensions
Source: <https://www.navy.lk/sea-ops.html>

Figure 4. Illegal Indian fishermen/poachers crossing IMBL at night at Mannar basin

Source: Classified

2)   Illegal trafficking: Geo-strategic advantage of Sri Lanka is optimized by the traffickers in the region and across the globe. Sri Lanka has become a transit hub mainly for drugs, weapon and human traffickers.

"Sri Lanka is a transit point for mass scale drug dealers"

-Sagala Rathnayake (Minister Law and order 2017)-

Figure 5. Use of Sri Lanka as a Drug transit hub
Source: National Dangerous Drugs and Devices Board

Sri Lanka can no longer be considered a soft transit point for narcotics given the recorded number of drug detectionsin the past few years.


Figure 6. Seizure of drugs from 2011-2020 by SLN
Source: <https://www.navy.lk/sea-ops.html>

Statistics related to seizer of illicit drugs showcases that effort made by all law enforcement agencies is not sufficient to have a meaningful impact since almost all drugseizures are trending to increase.

Apart from the drugs, trafficking of weapons and humans also takes place in the region. Greater mobility both within and outside national borders has historically become the norm rather than the exception, so the development of people-smuggling networks in places such as Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka is hardly a new phenomenon (Hugo & Dissanayake, 2014); (Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012); (UNDOC, 2015).

Today, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, together with other acts such as drug trafficking, trafficking of firearms and money laundering, are regarded as "transnational organized crimes". The threat to human society from such organized crime is considered to be so serious that it led to the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,

on 15th November 2000, in Palermo, Italy (Hamza, n.d.).

Figure 7. Reported Human smuggling and Illegal immigration2020
Source: <https://www.navy.lk/sea-ops.html>

Lack of resources employed and insufficient capacity of law enforcement agencies indicates the process needs more sophisticated, rapid and effective respond to mitigate the issue. A holistic approach with an integrated system is needed to effectively capitalize the available resources for the requirement.

3)   Piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism oncommercial shipping: Piracy and armed robbery in Gulf ofEden and towards Bay of Bengal has been a serious issue on commercial shipping through Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) across the Indian ocean in past decade. However, the combined efforts made by the maritime law enforcement entities in collaboration with Naval forces in the region and extra region were able to effectively control the threat posed by the pirates on commercial shipping. Nevertheless, this threat could rise again if the grip is loosened. The United Nations Convention on the High Seas was one of the four Laws of the Sea Conventions concluded at Geneva in 1958. It identifies what constitutes piracy and measures to address which, requires positive contribution of the states of capacity. Maritime terrorism has a similar fate on free shipping, have different objectives though.

Nevertheless, unlawful acts against the safety and freedom of maritime navigation jeopardize the security of seafarers and property, seriously affect the operation of maritime services, and undermine the confidence of the people of theworld in the safety of maritime navigation. It has been seriously discussed during convention for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence against the safety of maritime navigation (sua convention) 1988. It further recognizes the need for all states, in

combating unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, strictly to comply with rulesand principles of general international law in order to ensure freedom of navigation of the commercial shipping. As a maritime nation Sri Lanka has enacted a special act called "*Suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation act, no. 42 of 2000*" displaying its commitment towards ensuring safety of marine operations in its seas.

SLN is doing a commendable job in this regard with its limited capacity and capabilities available. However, as a potential aerial force the contribution by the SLAF to this course is yet to develop. The laws cannot be enforced effectively if sufficient manpower and resources are not employed to the job.

4) *Maritime pollution:* Maritime pollution is another threat experienced by the developing maritime nations. Unlike other challenges, this imposes serious long-term damages to the affected area. The pollution of marineenvironment can occur due to deliberate, negligent or accidental release of oil and other harmful substances fromships. Harmful substance means any substance which, if introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea (MARPOL, 1973).

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973 deeply describes how a pollution can occur and law abiding to deal with such instances comprehensively. The damage is unpredictable and does not depend on the size of the spill, rather depends on the closeness to the shoreline and vulnerability of the area (Wanasinghe, 2016).

Figure 8. Incidents reported with marine pollution in last two decades

Source: Author

New diamond-2020 and X-press pearl-2021 crises have created a reasonable debate on the matter specially across the mass and social media platforms. Unlike earlier the social media platforms rapidly disseminate the footages of such incidents among the public creating a greater pressure upon the authorities.

The main question is that whether can we notice that such incidents are taking place specially in case of deliberate dumping. Naval vessels alone cannot practically monitor the entire EEZ throughout. The best mode of surveillance in this regard is the air surveillance. Single aircraft can cover a larger area within a short span of time. Onceidentified further monitoring can be done until surfacecrafts arrive. With the deployment of aerial assets in to surveillance, it amply increases the possibilities of early detection of such cases. Early detection of pollution could leave the authorities with more options on the table to contain the situation with reduced damages.

All of these criminal activities have multidimensional effects as follows.

- Create unsafe environment for merchant shippingand marine societies.

- Directly involve in transnational crimes.

- Inflict short-term and long-term damages to thenature.

- Incur economic and financial losses to the stateconcerned.

- Create space for other state and non-state actors tointerfere with state affairs.

B. *Search and Rescue (SAR)*

Under long standing traditions of the sea and various provisions of international law, ship masters are obligated to assist others in distress at sea whenever they can safely do so. The responsibilities to render assistance to a distressed vessel or aircraft are based on humanitarian considerations and established international practices. Specific obligations can be found in several conventions, including the following:

- Annex 12 to the Convention on International CivilAviation

- International Convention on Maritime Search andRescue

- Regulation V/33 of the international Convention for the safety of life at sea.1974 (SOLAS 1974 Appendix A).

Many states have accepted the obligation to provide aeronautical and maritime SAR co-ordination and services on a 24-hour basis for their territories, territorial seas, and where appropriate, the high seas (IAMSAR, 2013). Hence, there is an added responsibility to the SLAF and SLN responding to distress situations occur in the area of responsibility. Both the entities have their own role to playin SAR missions. The contribution of these elements couldbe decided by following factors.

- Location of the incident
- Weather over area
- Nature of the distress

Effective and synergistic combination of capacities and capabilities of the respondents could alter the final outcomeeven against the odds. Therefore, the state has a responsibility to ensure that the SAR respondents are provided with appropriate assets and technologies which needs financial backup for acquisition, operation and maintenance. The maritime-air respondents have a responsibility to forecast the future requirement and projectit to the relevant authorities for perusal. Further to develop concepts, tactics and techniques to effectively employ available resources for an efficient output.

Figure 9. Reported incidents needed maritime SAR service-2020.

Source: <https://www.navy.lk/sea-ops.html>

IV. CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING AND EXPLOITING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS(MDA)

As a potential maritime nation, we need to understand thatwe have not put our maximum effort to exploit our maritime domain. SLAF is yet to contribute for the full spectrum of MDA efforts. For maritime operations SLAF requires specialized aircraft, specialized equipment andspecially trained professional airmen. In modern day context heavy use of electromagnetic spectrum is required for effective and efficient conduct of maritime operations. SLAF has following challenges as at now to meet the emerging MDA demand.

A. Insufficient Air Assets

Up to 2009 SLAF focused on supporting surface troops in order to eradicate the LTTE terrorism. Afterwards also SLAF continue to lend its support for the efforts of the surface troops denying the re-emergence of terrorism and nation building efforts of the government. However, with the increased threats to the maritime security aspect SLAFre-established long suspended maritime squadron. At present the squadron is equipped with basic maritime surveillance and recce platforms. Modern day maritime aircraft needs some additional characteristics for safer and efficient operation such as long range and endurance, multiengine, auto piloting (at least auto recovery modes), capability to utilize electromagnetic spectrum for monitoring, detection and tracking of targets.... etc. All of these characteristics entails higher capital and recurrent cost. SLAF currently plans to enhance the existing capacity and capability under the concept of smart, stretched re- fleeting.

B. Absence of dedicated maritime command and control structure

At present SLN and SLAF coordinates to a certain level for conducting maritime operations. SLAF deploys its maritime platforms on request as well as independently for designated operations. SLAF is gradually establishing routine surveillance and recce operations. However, a dedicated maritime command and control structure is not available. Absence of a proper structure creates numerous practical issues when it comes to operations. Proper coordination is required among the air and naval elements. There are no effective establishments dedicated for maritime operations which can command and coordinate all aerial and naval elements.

C. Inadequate collaboration between aerial and naval elements

SLAF and SLN shares two distinctive cultures and ways of operation. During the humanitarian operations these two elements worked closely to achieve common objectives. Unfortunately, after 2009 there were very limited occasions where SLA and SLAF worked together. Gradual shift of operational focus and change of intention of the government paved way for day by day reduced opportunities for joint exercises and collaboration. Hence, after a decade or so SLN and SLAF are facing difficulties in integrating its systems, techniques, tactics, capacities and capabilities to attain common objectives. Understanding on the core values and functions of each other can improve the relationship and cohesion between these two entities forestalling the competition for dominance being on cross roads.

SLCG is predominantly manned by SLN as a secondment due to absence of direct recruiting as at now. SLCG is equipped only with limited vessels and no aircraft. Nevertheless, specialized equipment for certain operations such as oil spillage controls are with SLCG. Hence, SLCG also needs to re-form with people and resources in order to function as an active law enforcement agency.

V. PRAGMATIC RESPONSES TO OVERCOME PRESENT CHALLENGES

In a post pandemic scenario focusing more on recovering from the downfall and further development as a nation it is a commonplace the military expenditures are been truncated to accommodate economic, health, social and educational priorities. Since Sri Lanka has greater maritime resources spread through the EEZ, which is mostly unexploited need more attention. SLN and SLAF are the two organizations at present which have the potential of engaging this undertaking. Already these organizations have taken steps to exploit these unexploited maritime resources in different scales. Under heavy impediments on national economy due to the COVID-19 pandemic, investing on the costly maritime assets would be a task beyond reality as at now. Nevertheless, formulating a framework bridging the gap between present and intended future would not be a waste since, there are activities and changes which could be done with minor financial expenses.

We need a strategy that points the way forward and does not limit us to an intractable scope in future. It should be actionable with clear goals and vectors.

Possible key steps towards better MDA and stronger maritime capabilities for SLAF are as follows.

A. Smart and stretched re-fleeting

Smart and stretched re-fleeting is a relatively new concept which is used to augment fleets without adding surges financially where the government could afford without hindering its other commitments. Every strategy requires adequate Mass, appropriate Mix and reasonable Mobility for making the concept to action. It says that "*few silver bullets could not win a war*". It requires sufficient aerial platforms with effective reach at least up our EEZ. Due to scarcity of aircraft, SLAF happen to utilize the same platforms deployed for maritime operations for overland surveillance and recce too. Since we are an Island nation, we have different challenges dominating different sea areas. For example, IUU fishing is mostly occurs in basin of Mannar, almost all commercial shipping follows SLOC circumventing southern half of the Island, smuggling cases are mainly reported from western and southern seas…etc. Therefore, it requires to cover entire EEZ due to various priorities. Hence, following strategic steps could be taken for building up an effective maritime-air fleet in future.

- Upgrade existing platforms with better avionics packages specialized for maritime operations.

- Augment the existing fleet with advanced maritime platforms.

Once sufficient air assets are acquired, they can split into separate flights and re-position them in most appropriate air bases to respond rapidly and efficiently with task specialization.

B. Formulation of maritime-air command structure

SLAF needs effective integration with responsible maritime entities to form up a maritime-air partnership. This partnership could act as a capacity builder for all the forces. For maritime operations such as ISR and SAR a joint maritime air command could be established. The maritime-air command can function through a Maritime- Air Command and Control Center (MAC&CC). Maritime operations fall under ISR and SAR can be performed under the direct command and control of this establishment. Following entities can be linked with the MAC&CC for communication and coordination. The aerial and maritime platforms coming under these entities are indicated against them.

Table 1. Agencies responsible for maritime ISR and SAR operations and their maritime assets

S/N	Organization	Assets
01	SLAF Central Air Ops Room	Maritime and SAR aircraft
02	SLN Head Quarters (HQ) Ops Room	Different types of Naval vessels
03	SLCG Central Ops Room	Different types of Naval vessels and equipment
04	Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)	Intelligence network
05	Maritime Rescue Coordinating Center (MRCC)	Link with merchant shipping and SLN
06	Director General Merchant Shipping (DGMS)	Link with merchant shipping

Source: Author

At present all maritime entities works together up to a certain extent. Nevertheless, MRCC and SLCG duties are carried out by SLN for the time being due to inadequate manpower and relevant resources. Hence a strategic framework is proposed as follows to integrate the elements operating to perform ISR and SAR missions in to a centralized structure for better output.


Figure 10. Proposed conceptual structure for Maritime-air command

Source: Author

Under this structure it is proposed to formulate a dedicated MAC&CC under a Maritime-Air Commander tomake centralize decision making and decentralized execution under a unified command and control. The information with regard to maritime security threats andSAR requirements can be feed to the MAC&CC through the organizations listed above.

Then the situation analysis and mission planning can be done at MAC&CC considering the assets availability, capacity and capability of executing entities such as SLAF, SLN and SLCG. Assistance of DGMS couldbe seek if the situation demands in case of SAR operation.For the execution of the mission aerial and maritime platforms, professionals and relevant equipment are to be assigned to MAC&CC by the above respondents. Then throughout the mission the assets should be under thecommand and control of MAC&CC.

This strategy would minimize practical problems arising in control and reporting under multiple commands. Utilization of available assets in hand effectively would bethe pragmatic approach to the future operational mission requirements. Integration of assets from different entities in to single force whenever the situation demands could produce synergistic effect rather than operating independently.

C. Joint maritime-air training

In support of joint operational effort, carrying out of joint training with the participation of above stake holders are of extreme importance for seamless function of the maritime-air organization. The best option available to avert the differences in concept of operations, culture, terminology, techniques and tactics is the conduct of joint training.Understanding of naval concepts by airmen and aerial perspective by seamen would provide the essential intangible touch in order to drive this integrated concept. Existing training establishments can be utilized for conducting of maritime operations training with the participation of both airmen and seamen. The fundamentalsof joint operations need to be slot in to the basic, advanced and continuation trainings. Afterwards the art of joint operations would be mastered through continuous joint operational training in different scenarios (Wanasinghe, 2017).

VI.   RECOMMENDATIONS

After the study, following conceptual recommendations were made. However, under the present financial situationof the country due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic until such time the economy gets strong enough to augment the inventories of the maritime-air operators, the framework for maritime-air command structure could be established. Furthermore, maritime security has an indirect impact on the economy of the country since it is ofgreat concern for the merchant shipping. The more the safe and secure SLOC Sri Lanka can produce more the beneficial would be the shipping through these waters.

A. Augmenting of maritime-air assets andcapabilities

The acquiring of new platforms, new technologies is a costly affair. However, attaining the professional maritime-air capabilities consumes a considerably longer time even the assets are procured. Hence, smart and stretched re- fleeting and gradual acquisition of new technologies step by step would result a better geared maritime-air entity with proper mass, mix and mobility to counter future maritime- air challenges in long run without adding financial pressure surges.

B. Formulation of integrated maritime-air commandstructure

Formulation of such a structure is within the capacity of therelevant elements as at now. At present certain integration is available among the maritime entities. Incorporating the aerial entity in to the mix and configuring them to form upa structure as discussed above need a thorough and unpretentious discussion among these forces. Aim of the structure and the command should focus on attaining the maritime-air objectives effectively and efficiently in line with national objectives.

C. Conduct of joint maritime-air training

Pooling of tangible assets would not do much unless otherwise the men behind machines performs accordingly at the maritime-air interface. Joint effort could result synergistic outcome theoretically and chaos in reality if proper integration does not occur. Carefully designed joint training can translate the theory in to an effective reality. Across the globe such joint training and exercises are a common place to achieve, maintain and master the cohesion and understanding among conceptually different elements to achieve common objectives. Hence,

continuousjoint training and exercises involving all levels of professionals who will engage in future maritime-air operations would be an underling component of developingthe integrated maritime-air structure.

VII.   CONCLUSION

Maritime-air operations are not a novel notion to Sri Lanka.By the end of the humanitarian operations in 2009 there was a better opportunity and environment to form-up a maritime-air structure which would supplement the national potential to exploit the vast maritime resources we possess. Unfortunately, the maritime potential was not given with due significance so far making the national maritime resources idling and letting other state and non- state actors to exploit. Failure to optimizes the geostrategic advantage for the betterment of the nation by responsible authorities, the oceanic region around the Island has become a loitering ground for state counterparts and transshipping hub for criminal actors. Increasing the maritime-air capacity and capability with a clear intent to exploit the vast maritime zone around us would make the region safe and secure for legitimate operations, thus limiting opportunity for illicit activities. By the time the authorities are ready to explore the marine heirloom itwould be safe and secure to do so in future.

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Maritime Terrorism in South East Asia: An Assessment

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Abstract- This research evaluates the possibility of an increase in maritime terrorist violence in Southeast Asia, based on a recounting and analysis of some of the most recent past incidents in these waters. Through the research objective, it tries to identify the challenges facing states in the region in maritime terrorism and the emerging trends in maritime terrorism. It also studies the emerging terrorists in Southeast Asia and their potential. Further, it pays particular attention to how geo-strategic issues in Southeast Asia are confronted. The research was based on qualitative methodology, and only secondary data were used. Secondary data were collected by means of a literature review and reference sources such as legislation, international treaties, academic literature, newspaper articles and sources. Maritime terrorism is seen as a critical threat to maritime safety in Southeast Asia. According to research, maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia are relatively high compared to other Asian regions, and maritime terrorism has grown significantly. Terrorist attacks in the maritime domain are worrisome because of their potential flow on trade effects. In South-East Asia, maritime terrorism by vile non-state actors takes place primarily in the Sulus and Celebes seas, with the Abu Sayyaf group considered the main author.

Keywords— maritime terrorism, maritime security, South East Asia

I.   INRODUCTION

Maritime terrorism is frequently specified as "the undertaking of terrorist acts and actions within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea, or in port; or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or small towns, including tourist resorts, port areas. Marine terrorism in South-East Asia refers to politically motivated acts of extreme marine violence in the South-East Asia region. Despite seaborne terrorist attacks accounting for just 2% of all international terrorist incidents from 1978 to 2008, according to RAND's Terrorism Database, Southeast Asia has proven a hotbed of maritime terrorism. As a result of the high frequency of pirates in the region, many terrorist groups based in Southeast Asia have appropriated piracy tactics to carry out their violent political struggles. In 2003, the International Maritime Bureau reported that out of the 445 actual or attempted pirate attacks on merchant vessels, 189 occurred in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia remained at the top of the regional standings, with 93 incidents occurring in Indonesian waters. Between 2014 and 2018, there have been 242 attacks in Southeast Asia, mostly in Indonesian waters. Among the maritime terrorists in Southeast Asia, the most popular weapons are IEDs and firearms, which have served in about 60% of maritime attacks in the region.

A.   Objectives of the research.

Southeast Asia holds global and strategic importance. This research examines the development of Southeast Asian maritime terrorism and its strategic risks. Maritime terrorism often occurs in this area. Also, studies of emerging terrorists in Southeast Asia and its potential. This research seeks to identify the challenges faced by states in the region in maritime terrorism and emerging trends in maritime terrorism. It also pays special attention to the way in which Southeast Asia is confronted with a geostrategic level. In evaluating the odds of a major panic attack, it explores a suspected terrorism-piracy nexus and the land of port protection in key continental regions, highlighting steps to bolster regional security, and ways to improve coastal preparedness against terrorism. The document is not an attempt to sketch out a complete anti-terrorism doctrine for maritime agencies a task best left to professional security planners. Its objective is to evaluate recent attacks in the Asian seas in order to better understand the dynamics of maritime terrorism violence.

B. *Concepts for marine, terrorism.*

International maritime laws and treaties

Before 1988, there had been a debate in the international legal community as to whether the human activities of maritime terrorism could be meaningfully prosecuted under anti-piracy legislation put forth every bit a constituent of the UNCLOS III agreement in 1982. The main debate was around exactly what was meant by "private ends" that UNCLOS III called piracy. International jurists such as Douglas Guilfoyle have argued that "private" refers to the lack of state sanction behind the law, considering that "private" and "public" constitute the relevant dichotomy. Other researchers, such as Saiful Karim, argued that the term "private" refers to the presence of a profit motive behind the act, and thus considers the term "private" and "political" to be the relevant dichotomy. Karim based his assessment on attempts to codify anti-piracy laws dating back to the work of the League of Nations committee during the inter-war period.

A founding convention that has been significant in defining maritime terrorism was the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) of 1988 and its accompanying SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. While the 1988 SUA does not define "terrorism" or "maritime terrorism", it is a response to the 1985 attack on the Achille Lauro cruise ship, a major terrorist incident. The United Nations General Assembly subsequently asked the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to study terrorist attacks on board or against ships in order to formulate recommendations for countermeasures. On November 1986, Italy, Austria and Egypt submitted a draft to the IMO for a new formula for the suppression of maritime terrorism, which had taken influences from 3 previous counterterrorist conventions; the Hague Convention on Aircraft Hijacking, the Montreal Convention on Sabotage of Airplanes and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. Following two years of discussions, the IMO adopted the 1988 AUS Convention. The commissariat of the convention made the threatened or actual hijacking, damaging or destruction of vessels and violence against crew prosecutable offences under the rule as such acts threatened the safe piloting of ships. Unlawful acts committed for both individual and political ends were hidden under the convention and an obligation was imposed on all countries party to the agreement to deport or prosecute convention offender's

resident upon their soil. The AUS Fixed Platform Protocol was also signed during the 1988 Rome Convention, after the US and Spain raised the question of fixed platforms as potential terrorist targets. The SUA Protocol thus made it a prosecutable offence to launch attacks against a fixed platform on the provision that the fixed platform is bound to the ocean floor, serves economic purposes like resource exploration or exploitation and operates on a continental shelf.

Nevertheless, the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol did possess several flaws, one of which was the fact that both parts of the legislation were reactive towards maritime terrorist acts and offered no preventative provisions or measures to prevent maritime terrorist acts from taking place, as put forth by Justin S. C. Mellor. In essence, the legislation was merely in place to prosecute perpetrators in the wake of the crime rather than provide contracting states with powers and legal authority to interdict and prevent violations of the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol.

Following 9/11, the IMO adopted IMO Assembly Resolution A.924 (22) which called for a reassessment of existing statute law and bills that aimed to prevent terrorist acts against the safety and security of passengers, crew members and vessels. In October 2001, the IMO Legal Committee initiated a review of the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol, with April 2002 witnessing the creation of a US-led Correspondence Group, which would provide the IMO Legal Committee with a working paper containing potential amendments to SUA 1988 for the Legal Committee's 85th session in October 2003. The amendments suggested by the Correspondence Group presented before the IMO Legal Committee included 7 new offences under Article III of the 1988 SUA Convention and new provisions authorising the boarding and searching of foreign vessels in international waters who are either suspected of involvement in or are at risk of being targeted by acts prohibited under Article III. Although most IMO delegations expressed support for the amendments, concerns were raised concerning the amendments' effects on freedom of piloting and the exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction over their vessels within international waters. Later on three years of slowness, the IMO Legal Committee completed its review during its 90th session during April 2005, with the resulting International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties in October 2005 resulting in the official adoption of the 2005 SUA Protocol. New offences under the protocol included

the knowing and intentional weaponization of ships with terrorist motivation, the knowing and intentional transportation of WMDs and related materials via the high seas both with or without terrorist motivation and the knowing and intentional use of a ship as a transportation means for any person who has committed an offence under any current or future UN terrorism conventions, including the 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol.

C. Defining 'maritime terrorism

Maritime terrorism is frequently specified as "the undertaking of terrorist acts and actions within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea, or in port; or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or small towns, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities". Another definition, however, determines the phenomenon as "any premeditated, politically motivated violence committed against non-combatant targets at sea by sub-national groups or clandestine agents". As many realize, there is a political dimension to terrorism, with essentially ideological objectives. In this account, a violent incident at sea can only be considered an act of "terrorism" if it has clear ideological and political motives. Others take a firm stand that all political violence (including maritime piracy and armed robbery) is a kind of terrorism, their radical causes and enabling factors being similar; this is not a sentiment widely shared by most legal experts.

Operationally, a simpler way to understand maritime terrorism is to establish a typology based on the use of maritime space and target selection.

a. Where the ocean is just a medium for terrorist attacks on land-based targets: An instance is the Mumbai bombings on 26 November 2008, when ten terrorists landed on the city shores using speedboats and carried away a series of organized approaches on ground targets.

b. Diversion of naval ships and hostage-taking by terrorists: one of the most widely used maritime terror tactics in conflict-prone areas. Examples include the series of hijackings of Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu Sea, the subsequent hostage taking and their brutal handling.

c. An attack in ports, installations and coastal installations: On June 2018, terrorists attacked the Libyan oil ports of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider, setting at least one storage tank on fire, following which the installations were closed and emptied.

d. Terrorist Attacks on Civilian Vessels and Warships: On October 12, 2000, two Al-Qaeda suicide bombers hit an explosive canoe on the USS Cole, killing 17 US soldiers. Two long time later in October 2002, a terrorist strike on the French oil tanker, M/V Limburg killed 16 people and wounded dozens others, also causing an environmental catastrophe with a massive crude oil fall into the Gulf of Aden.

D. Piracy-Terrorism Nexus

However, the link between piracy and terrorism creates a theoretical and legal problem with regard to the legalized conceptualisation of maritime terrorism described above. This link implies maritime terrorist acts in which the tactics, immediate motives and long-term motives of maritime terrorists are ill-matched, showing piratic characteristics compared to terrorists only. These numbers include the co-optation of pirates by maritime terrorists to perform acts like hijacking and delivering a tanker to maritime terrorists for use as an attack delivery system, meaning the pirates would have indirectly assisted maritime terrorist activities invites. Other acts include maritime terrorists using piracy to extort and generate funds for their political cause. Those two actions are, from a tactical point of view, piratic, but from a strategic point of view, of a terrorist nature. Some maritime security analysts, like Peter Chalk, argue that this type of cooperation between pirates and maritime terrorists is implausible on a significant degree due to their differing incentives and motives. Others, such as Graham Gerard Ong, suggest that hackers and maritime terrorists are remarkably similar because of their transnational nature, similar tactics and weaponry, and similar levels of extreme violence that accompany them. This legal fuzziness and definitional ambiguity surrounding the legal classification of these illegal activities for prosecution has led to the conception that piracy and maritime terrorism exist on a continuum between each other. The Terrorism Financing Convention partially resolves this legal conundrum posed by the piracy-terrorism nexus for, by intentionally partaking in funding activities for illegal acts under numerous international treaties, including the SUA conventions, one can be pursued under the

Terrorism Financing Convention. As the treaty punishes and allows for intentional collaboration with maritime terrorism actors, and makes explicit mention of terrorism in its title, the treaty effectively punishes offenders as accomplices of maritime terrorists.

E. Maritime Terrorist tactics

In academia, it has been noted that marine terrorists use a range of tactics to carry out their attacks. There has also been speculation on the future evolution of marine terrorist tactics. Martin N. Murphy identifies several means and tactics that maritime terrorists have historically and currently employed, including improvised explosive devices and naval mines. In Southeast Asian countries, this includes:

-Kamikaze divers or "human torpedoes": Several attacks on this variant have been attempted in South East Asia. Al-Qaeda planned to use kamikaze divers aboard U.S. Navy vessels moored in Indonesian ports in 2002. In 2005, an ASG operative by the name Gamal Baharan stated that he had moved to a Palawan Island ASG training camp in readiness for an underwater suicide bombing attack that was in the process of being planned by Jemaah Islamiyah. Attacks using a suicide bomber diver or an explosive-laden swimmer delivery vehicle could be employed to attack several different cases of maritime objects, including warships, naval bases, underwater oil pipelines or underwater telecommunication cables.

-Submarines as vehicles of terrorist transportation: There have been two famous examples of terrorist either obtaining or seeking to obtain these capabilities: The first took place in 1999, when the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines inquired about the possibility of buying a North Korean mini-submarines. The second was in 2000, when the Tamil Tigers were exposed in the construction process for a submarine and three mini-submarines in Phuket, Thailand.

Ms. Murphy also noted the possibility of a rarer and unprecedented use of marine terrorist tactics used at sea in the future. These include: -Running an oil tanker aground or sabotaging it in a similar way to the M/V Limburg in 2002 to cause intense oil pollution through the leakage, subsequently closing ports or blocking critical choke points, like the Malacca Straits. This would cause regional and global economic losses that would undermine the stability of the countries of Southeast Asia and the international trading system.

-Aerial attacks against vessels, such as the use of small aircraft loaded with explosives to force and attack the vessel. Murphy, however, judged the chances of such an attack to be extremely improbable.

Assumptions were also made as to whether ships could be used as a delivery system for weapons and power devices. Donna Nincic creates a typology for this type of attack between attacks from capacity, where maritime terrorists could use a vessel to deliver a traditional chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear device, and attacks from opportunity, whereby maritime terrorists hijack a vessel carrying dangerous maritime cargo (DMCs) such as LNG, LPG or ammonium nitrate and subsequently weaponise the cargo. Still, Murphy casts doubt on the potential for maritime terrorists to use vessels as a delivery system for WMDs or 'dirty bombs', which he judges as incredibly improbable due to the trouble in gathering such a gimmick and the high risk of mishap in transporting the weapon to its mark. Murphy also speculates upon the potential for massive casualty attacks committed using DMCs in a heavy inhabited area, merely intimates that such an approach would be logistically difficult to perpetrate, potentially ineffective and highly detectable to security helps.

F. Maritime Terrorism and The United States

The horrific events of 9/11 deeply affected the lives of all Americans. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks on the United States, we must learn from the events of that day and the circumstances that contributed to these events. The safety of the American people must be protected (9/11, 1). The Commission's report on the events of September 11 mentions that ports and shipping industries may be particularly vulnerable to future terrorist attacks. The introduction of a dirty bomb or other large quantities of explosives into one of our harbours could have a significant impact. This would not only be catastrophic to the safety of the masses, particularly those living in coastal areas nearby, but it could also effectively block the worldwide transfer of commodities and materials (9/11, 1). One way the United States can protect itself is to enhance the Coast Guard's capacity to prevent future attacks. The Coast Guard has been and is the primary organization responsible for protecting our country's coasts (11/9, 1). They identified maritime domain knowledge as a key objective (9/11, 2). The 9111 Commission report called for system-wide improvement in the national intelligence community

so that we may amend the quantity and quality and the integration of the data that is being gathered. We need to focus our energy and resources on expanding our intelligence capabilities on the high seas and at overseas harbours. We also need to be able to verify the lists of ports that vessels approaching the United States have used in the past. We need to enhance our ability to identify individuals or groups who control the interests in ships and goods and to track the long-range movement of those ships. Improving the collection and dissemination of maritime intelligence data is essential if the Coast Guard is to succeed in securing United States ports (9111.2). We have made some improvements in the last little while. For example, the Marine Transport Security Act provides for the boarding and inspection of thousands of foreign and Canadian vessels. It has also enhanced the security of American ports. Security needs are continually being identified, and we still need to refine and continue to look for new ways to meet these new needs (11/9, 2).

Eighty per cent of the drugs sent by Colombian water to the United States enter our safety and reach our shores. If it is not hard for drug runners to bring their drugs into the United States, it would not be hard for somebody to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S. Less than four percent of the containers that enter the United States each year are fully scrutinized. In addition, terrorist organisations used suicide bombers to attack civilian and military maritime platforms with small ships that explode on impact. It was al-Qaeda's method of attacking the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000 and Limburgh in October 2002. Other terrorist groups used the method during the 25 April 2004 attack on the Basra oil terminal in Iraq. These tactics could also be employed against cruise ships, offshore oil installations, chemical tankers and other vessels. The LOOP oil terminal offshore Louisiana is highly vulnerable. This oil terminal handles 25 percent of our imported oil, and a small boat with explosives could attack the facility and severely cripple our economy (9111, 3) the world organization is characterised by free flowing international trade in a globalized economy. The system has changed over the years to be the most open it can be. The hope was that this system of painless commerce would lead to enormous growth. This system is dependent upon large fleets of ocean-going vessels and the reduction of commercial barriers. This was a scheme that was forever changed on September 11, 2001, as governments around the globe raced to take in how susceptible

they were two attempts by organized terrorist groups that were not hesitant to sacrifice thousands of animations to further their case. The primary focus was on the air transport industry, but the focus was on the marine sector. "Counter-terrorism efforts are compounded by a global trend towards deregulation, open borders and expanded trade (Perl 5)." In this part of my dissertation, I will explore how globalization has not only made it possible, but also easier for international terrorist organizations to run together from areas around the globe to work the process of openness and global trade. I will review the Southeast Asia case study in this section to prove it and examine how globalization has affected marine terrorism in Southeast Asia.

II. REAERCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology was based on qualitative methodology and used secondary data. Secondary data were collected by means of a literature review and reference sources such as legislation, international treaties, academic literature, newspaper articles and sources. The quality research methodology was used primarily for this research. Historical reports and sources were also used. Sources of maritime law and international law were used. There was a dual analysis of maritime defense theories as well as international maritime law.

III. FINDING AND DISCUSSION

A. Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia

Maritime terrorism is seen as a critical threat to maritime safety in Southeast Asia. As noted in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism: the 'ASEAN heads of states view acts of terrorism in all its phases and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a heavy threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world'. In ordination to come up to this, the ARF member States committed to extend existing activities, including joint coordinated patrols, intelligence and information interchange, and workouts to combat piracy, armed robbery against ships at sea and other transnational crimes (including terrorism). Terrorism refers to a group of people associated with a particular organization engaged in criminal activities to achieve their political ambitions. This is violence (or threat of

violence) intentionally directed at civilians in order to create a climate of fear and intimidation.

In order to exert political pressure, terrorists often target their attacks to obtain as much publicity as possible, generally claiming the merit of what they have done. Terrorists also seek to create lasting harm by their actions. This price can be psychological, in the sense of cultivating an aura of fear and panic, or it may assume the form of physical acts causing damage or destruction, the aim being that the relevant authorities may grant (or partially concede) to the terrorists' demands. This chapter looks at international and regional frameworks for marine terrorism. In order to understand the extent of the problem in Southeast Asia, as well as the measures taken to combat terrorism, this chapter will explore:

(i) maritime terrorist activity as a security threat;

(ii) type of maritime terrorist threats in South East Asia; and

(iii) international legal framework for marine terrorism; and

(iv) The regional legal framework for the fight against marine terrorism; and.

(v) What are the gaps in international and regional frameworks?

Current frameworks, both internationally and regionally, fail to combat maritime terrorism in South East Asia. Furthermore, given its transnational nature, maritime terrorism cannot be fought by unilateral state action. In fact, regional cooperation involving all Southeast Asian states is needed to eradicate maritime terrorism in the region.

B.   Marine terrorism is a threat to marine security.

Maritime terror is generally recognized as a threat to maritime security. The terrorists operate in the maritime zones and target naval and civil vessels. There is suspicion of a link between piracy and maritime terrorism with respect to numerous maritime attacks in South-East Asia. Although the modus operandi of both acts is fairly similar, the distinction resides in the motive of the attack in question. As I said earlier, maritime terrorism is politically motivated, while piracy is mostly for private ends. Maritime terrorists need the specialized knowledge and skills that pirates tend to have to conduct their attacks. Nevertheless, such skills may not be sufficient where the intention is to stage a major terrorist attack, and therefore

terrorists are also suspected of having ties with former naval personnel and commercial seafarers in Southeast Asia. In addition, pirates in the region are believed to have received assistance from other actors when they diverted maritime assets (including cargo) and then sold them to other parties. Indeed, it would be almost impossible for pirates to over-sell misappropriated assets without full planning and connections with other criminal unions.

It is important to note the different hacking patterns. One of the reasons behind the hacking is to get a financial advantage. Indeed, this view was emphasised at the 2004 Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (MSAP) Conference, which identified that the most pressing subjects in the region was the need to fight pirates, not terrorists. This is because pirates are now thoroughly trained and are usually armed with grenades, automatic weapons and anti-tank missiles. In addition, they tend to be equipped with GPS systems and satellite phones. Given that the primary sources of funding for terrorist groups are increasingly frozen by the international community, terrorists can turn to piracy to support their activities. Moreover, as both terrorists and pirates have operated in the same areas for prolonged periods of time, such as in the Sulu Sea and the Arabian Sea, it is not hard for them to play together and mutually confirm each other's actions. During the 1990s, terrorism was not considered a major threat to international marine safety. As a result, unlike other threats to maritime security, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime terrorism was not governed by any single international instrument.

Several more incidents of maritime terrorism have occurred since then. For example, on May 4, 1991, a marine terrorism incident took place against Abheeta, a Sri Lankan navy ship. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed responsibility for the attack that took place north of Sri Lanka's Kankesanthurai port. A similar terrorist attack was carried out in October 2000 against the USS Cole, this time off the shores of Yemen. During this incident, the United States Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) was attacked by al-Qaeda while refueled in Aden Harbor. Despite these attacks, historical evidence shows that maritime terrorism is not a common form of terrorism. Terrorists are more likely to target areas that make planning easier and will lead to more victims. That includes the aviation industry and ground targets. In addition, in order to carry out marine terrorist activities, terrorists need

certain equipment, such as ships and weapons, as well as specific skills, such as boarding techniques and knowledge of ship operations. As a result, terrorists who choose to carry out illegal activities in the maritime domain most often have naval jurisdiction and usually come from coastal states.

However, after the 9/11 attacks, terrorist groups widened their attention from the aviation sector and land-based targets to include the maritime arena, targeting container traffic, port infrastructure and the transportation industry. This transformation is due to the fact that the international community has gone to big lengths to halt the tide of terrorist attacks in the sky and on solid ground, whereas the maritime sector had been left largely unprotected and is therefore vulnerable to assault. This shift toward marine targets was detected by the terrorists themselves. Following their arrest in 2001, members of the militant group Jemaah Islamiah stated that they intended to attack U.S.-owned ships and naval facilities. In early 2002, terrorists planned to attack a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean by hijacking a civilian plane and crushing it into the warship. Although Moroccan authorities foiled a terrorist plot to attack merchant ships in Strait of Gibraltar in mid-200225, a ferry, the Super Ferry 14, was bombed by terrorists in Manila Bay in the Philippines in February 2004.

C. Types of Sea Terrorism Threats in South East Asia.

Terrorist attacks in the maritime domain are very worrisome because of their potential flow on trade effects. Indeed, the maritime sector is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as the international community has focused heavily on the development of packages of safeguards against land-based terrorism. We can see maritime terrorism in recent attacks on naval assets. Arguably, terrorists have been able to cope with the operational constraints of the marine sector by working with other criminal groups involved in crimes committed at sea. In any event, maritime terrorism differs from other marine crimes. Terrorists are motivated by their political objectives, not by a financial profit. Maritime terrorism has direct or strategic political goals. Terrorists are prepared to learn from past mission failures and may have the patience to wait until they have broadened their capabilities to ensure a higher probability of mission success. Other crimes at sea, like piracy, for example, are carried out for profit. Hackers are looking for the best return on their investment, and are prepared to shift their focus to

opportunity targets that offer the highest probability of success. Southeast Asia is famous for its waterways, which are very important for international trade. Straits such as the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok are among these important straits found in South-East Asia. Thus, from a geographical perspective, any disturbance of these waterways would have serious implications for recent relevant maritime attacks. These waterways are positioned between the islands of Southeast Asian States, which are inhabited by people who do not have ideal economic, societal or political conditions. Furthermore, the region is renowned for its shallow reefs, small islands and narrow channels. It creates an unstable environment ideal for the commission of maritime crimes such as piracy and terrorism.

The bottlenecks, which occur in different parts of the narrow channels, offer a perfect opportunity for terrorists to commit illegal acts. The Strait of Malacca links the Indian Ocean to the Southern China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The 1,000-kilometre-long strait is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, and approximately 50% of the world's large vessels pass through it every year. We have container ships, bulk carriers and tankers. Moreover, it is only through the Strait of Malacca that approximately 50% of Asia's oil supply is shipped. The Singapore Strait also has narrow points that make it ideal for those who commit crimes at sea. The narrowest portion of Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait is only 1.5 miles wide. A planned attack against American ships in the area by members of the Jemaah Islamiah was discovered by the Singaporean authorities and the persons involved were apprehended. The terrorists' strategy was to bomb American ships moving eastward from the Sembawang dock by means of a small suicide ship. Because of the narrowness of the channel, the possibility of the American ship escaping the suicide ship would have been small. Therefore, ramming a suicide vessel into a targeted ship (in a standardized manner to the approaches on the USS Cole and the Limburg) could be a potential tactic used by terrorists. The incident involving Limburg occurred in October 2002 in the Gulf of Aden, where an explosive-laden dinghy bumped into the side of the vessel, is an exemplar of this style of terrorist attempt. The Limburg, which was transporting more than 390,000 drums of crude oil caught fire and approximately 90,000 barrels of oil leaked into the ocean and caused pollution to the maritime

environment. One crew member was killed, while 12 others were wounded. Another tactic which terrorists could use to disrupt the flow of world trade would be to place huge ships at checkpoints, thus causing container and other ships to discover alternative routes and undoubtedly increasing transport costs for manufacture.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a report in 2003 that addressed the risks posed by terrorist organizations to the international commercial maritime transport system. The report drew attention to the economic impact of terrorist attacks on maritime transport. Some of the risk factors identified by the OECD that are relevant in Southeast Asia include risks to ships, financing and logistical support, and risks to persons. The motives of terrorists to attack ships include holding the crew hostage for ransom, hijacking their cargo, or sinking the ship. In order to support the terrorist activities of their related groups, the main terrorist groups are able to provide financial and logistical support through marine transport. Moreover, the participation of a large number of seamen in the international trade of commercial vessels makes them vulnerable as victims of terrorist attacks directed against ships.

Marine terrorism threatens South East Asian trade. The ports serve as hubs for the transportation of logistics from one area to the next. These logistical items are normally stored in containers and transported to the destination ports. Containerization has changed the delivery of logistics from the traditional port to the port approach to a modern door-to-door delivery service. As a result, the goods may reach their final destination without ever being opened during the shipment process. While each port has some level of capacity, the busiest ports are those that can provide complete logistical networks and accommodate large container vessels. In fact, there are only several ports that are large enough to handle the high volume of containers required for world marine trade. Aside from their capacity, these megaports must be located in areas or along shipping lanes with a high density of vessels. To exemplify the importance of ports to sea trade, one estimate has been established that if the Port of Singapore were to close, the toll on the global economic system would exceed $200 billion per year. Another important example is the closure of U.S. west coast harbours in 2002. This closing resulted in losses of about $1 billion per day.

Given the importance of ports (and especially megaports) to the global economy, it is easy to understand why terrorists would choose to focus on them. Terrorists are able to make bombs from liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), first by diverting LPG carriers, then by detonating them in order to disrupt port operations. Because of this kind of attack, not only would the harbour facilities be damaged or destroyed, but the real risk of loss of life exists. A 1,200-metre-wide fireball could well be generated by the explosion of a tanker transporting 600 tonnes of LPG.

The laying of bombs in ports may also be done by smuggling containers carrying logistics. Maritime terrorists don't just target the ports; they attack the ships. In order to reduce the risk of attack, shipowners or captains would be able to choose other routes that are less likely to be targeted by terrorists. However, this will likely result in higher transportation costs for businesses, which will then have to be passed on to consumers. There are significant maritime capabilities for terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. Organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf group, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have all reportedly carried out naval attacks since 2000. Marine areas are also used by terrorists to ship weapons back and forth.

D. South East Asian terrorist groups.

There are a number of terrorist groups in the region that have maritime capabilities, so they are well positioned to carry out terrorist attacks against maritime targets. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group (GSA), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaida. One pioneer in Asian maritime terrorism was the LTTE. The militant group consisted of approximately 3,000 people and was equipped with more than 100 surface and submarine vehicles. In addition, the LTTE had a maritime division specializing in the development of maritime engineering and boat building capabilities, as well as underwater demolition teams. Although the LTTE operated only in Sri Lanka, it was known to share information on maritime techniques and tactics with other terrorist groups, such as the MILF and the ASG. Even though not all terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are in a position to commit acts of maritime terrorism, each group has its own agenda and individual capacity to commit maritime crimes. Among the groups that are well positioned to

conduct maritime terrorist attacks are ASG, MILF, GAM, JI and Al-Qaeda.

E. The Abu Sayyaf Group.

Abu Sayyaf is a small violent and feverish Muslim group which operates in the western fringes of the large island of Mindanao and on the Sulu Islands which extend from Mindanao. He has murder and abduction records and links to al-Qaeda. Abou Sayyaf abducted three US nationals in May 2001. One of them was beheaded in June1001. The kin of the other two, a missionary couple, the Burnhams, has revealed that in March 2002 they made a ransom payment of $300,000 to Abu Sayyaf, but the pair was not resigned, presumably because the payment was mistakenly handed over to a rival Abu Sayyaf faction. Payment would have been facilitated by representatives from the United States and the Philippines, including the Federal Investigation Office24. In June, the Philippine army rangers met with the Abu Sayyaf groups that owned the Burnham. In the follow-up shock, Mr. Burnham, along with one Filipino hostage, were killed. Burnham got bailed out.

Terrorist attacks in Mindanao increased in the latter part of 2002 and in 2003. The attacks were initially perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf, until February and March 2003, when AFP accused the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of major bombings.

Table: 01 Major terrorist attacks in South-Eastern Asia.

Terrorist Group	Attack	Year	Maritime Attack
Abu Sayyaf	Attack against the MV Doulo. There were over five fatalities and 32 injuries as a result of this incident.	August 1991	Yes
Abu Sayyaf	Made a raid on the Christian city of Ipil, south of the Philippines, killing more than 50 people after stealing banks and shops and burning down the city center.	April 1995	No
Abu Sayyaf	Gunmen seized 21 people, including Western tourists, from a Malaysian resort and got them to their Philippine stronghold in Jolo Island; most are resigned in exchange for millions of dollars in ransom reportedly paid by Libya.	April 2000	No
	Americans and other tourists are snatched from the DOS Palmas resort in the southwestern Philippine	May 2001	No

Organization	Event	Date	Yes/No
	province of Palawan, starting a year long kidnapping saga that left several hostages dead, including Americans Guillermo Sobero and Martin Burnham.		
	33 Christian residents of the village of Balobo in the southern Filipino island of Basilan are held hostage and 10 are beheaded.	August 2001	No
Al-Qaida helped fund the attacks	The triple bombardment on Bali, Indonesia, killed 202 people, mainly foreign tourists, including 88 Australians.	October 2002	No
Abu Sayyaf	A nail bomb detonates in the southern Philippine town of Zamboanga, killing four people, including an American green beret. Another four attacks in a month, killing 16 people.		
	A suicide bomber attacks the J. W. Marriott Resort in Jakarta, killing 11 people.	August 2003	No
Abu Sayyaf	A bomb on a Superferry 14 passenger in Manila Bay kills 116 in Philippines' worst terrorist attack.	February 2004	Yes
	Three crewmen of a Malaysian tugboat are abducted off Malaysia's Sabah state; they are believed to have either died of illness or killed by their captors	April 2004	Yes
	A suicide bomber exploded a ton of explosive	September 2004	No

Group	Description	Date	Yes/No
	s wrapped in a delivery truck outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 11 people and wounding 200.		
	Almost simultaneous shelling in Manila and two southern towns kill. Eight and over a thousand wounded.	February 2005	No
Abu Sayyaf	Triple suicide bombers kill 20 of them in diner attacks in Bali.	October 2005	No
Abu Sayyaf	Attack on a Donald Ramona ferry. It killed two people and wounded over 20 others.	August 2005	Yes
	Armed men on Jolo abduct three aid workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross of Switzerland, Italy and the United States. Philippines. They are released individually, after the payment of the ransom.	January 2009	No
	Filipino militants abduct an American, his adolescent son and his Filipino cousin. She was released two months later and the young man escaped in December.	July 2011	No
	Armed men grab two tourists, one Dutch and one Swiss, in Tawi-Tawi province in the southern Philippines.	February 2012	No

Source: Major attacks in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia attributed to the al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf group and their allies from the regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah, see a look at

major terror attacks in Southeast Asia, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/139063/a-look-at-major-terrorattacks-in-southeast-asia at 21 October 2015 and see Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa and William Rosenau, The evolving terrorist threat to Southeast Asia: A net assessment (Rand Corporation, 2009),99.

Terrorist groups based in South-East Asia have a longstanding predisposition to use the seas as a vector of attack. As shown in Table 1, between 2014 and 2018, there were close to 200 actual attacks and attempts on vessels in the coasts. The bulk of the attacks were carried out by the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) group, a radical Islamist organisation based in the Philippines. The same terrorist organization attacked Superferry14 off the coast of the Philippines in 2004, killing 110 passengers and crew members. Since 2015, the ASG has existed at the intersection of crime and panic, carrying out armed robberies at sea, but also violent hostage taking and executions, revealing tactics inspired by the IS and Al Qaeda. As can be seen from Table 2, the actual number of attacks in the waters off Indonesia remains considerable. Many of them were allegedly carried out by Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah, another fundamentalist organization closely related to IS.

Table 1: Actual and attempted attacks against maritime transport in South Asia and Southeast Asia (2014-2018)

Location	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Indonesia	47	54	24	19	25
Malacca Strait	1	3	-	-	-
Malaysia	9	11	4	3	3
Philippines	2	4	3	13	3
Thailand –	1	-	-	-	-
Singapore Strait	6	6	-	1	-
China	-	5	1	2-	
Bangladesh	10	11	2	5	7
India	4	4	13	1	2

Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report (01 January to 30 June 2018)

Table 2: Actual and attempted attacks against navigation in South East Asia (January to June 2018)

Location	Actual attacks		Attempted attacks	
	Boarded	Hijacked	Attempted	Fired Upon
Indonesia	19	-	6	-
Malaysia	1	-	1	-
Philippines	1	-	1	1
China	-	-	2	-
Vietnam	2	-	-	-

Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report (01 January to 30 June 2018)

In 2016, mounting pressure from the Philippines combined with renewed international interest in fighting global piracy, restricted ASG's freedom of motion along the Sulu archipelago, limiting its ability to conduct onshore kidnappings. In response, the group moved operations further offshore, carrying out seafarer abductions while the ships were en route. They first targeted smaller vessels, but quickly began to attack larger vessels, threatening international and regional traffic. After Philippine armed forces clashed with ASG and IS militants in Marawi city in June 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines set up joint operations to oppose terrorism and transnational crimes in the Sulu Sea.

Even thus, action against the Abu Sayyaf challenge in the Sulu-Celebes Sea has been hard to coordinate first, the militant group's main area of bodily process is the Philippine seas, where Manila is less than eager to grant admission to foreign maritime powers, resulting in a slowdown of security operations. Second, the presence of extra-regional forces in the disputed areas of the South China Sea (including the Chinese Navy, PLAN) made the South-East Asian states afraid to expand their cooperation. Manila was particularly cautious, fearing that larger and more capable naval forces would overshadow the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard in its own hinterland. The ASG exploited the situation, widening regional networks, buying arms and

munitions on the black market, even using ransom money to buy local officials. Executives sought to replicate the brutal tactics of IS in South East Asia, with violent kidnappings and a series of suicide bombings, revealing a vicious side of his ideology.

F. Terrorist Centre of Gravity in South-East Asia.

The Sulu-Célèbes Sea is known for their hostage-taking tactics (KFR). The GSA started using KFR after the death of its leader Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, which severed the financial link between the GSA and Al-Qaeda. Besides KFR tactics, the ASG has exploited their asymmetric maritime capabilities to check the flow of terrorist militants, logistics, and finances. Thus, while ASG still carries out illegal activities on land, they can also rely on maritime alternatives, such as the diversion of freighters to plunder and steal from the gang.

In South-East Asia, maritime terrorism by violent non-state actors takes place mainly in the Sulu and Célèbes seas, with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) being considered the main group. Kontinentalist says it is an Islamist separatist organisation fighting for an independent Muslim state in the south of the Philippines. Also have to recognize that marine insecurity does not happen in a vacuum. To wit, in Southeast Asia, pirates and armed robbers live in an arena that is full of natural resources and a lot of it is in the gloomy depths of Asia's oceans and oceans. However, the economic development of that region has left millions of dollars on the sidelines. Instead of helping coastal communities prosper, coastal communities suffer from poverty and environmental degradation. Specifically, Asia is home to nearly 85% of the world's fishing and aquaculture population.

Figure number 01 SULU SEA – Piracy and Terrorism.

Source;
https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpraesidiumintl.com%2Fgeneral%2Fsulu-sea-piracyandterrorism%2F&psig=AOvVaw0oSARQAoMVOa9rpCFDw24d&ust=1624030515337000&sou

rce=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAoQjRxqFwoTCICZ7qn_nvECFQAAAAAdAAAAABA3.

The archipelago terrain has improved the GSA's ability to survive. Marine law enforcement has difficulty locating members of the GSA who jump on the island to avoid arrest. The ASG also used shallow waters and mangroves from the region to foil the authorities. In addition, they often carry out their removals and flights at sea in small vessels to avoid satellite detection and reduce visual exposure to air or naval patrols. The Sulu-Celebes Sea is also the doorway to terrorism in Mindanao. During the era of Al Qaeda (AQ) terrorism in the late 1990's - 2000's, its affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had sent terrorists from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to Mindanao to train. A lot of these were smuggled into Mindanao by the TBA. CA continues to be a significant threat now. A recent statement by Sabah Police Commissioner Hazani Ghazali in February 2021 stresses that Sabah remains a point of recruitment, transit and fund-raising for CA members. In fact, between 2014 and 2020, there were 83 people held in Sabah for suspected involvement in JI activities, of which 38 were locals, were Filipino and eight were Indonesian. Today, Mindanao is ISIS's primary battleground in Southeast Asia. Authorities reported that activists were smuggled through the Sulu Archipelago, the Sangihe Islands or Palawan to attend the Marawi siege in 2017. In the post-Marawi environment, the Sulu-Celebs Sea remains essential to the survival of terrorist groups in Mindanao. Foreign fighters worldwide continued to enter Mindanao to support ISIS-affiliated groups like Abu Sayyaf, Maute Group, Ansharul Khilafah Philippines and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Their daughter, Risky Fantasya Rullie (also known as Cici), who also intended to become a suicide bomber, was detained in August 2020 on Jolo Island, along the Sulu Archipelago.

G. A dilemma of national sovereignty and counterterrorism.

The weaknesses of the ATT are often attributed to the lack of coordination capabilities required for joint patrols as a result of sovereignty claims in the region that affect the three countries. The Malaysian-Indonesian-Malaysian-Philippine dispute over the Ambalat and Sabah block can complicate the responsibilities of maritime patrols. Indonesia has deployed warships and air squadrons to carry out exercises near the Malaysian borders around the disputed Ambalat area. It was said that this exercise

was intended to improve the coordination of the Indonesian navy and aviation to protect their sovereignty. The Philippines has also re-launched its claims on Sabah even though no military action has been undertaken to date.

However, in addition to the territorial disputes among the three ATT Member States, they are also troubled by the maritime dispute in the South China Sea, north of the Sulu-Celebes Sea. Each year, a total of US$3.37 trillion in trade and the percentage of LNG in the world crosses the South China Sea. China has claimed territorial sovereignty over the percent of the South China Sea on the basis of its 1947 nine-dash lines — an arbitrary line drawn by Chinese authorities on the basis of "historical rights." This land claim straddles the exclusive economic areas (EEZs) of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The main territories disputed by the ATT Member States are the Natuna Islands, the North Borneo Seas, the West Palawan Seas and the Sabah Region. Asylum-seeking states have increasingly been militarizing their naval assets. Indonesia has relocated its headquarters from the Navy Combat Squad to the Natuna Islands 58, highlighting the priorities of the current administration. In October 2019, then Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Saifuddin Abdullah, shared his concerns on a major usurpation of his country's maritime territory and indicated that Malaysia would need to upgrade their naval assets to bring off their territorial waters better. The Philippines is also in the process of building a para-military force at sea to counter China's demands in the South China Sea. Of late, there has also been increased military collaborations between the United States and Philippines at the South China Seas after the Chinese navy encircled the Philippines naval assets at Philippines' territorial waters. Given limited resources, states would likely prioritize national sovereignty over their initiatives to combat terrorism. For example, the arms race in the South China Sea could further limit the TBA's resources. Despite their relative proximity, naval assets deployed to resist China's naval expansion in the South China Sea cannot be crossed-deployed for counterterrorism or counterpiracy efforts in the TBA due to the assortment of terrain in these contested waters. The TBA also includes scattered deep-water and shallow mangrove regions. Hence, the blue (deep water and open ocean capabilities) or green water (littoral and nearshore capabilities) military assets deployed to safeguard their interests in the South China Sea by the three TCA countries

may not be capable to sail the waters of the Sulu-Celebes Sea.

IV. CONCLUSION

The political efforts and cooperation of ASEAN over the past decade have eliminated loopholes in the law that offered a safe haven for terrorists. Regional efforts and the whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism have been effective in discouraging, detecting and disrupting terrorism.

Countering terrorism requires careful threat assessment and prioritization of mitigations. The main challenge is getting the merchant community ready for this task. Despite increased adherence to best management practices, the shipping community as a whole does not take maritime terrorism as seriously as it should be. In fact, many in the shipping industry view terrorism as an exaggerated threat; they are convinced that terrorists have not yet developed the capacity to target high-value platforms. The primary objective of their business-as-usual approach is to keep costs low and increase turnover, which will create greater opportunities for terrorists. It should be noted that the psychological dimension of terrorism remains critical in evaluating the strategy behind seemingly random attacks in coastal areas. Terrorists may commit violent attacks to target the minds of maritime security planners. Radical terrorist organizations understand that an attack at sea is a logistic challenge. Also have to recognize that marine insecurity does not happen in a vacuum. To wit, in Southeast Asia, pirates and armed robbers live in an arena that is full of natural resources and a lot of it is in the gloomy depths of Asia's oceans and oceans.

Regional states need formal and effective means to investigate threats, identify vulnerabilities and engage stakeholders in counterterrorism processes. A strong law that empowers security agencies to act quickly and defend commercial and coastal military property is a precondition. Regional governments need to make stakeholders and security agencies accountable, with liability fixed in ways so that the associated costs of a terrorist incident are borne by the parties responsible for having neglected to forestall it. This analysis of existing definitions of maritime piracy and terrorism has identified four key gaps, which should be addressed in the next analysis framework. First, there is a lack of common understanding of the kinds of assaults that are subject to maritime violence. Tertiary, the broad definitions of piracy informing IMB and IMO statistics on maritime violence do not distinguish

between simple acts of robbery and the form of crimes this study is concerned with, namely major attacks threatening international cargo transportation and/or international security. The newly established framework should clearly delineate the core instruments of this study. Finally, the important intersections between the two phenomena of piracy and maritime terrorism will have to be specified and incorporated into a coherent analytical concept.

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Conceptualising an Air Diplomacy Framework for Air Strategy of Small Air Forces to Strengthen Foreign Policy Aspirations: Sri Lankan Perspective and Way Forward

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Abstract— The term air diplomacy first came into limelight in the first half of the 20th century amidst the advent of air power. The air diplomacy is the employment of air power elements in support of the foreign policy. The study explored how an air diplomacy framework could be incorporated into the air strategy with object to strengthen country's foreign policy aspirations; further, it is benefitted to bolster the tangible and non-tangible capabilities of the SLAF. The contemporary world has seen regional/global air forces have been attempting to leverage air power in quest of protecting national interests and human capital beyond its seashores. Although, it is observed that Sri Lanka has not been exploiting the air diplomacy to the fullest extent, in quest of attaining foreign policy aspirations irrespective of the governments in power. Hence, it is imperative to bridge this gap and employ the air diplomacy in order to attain desired ends while supporting the regional stability/cooperation. Researchers have derived the conceptual framework based on the review of theoretical studies. The exploratory study accustomed with inductive approach and interpretivism research philosophy while conducted as a qualitative study. Eventually, researchers have developed an air diplomacy framework which could, schematically be imbedded into SLAF's air strategy, whilst aiming to support country's foreign policy aspirations, subsequent to recognised current government's foreign policy imperatives, where the air diplomacy could be employed. The two spheres of SLAF's engagements within the air diplomacy spectrum explored as kinetic and non-kinetic engagements.

Keywords— foreign policy, air strategy, air diplomacy

I. INTRODUCTION

"The ability to get what you want through attraction and not coercion"

- Joseph Nye

The dawn of 20th century had seen numerous advancements in technological perspectives. Besides, Wright brothers invented powered aircraft namely 'Kitty Hawk' in 1903 made its first flight in North Carolina which rooted to advent of air power. Air power created a significant impact on warfare and aviation industry which abetted to increase connectivity between regions/continents, due to its unique ability to operate in third dimension alongside with speed and reach. Meantime, aviation has invariably facilitated diplomats to exercise diplomacy swiftly and the term 'air diplomacy' first came into existence in 1920s along with the Lindburg's transatlantic flight.

Figure 3. Charles Lindburg with Spirit of St. Louis

Source: www.space.com

The VUCA world demands states to be aware on potential of air power's attributes to furthering national objectives. It is apparent that air power has been incorporated into foreign policy aspirations by many regional and global states in the contemporary world, particularly during the Covid 19 pandemic. The current government's policy framework which

based on 'Vista of Prosperity and Splendour' aiming to march the nation ahead on the path of socio-economic growth while seeking to fulfil its citizens' legitimate aspirations. The foreign policy entails an integral part in this regard beside air power can be exploited optimally to enable the foreign policy aspirations as a supplemented tool in the country's foreign policy with its unique core characteristics of speed, height and reach.

The SLAF has abetting country's economic growth by generating foreign revenue through United Nation's Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) since 2014. According to SLAF annual report 2018, UNPKO have been yielding substantial amount of foreign revenue USD 10.3 million, which accounted for 0.0125% from the GDP.

Besides, SLAF has outstretched its capabilities in support of country's foreign policy in the recent past even though it has not been methodically imbedded in the foreign policy of the country along with the air strategy. Namely, SLAF conducted Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations twice to assist Nepal government during earthquake in 2015, carried essential needs to Pakistan during flood and earthquake 2010/15, Male water purification crisis in 2014 and resupply missions to African continent in 2016 to sustainment of SLAF's aviation contingents were few of the notable missions conducted in the recent past. However, it is pertinent to state that the SLAF has not been able to extended its fullest support to the country's foreign policy mainly due to capability/capacity constraints. The prevailing gap between foreign policy execution and air diplomacy needs to be bridged whilst air diplomacy being employed as a tool of country's foreign policy.

A. *Significance of the Study*

The study will certainly add knowledge to the existing literature and will abet to bridge the gap between foreign policy aspirations and employment of air diplomacy. Further, this study would significantly develop an air diplomacy policy framework for future air strategy of the SLAF in par with the dynamics of the air power while probably the first kind of study in the SLAF and Sri Lanka.

B. *Problem Statement*

Foreign policy of a country is the tool which links its national interests with other state and non-state actors (Wijetunge, 2020). Meantime, air power is the tool that is readily available option for government to use irrespective in peace or war time (IAF, 2012).

It is evident that Sri Lanka's foreign policy has been invariably abetted to strengthen the SLAF's potential throughout its history of 70 years. However, insights have not been given prominently to augment the foreign policy through effective air diplomacy which opted the researchers to study the observed phenomenon.

Although, air diplomacy has been employed by many Air Forces in the region in support of respective governments' foreign policies whereas Sri Lanka does not practice or conjectured in a well-thought-out manner. The IAF has outstretched its contribution during the pandemic by airlifting tons of oxygen from all over the world which could be fitted into Covid diplomacy and health diplomacy. However, it has been noted that in the recent past, particularly post conflict era has seen SLAF's capabilities have been stagnated and inflicting a critical gap between its aspirations and available resources. In turn SLAF's presences had been critically hampered during the pandemic, to support government's foreign policy whereas the national carrier stood in the quest of the same. Particularly, during repatriating thousands of nationals from all over the world.

According to Wijetunge (2020), the significance of the Indian Ocean (IO) has felt ever than before and power rivalry continues to expand over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) between global powers (China, USA, India, Japan and Australia). China's BRI and US Indo-Pacific strategy along with the Quad have implicated such rivalry and same have severely effected on regional stability as well. In this backdrop, air diplomacy could act to endorse regional stability through cooperation, confidence building and working on a common doctrine between Air Forces, intensely in the new normalcy.


Figure 2. Sri Lanka's geo-strategic location in the IOR

Source: www.lankamarine.com

It is to be noted that the term air diplomacy is relatively novel to the SLAF personnel even though it has been exercised on and off. Thus, it is noted that affinity of air diplomacy not being inculcated among Air Force Officers has resulted in lack of research on the subject by SLAF Officers. Hence, SLAF personnel have not properly understood the broad concept of air diplomacy, as most of middle grade Officers do believe only air operations can be exercised within the spectrum of air diplomacy. Therefore, it is prudent to identify other components fall within air diplomacy umbrella. According to Cooke (2021), underscored five areas to ponder in an air diplomacy policy such as bilateral engagement, multilateral engagement, research and training, diplomacy dialogue and Air Chief's conclave. Thus, it is essential to identify relevant aspects of air diplomacy which could generate opportunities and benefits to the foreign policy as well as the SLAF.

Therefore, if the gap could able to be filled between foreign policy aspirations and application of air diplomacy, certainly it would yield new opportunities to the country, foreign policy and bolster SLAF's potential. Hence, it's imperative to formulate such a foreign policy embedded with air diplomacy in order to open new windows in support of government's policy framework.

C. Aim of the Study

To develop an air diplomacy framework to be incorporated into SLAF's air strategy in order to bolster country's foreign policy and SLAF's potential in a new normal epoch.

D. Objectives

i. To ascertain foreign policy aspirations that could be supported by air diplomacy.

ii. To identify the roles that SLAF could execute within the spectrum of air diplomacy.

iii. To explore the benefits that could be generated through air diplomacy towards Sri Lanka, and SLAF.

iv. To identify ways, means and ends to implement an air diplomacy framework in line with SLAF's air strategy and the foreign policy.

II. Literature Review

This segment encompassed theoretical studies, books, newspaper articles, internet articles, air power doctrines of regional/global Air Forces and journal articles in respect of the field of study. Further, same has schematically organized in accordance with study objectives.

A. Air Diplomacy and its Correlation with Foreign Policy

General Charles De Gaulle (1960), underpinned the link between diplomacy and employment of military while underscoring Armed Forces' role in foreign policy. He emphasised military's role to support country's foreign policy. In par with these lines Lespinois (2012), had defined air diplomacy as use of air assets to support foreign policy. Meantime, Lowther (2010), penned air diplomacy as a proactive approach to prevent conflict by use of air power in non-kinetic operations as an instrument of national power. IAF Air Power Doctrine (2012), rationalised military power's applicability in diplomacy to converse both intent and credibility during negotiations whereas remained as a critical enabler. Thus, researchers learned that air diplomacy as an integral component in a state's foreign policy whereas could be employed as an instrument of national power as well. However, researchers argued that the extent which air diplomacy could be extended by an Air Force is proportionate to its capabilities and capacities.

B. Foreign Policy Aspirations and Air Diplomacy

President Rajapaksa (2019), underpinned the paramount importance of national security and considered as the pinnacle of his policy framework. Cooke (2019), underpinned necessity of security remains critical as protecting of air/maritime boundaries from external interferences are core in this regard. Thus, researchers have understood that current government has given top priority to the national security as it constitutes pilar of national stability and growth in 'Vista of Prosperity and Splendour'. Hence, it is to be noted that invariably the SLAF has a pivotal role in this regard. Therefore, SLAF requires to be maintained its operational readiness constantly and same has identified as a core competency of the organisation as well. However, researches argued that SLAF needs to build capabilities and capacities in view of achieving such object.

President Rajapaksa during his sworn in ceremony (2019) and state visit to India has signified India first policy on strategic and security affairs which underlined Sri Lanka will not be a security concern to India. According to Vista of Prosperity and Splendour

(2019), Sri Lanka aims to work closely with India, SAARC and BIMSTEC nations towards regional security. Cooke (2018), underscored air diplomacy policy as an integral component in country's foreign policy which would yield basis to enhance Sri Lanka's interconnectedness with principally regional and strategic players. Thus, researches have explored that air diplomacy could be employed in quest of government's interest on strengthening ties in the region towards stability and cooperation.


Figure 3. Sri Lanka's salient foreign policy aspirations

Source: Vista of prosperity and splendour (2019)

C. Application of Air Power in Air Diplomacy

Poss (1994), argued that air diplomacy eternally has several gains compared to Naval and Army diplomacy due to air power's core characteristics of speed, reach and height. Owing to this Lowther (2010), underpinned the roles that USAF can play in the spectrum of air diplomacy such as public,humanitarian,military, commercial, traditional, preventive, coercive and deterrence.

BAF (2014), has elucidated three distinct roles in air power's peace time application whereas disaster relief and promoting IR has given more prominence. IAF (2012), has underpinned the importance of assisting foreign friendly governments in disaster situations where air power's speed and reach permitting government to outstretched its goodwill swiftly. Followings can be underpinned as significant air roles which abetted to augment foreign policies of respective governments.

i.   BAF took part in post-earthquake operations to India in 2001 and Pakistan in 2001 and 2005.

ii.   BAF and IAF both conducted HADR operations in post-Tsunami 2004 to affected countries in the region.

iii.   IAF delivered aid and supplies to USA during Katrina Hurricane in 2005.

iv.   IAF launched 'Operation Cactus' in support of Maldives government to ensure not been overthrown.

v.   IAF airlifted Covidshield vaccines to Mauritius and Seychelles in 2021.

Correspondingly SLAF (2018), underscored its extensive support had been yielded to friendly nations during disaster situations.

i.   Airlifted relief and supplies to Pakistan during flood and earthquake respectively in 2010 and 2015.

ii.   Airlifted rescue and relief contingents to assist earthquake hit Nepal in 2015.

iii.   Assist Maldives during water purification crisis in 2014

Figure 4. SLAF's No 2 Squadron airlifted medical contingent to assist Nepal's earthquake victims

Source: www.airforce.lk (2015)

Thus, researchers have explored that assisting foreign friendly governments at the need of hour in disaster situations more prominent among Air Forces which reflect government's goodwill towards

those affected nations. Hence, researches opined such operations form an integral part within the spectrum of air diplomacy to strengthen state's foreign policy ties. However, researchers argue that strategic reach of SLAF needs to be boosted in this regard despite possessing the regional reach.

D. Covid Diplomacy and Air Power

Vidanage (2020), signified that Covid diplomacy becomes increasingly popular among states as the global pandemic badly hit the world. Recently concluded G 7 summit signified that G 7 leaders are eager to assist developing countries for recovering from the Covid 19 through providing vaccines and other medical apparatus (G7UK, 2021). Bhalla (2021), stressed IAF's role during the Covid 19 in quest of government's needs by airlifting tons of Oxygen from all over the world to Delhi during their recent Oxygen crisis and extending great support to friendly nations during the pandemic by delivering vaccines and other medical necessities symbolising the Indian government's vaccine diplomacy.

Thus, researchers explored that necessity of integrating air power in quest of Covid diplomacy which being highly applicable to the Sri Lankan context as well. The SLAF could outstretched to assist government's foreign policy aspirations in relation to Covid 19. However, it is to be noted that SLAF's capabilities have to be critically analysed in this regard. Researchers have identified No 2 Heavy Transport Squadron's role is vital for the same along with arrival of overhauled Yankees

Figure 6. IAF's transport fleet supporting the fight against Covid 19

Source: IAF (2021)

E. United Nation's Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO)

BAF (2014), rationalised BAF's contribution towards preservation of international peace through participating in UNPKO over the last few decades. SLAF (2018), underscored SLAF's participation in UNPKO in South Sudan and Central African Republic invariably act as an augmenting tool to strengthen ties between Sri Lanka and the UN. SLAF Annual report 2018, underscored that SLAF's Mi 17 Aviation Contingents have generated foreign revenue of USD 10 millions in year 2017. However, recently SLAF (2021), announced cease of its operations in South Sudan w.e.f. June 2021 upon completion of ongoing mission's tenure. Thus, researchers have understood that take part in UNPKO by SLAF being benefitted to the country in two facets. First, generating foreign revenue and secondly enhancing ties with the UN. Employment of UN Staff Officers (UNSOs) also is pivotal in this regard since they do help to enhance the ties with the UN while generating foreign revenue. Therefore, authors explored that SLAF should be endeavoured to increase no of UNPKO as well as UNSOs appointments whereas SLAF alone cannot be afforded. This endeavour demands government's involvement through an effective diplomacy with the strategic and operational levels of the UN hireachy.

Figure 7. SLAF Aviation contingents in Central African Republic and South Sudan

Source: SLAF Basic Doctrine (2018)

F. Promoting National Pride

Figure 8. SLAF Blue Eagles aerobatic team

Source: www.airforce.lk (2018)

According to IAF (2012), promote national integration and national pride are an essence in a multi-ethnic state. Further, participation in air exercises regionally and globally would strengthen mutual cooperation whilst augmenting the national pride in the international forums. IAF's aerobatic/diplay teams regular participations in aerial displays in foreign skies underscored the trans-continental diplomacy. This was more notable during SLAF's 70th anniversary flypast in Colombo 2021.

Figure 9. IAF's Suryakirans over Colombo skies 2021

Source: www.airforce.lk (2021)

Lowther (2010), also underpinned USAF's trans-continental diplomacy where USAF take part in numerous air exercises with allied nations. SLAF (2018), penned necessity of take part in air exercises and hosting such exercises among regional Air Forces. Further, it stressed such involvement would increase cooperation, build partnerships among Air Forces. Thus, researchers have explored that SLAF too has to be given more insights in this regard, where SLAF could promote the national pride in such forums. Albeit, it is deemed necessary to boost SLAF's capabilities in view of such roles. i.e. Blue Eagles aerobatic team's capabilities/capacities. However, foreign Air Forces' air displays in Colombo

skies have implicated political paradox in the country where opposition political parties had been opposed such efforts through wrong interpretations to gain political advantages. Therefore, SLAF needs to have a consensus approach between politico-air leadership to alleviate critical political aspects while propagating the right image to the population.

G. Bolstering the Conceptual Component of SLAF

Figure 10. Components of fighting power

Source: British Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)-Operations (2010)

According to ADP (2010), conceptual component constitutes an integral fragment in fighting power which illustrates knowledge, understanding and application of doctrine to fight. Thus, professional military education (PME) is essential to bolster the conceptual component. Cooke (2021), penned necessity of yielding foreign staff courses to SLAF Officers, other technology know-how programmes in turn giving opportunities to the global/regional Air Officers to undergo local military/air educational programmes, which would enhance interaction between Air Forces. Thus, researchers underscored that air diplomacy could be abetted to obtain foreign PME opportunities to SLAF Officers where the regional interaction and confidence building would be enhanced. Further, invariably this would be abetted to strengthen foreign relations while enhancing the regional stability in a post pandemic era as well.

H. Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Engagements

British Air and Space Power Doctrine (AP-3000,2009), has enunciated application of kinetic and non-kinetic air power roles within the spectrum of conflict as well as in peace time. Authors have noted that kinetic air power roles invariably imbedded with attack, bombing and other air operations while non-kinetic air power roles roles

have opposed to kinetic activities. However, Lowther (2010), has rationalised air diplomacy as a proactive approach to prevent conflict through use of air power in the form of non-kinetic operations. Therefore, researches have explored that air diplomacy roles have fallen within the spectrum of non-kinetic air power. However, researches have recognised that, within these non-kinetic operations, two tiers of engagements could be underpinned. Thus, engagements which aircraft being employed and aircraft not being employed ,where the researchers have presented as kinetic engagements and non-kinetic engagements in the spectrum of air diplomacy.

III. METHODOLOGY

This segment has discussed the methodology of the study and aided to derive the conceptual framework from the theoretical framework developed through literature review. The operationalisation of the derived conceptual framework discussed subsequently. The qualitative study has used thematic analysis as the tool of analysis.Further, the research design of the study as follows.

Research Approach- Inductive approach has been used in the study in order to find solutions to the observed phenomenon.

Research Choice- The study accustomed as a qualitative exploratory study.

Research Philosophy- Researchers have used intepretivism as the study philosophy in order to intepret reasons and meaninigs to the observed phenomenon.

Research Strategy- The study encompassed grounded theory strategy to develop an air diplomacy framework for SLAF's air strategy.

Time Horizon- Cross-sectional time horizon employed.

Technique and Procedure- Data collection and analysis are the technique and procedure of the study.

A.   Conceptualization

The conceptual framework of the study has illustrated, what the researchers expect to explore through this study. Following conceptual framework has been developed in line with the four exploratory research objectives which aims to work as the blueprint of the study.

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
Independent Variables   Dependent Variable

Figure 11. Conceptual framework

Source: Author (2021)

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The study determined to ascertain knowledge in relation to the prevailing gap between Sri Lanka's foreign policy aspirations and air diplomacy. Subsequently to reshape SLAF's air strategy by developning an air diplomacy framework. Thus, researchers have depicted the findings in line with the study objectives.

A.   Foreign policy Aspirations of the Government that could be supported by the Air Diplomcay

Current government's foreign policy basis on President's election manifesto -2019 'Vista of Prosperity and Splendour'. According to the respondents, researchers have noted following imperatives which could be supported by air diplomacy.

- National security
- Regional cooperation/stability
- International interaction
- Ppromoting national pride
- Covid diplomacy

i. **National security** termed as the top priority of the current government. Air power invariably remains pivotal in national security. Albeit, authors explored according to the respondents air diplomacy could be outstrched to boost maritime security which constitutes predominant segment in national security. As the nation endeavours to thrive as a maritime hub in the IOR, maritime security should be bolstered by the two main stake holders, SLN and SLAF. It was found that maritime surveillance, maritime air defence (MAD), maritime search and rescue (MSAR) and collective information sphere are

the salient areas that SLAF could exploit air diplomacy. Sri Lankan seaspace nearly 27 times bigger than her land mass. Thus, identifying critical capability gaps to counter transnational crimes within own seas (i.e. human trafficking, drug trafficking, sea piracy etc.), secure sea line of communications (SLOCs) and facilitate MSAR services within the AOR is necessary. Therefore, researchers underpinned that air diplomacy would be a great catalyst in this regard where the regional Air Forces could be extended air partnerships in view of establishing collective information sphere to secure such common maritime interests within the IOR. Thus, researchers have derived following model while correlating the air power roles and maritime security which could be imbedded with air diplomacy.


Figure 12. Maritime-air collabotaration for maritime security

Source: Author (2021)

ii. **Regional Cooperation/Stability** is a vital area that the government aims to work closely with India and other regional ogranisations such as SAARC, BIMSTEC in quest of regional security. Thus, authors opined that marime security posed an integral part in relation to the regional security as well. However, it was explored that regional Air Forces yet to implement such mechanism in view of regional security despite having dedicated organisation like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It is prudent to have a military cooperation apporaoch imbedded with air diplomacy in these regional forums to promote regional cooperation/security. Cooke (2021), underpinned importance of conducting Air Chief's Conclaves to strengthen the regional cooperation aided by air diplomacy.Although, a novel notion to SLAF, it is already practicing by several regions such as ASEAN Air chief's conference (AACC), African air chief's symposium (AASC), System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces (SICOFA) etc. Thus, researchers opined that SLAF could take initiative to host such conference aiming on regional cooperation which would unarguably be abetted to boost regional

cooperation with air diplomacy. Furhter, it was found that Sri Lanka yet to explore air partnerships with foreign friendly Air Forces. Researchers opined that existing regional bilateral partnerships could be explored into the sphere of air partnerships whereas SLAF be benefitted to boost its capabilities and capacities. Thus, researchers have derived following model to boost regional cooperation/stability through the non-kinetic engagements which could be imbedded with air diplomacy. Furhter, it was understood that such model would immensely benefitted to host/participate combined air/military exercises and sharing of expertise knowledge.


Figure 13. Air diplomacy for regional cooperation/stability

Source: Author (2021)

iii. The government seeks to increase **International Interaction** from a standpoint of equality. The Covid 19 pandemic has curtailed the global connectivity though new windows to be opened to keep alive the global interaction in new normalcy. Authors have identified following kinetic and non-kinetic engagements could be employed to maintain international interaction amidst of the pandemic in view of promoting air diplomacy to strengthen ties.

- HADR- To assist foreign friendly governments in disaster/crisis situations.
- UNPKO- To assist UN to preserve global peace and security.
- Air dialogues- To enhance global cooperation among Air Forces in view of multilateral cooperation.
- PME/Aviation education(Avi-Tech) - To explore newest developments in air power concepts and its related technology.

Further, researchers have recognised SLAF's involvement in UNPKO has a direct relationship with government's economic interests since, it yielding subsatantial foreign revenue to the national economy. Thus, authors opined to increase SLAF's participation in UNPKO. However, it is to be noted that, vice-versa SLAF needs to avail required

capabilities and capacities in order to meet such demands. Following depiction has illustrated SLAF's contribution towards national economy through UNPKO durig 2018-19 period. Further, researchers opined non-tangible benefits generated by the SLAF's UNPKO would predominantly aid to promote country's image and strengthen the ties with the UN.


Figure 14. Foreign revenue generated from SLAF's UNPKO

Source: SLAF Annual Performance Reports (2018 & 2019)

Moreover, authors opined that increase the no of UNSOs also would be benefitted in two forms such as bolstering ties with the UN and generating foreign revenue. Hence, researchers have developed following theoretical model to enhance international interaction through the kinetic/non-kinetic engagements which could be catalysed with air diplomacy.


Figure 15. Air diplomacy for international interaction

Source: Author (2021)

iv. **Promoting National Pride** identified as a key pillar in current government's foreign policy. It was found that numerous Air Forces have been employing air power to promote national pride in national and international forums. The SLAF could invariably share its experieneces in relaton to application of air power in counter insurgency operations (COIN) as the only succeeded Air Force in the COIN context. The SLAF would be inculcated these unique expertise knowledge in foreign PME programmes. SLAF's presence in global/regional air displays could be underscored as another way of

promoting the national pride, particularly in the regional forums. The SLAF aerobatics team 'Blue Eagles' capabilities/capacities have to be augmented in view of endeavoring such afford. Wahid (2021), underpinned IAF's Suryakirans role in this regard which being the premier aerobatics team in the region. Further, it was revealed that SLAF could extend its presence in regional air exercises by employing own air power assets and experience pilots, and SLAF could host such air exercises with involvement of regional/global Air Forces which would be immensely benefitted to the SLAF's pilots and other operational crew to have such exposure in post conflict era. Thus, researchers learnt that the air diplomacy framework would generate positive impact in view of promoting national pride in global/regional forums.


Figure 16. Air diplomacy to promote national pride

Source: Author (2021)

v. **Covid Diplomacy** increasing as the pandemic on the verge of critical level. Country's foreign policy executioners   along with health officials endeavoring all efforts to acquisition of required quantam of vaccines and medical apparatus. Wahid (2021), underscored IAF's role being played in this regard with object to support India's foreign policy imperatives at the need of hour. Thus, authors opined that SLAF could be a responsible stakeholder in view of Covid diplomacy being a supportive element to the foreign policy in view of air transportation of required medical assistance. Further, it was underpinned by the respondents that expats who live beyond seashores have been severely affected due to the pandemic. Thus, air diplomacy could be outstretched by the SLAF to repartriate those expats when needed. Hence, airlift operations would be employed by the SLAF with available limited resources. Further, these type of operations invariably symbolised the SLAF's presence in the new normalcy and constant readiness to undertake such national requirements.

A. *Constraints, Challenges, Opportunities and Way Forward*

The study has identified following constraints in view of implementing an air diplomacy framework in respect of the SLAF.

i. Capabilities/Capacities, the existing fleet is necessary to modernise in accordance with the preceding objectives. Thus, it is imperative to augment surveillance capabilities considering the strategic depth of the maritime domain while enhancing the strategic airlift capabilities to conduct trans-continental flights. Further, it is deemed necessary to develop/transform the 'Blue Eagles' into a robust aerobatic team since present platforms constitute concerns with its reach despite attractive performances.

ii. Financial constraints, are most common pitfall that small Air Forces experiencing in contemporary world. Prevailing pandemic has further deepened fiscal constraints as the country's economy has been severely contracted by -3% according to the President Rajapaksa (2021). Thus, acquisition of new platforms at this critical juncture would implicate socio-political criticisms against the government as well as the SLAF. Thus, in turn the government would loss popular support while creating a political gain on opponents. Hence, perception management of the public and effective communication of politico-air intents to the public is essential. Albeit, SLAF should schematically project acquision/modernisation of platforms while prioritising the requirements into a timeline. Further, management of socio-political implications is vital whilst circumventing loss of popular support.

iii. According to the respondents, researchers have identified the IOR power rivalry is the principal challenge before Sri Lanka. Emerging power competon between the Quad and China's BRI has constituted a significant impact on geopolitical sphere concerning to Sri Lanka, despite the country adapting a neutral foreign policy. Moreover, this has serious implications on acquisition of new platforms and technological advancements for developing economies since, the aviation technology within the purview of few developed economies. Particularly the Western technology whereas the Government needs to extend balanced foreign relations. Kainikara (2019), all small Air Forces are rely on external assistance to maintain its technical sophistication and efficacy. However, researchers opined that effective foreign policy execution would ease the circumstances and open new windows. Further, it is pertinent to reveal that SLAF should start focusing on indigenious industry outlay in view of sustenance in long term.

iv. Sri Lanka's geo-strategic location remains pivotal as the Island located equidistant from the African and Australian continents. Present Commander of the Air Force then Director Air Operations Air Marshal Sudarshana Pathirana underscored Mattala airport as the ideal location to establish 'Combined Air Task Force Hub' in Colombo Air Symposium 2018. Researchers also opined that Jaffna, Trincomalle, Hambanthota and Katunayake too equally significant since all geographic locations could act as connectivity hubs considering the air/land/sea connectivity, strategic importance and depth. Further, researchers opined to establish a regional MSAR centre in Sri Lanka considering the extensive maritime domain and congested sea traffic within the region. It is to be underscored that domestic political consensus approach also highly essential prior to establish such military partnerships. Else wrong socio-political manupilations could be propagated in view of attaining a political compensations.

v. Therefore, authors opined that considering the preceding facts is highly essential to develop an air diplomacy framework. Former US state secretary Henry Kissinger (2020), underpinned that the world order will not be the same in a post pandemic epoch. This implicated the balance of power would be shifted in a post pandemic era whereas Sri Lanka needs to appreciate its pros and cons and to exploit such paradigm shift in favour of the country's future aspirations. Thus, authors foresee the necessity of an comprehensive air diplomacy policy framework imbedded into the SLAF's air strategy with object to achieving SLAF's vision 2025 as well.

B. Air Diplomacy Framework for SLAF in Support of Foreign Policy

Researchers have scematicaly developed the air diplomacy framework based on the conceptual framwework. Researchers have identified the current government's salient foreign policy aspirations and the imperatives which could be supplemented by the employment of air power. Moreover, researchers have explored and underpinned that two tiers of engagements within the spectrum of air diplomacy where the SLAF could be engaged. First, kinetic engagements, where the aircraft operations being employed while non-kinetic engagements where the aircraft are not being employed. Hence, researchers opined that defined air diplomacy framework could be incorporated into

the air strategy of the SLAF which would support the government's foreign policy imperatives. Further, it would aid to enhance the regional cooperation/stability while bolstering the SLAF's capabilities/capacities.

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Figure 17. Air diplomacy framework for SLAF

Source: Author (2021)

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In a densely globalised world exerting soft power increasingly become a viable option in the statecraft in order to furtherance of national objectives. Thus, diplomacy has emerged as the first option for both power projection and conflict resolution. It was identified that air power's core charecteristics of speed, reach and height allow to be employed in discern situations to exert state's soft power through the air diplomacy. However, it was noted that the notion of air diplomacy is still being a novel to the SLAF which demands extensive study and comprehend about its implications.

Authors, subsequent to the extensive study and discussion following recommendations have made in accordance with the study objectives and findings.

A.   To establish air partnerships with regional air forces with object to yield effective maritime security mechanism in the IOR.

The necessity of a common maritime security mechanism to protect maritime interests of countries within the IOR has emerged due to the hike in transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking etc. Further, these partnerships should be encompassed a collective endeavour to yield maritime surveillance, MSAR, and MAD.

B.   To establish a regional combined MSAR centre in Sri Lanka to facilitate MSAR services to aircraft/ships in distress condition within the IOR.

Considering the geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka and the strategic depth, the Island ideally suits to establish a regional MSAR centre through collaboration with regional Air and Naval Forces. Considering the connectivity identified locations for such coined centre are, Hambanthota, Trincomalee, Jaffna and Katunayake. Although, considering the depth, reach and proximity to the vast maritime domain, Hambanthota could be underpinned as the ideal location.

C.   To increase no of UNPKO to SLAF in view of generating substantial foreign revenue, strengthening ties with the UN and to promote country's image in global forums.

SLAF's aviation contingents have already yielding a substantial foreign revenue to the national economy and increase the no of contingents and UNSO appointments, would be boosted the foreign revenue share by the SLAF. However, viability study needs to be done on required human and physical resources in view of meeting such demands.

D.   To establish a collective information sphere among regional Air Forces with object to alleviate transnational crimes and maritime related disasters.

Common information sharing mechanism among regional Air Forces within the IOR and adjacent seas is essential in order to take swift and promt actions in order to circumvent such activities like transnational crimes. Absence of such mechanism in present context invariably curtailing swift participation of the Air Forces into the situation.

E.   To augment capabilities and capacities of SLAF air power in view of maritime security, Covid diplomacy and participation in air displays/exercises.

Acquisition of new platforms very much debatable at this critical juncture as the country's economy has been already contracted by -3% due to the pandemic and same would likely to inflict socio-political implications in the country as well. Albeit, SLAF needs to appreciate required quantam and type of platforms in view of aerial diplomacy. Thus, researchers opined that acquisition plan in line with aerial diplomacy objectives to be articulated with object to acquire within a stipulated timeline.

F.   To host Air Chief's Conclave among regional/global Air Forces whom have common

interest in the region in view of confidence building, mutual cooperation, regional cooperation/stability.

This would allow SLAF to share a common forum with the participation of foreign Air Commanders in view of laying the foundation to articulate and implement an air diplomacy policy. Furhter, annual conferences would see the progress of given directives and end results. Particularly to bridge the existing gaps in the maritime security domain.

G. To disseminate SLAF's expertise know-how in relation to application of air power in the COIN context in global/regional air forums and enhance PME/Avi-tech education programmes with foreign friendly Air Forces.

The knowledge sphere in military or aviation field is deemed necessary to keep Airmen's cognition and conceptual ability at a higher level. Thus, enhance the conceptual componenet of Air Forces invariably high demanded task in the modern day. Dissemination SLAF's know-how in foreign air forums vice-versa would generate opportunities to augment SLAF's conceptual component.Furhter, availing of foreign PME/Avi-tech education programmes for its human capital through air diplomacy also could be underscored.

H. To induct a consensus political approach between the government and oppositions prior to establish air partnerships and exploit country's strategic assets for air diplomacy in order to circumvent unnecessary socio-politico manipulations.

A consensus approach is deemed necessary to circumvent socio-politico implications against intended air diplomacy aspirations. The current socio-politico environment saw numerous manipulations and adverse implications on political stability due to absence of an agreed approach between the government and oppositions. Further, effective communication is essential to convey right politico-air intents and its benefits to the public accurately while projecting right image of the SLAF.

V.CONCLUSION

Advent of air power created a significant impact on warfare and aviation industry which abetted to increase connectivity between regions/continents, due to its unique ability to operate swiftly in the third dimension. Lindburg's transatlantic flight in 1920s symbolised the emergence of then novel concept of air diplomacy. This study endeavoured to conceptualise an air diplomacy framework which could be incorporated into the air strategy while enhancing the country's foreign policy and boosting the SLAF's potential.

Air diplomacy policy as an integral component in country's foreign policy would yield basis to enhance Sri Lanka's interconnectedness with principally regional and strategic players. The study has identified that air diplomacy could be employed in quest of government's salient foreign policy aspirations in two spheres of kinetic and non-kinetic engagements in the new normalcy. National security, international interaction, regional cooperation/stability, promoting national pride and the Covid diplomacy have been underpinned as salient foreign policy imperatives which air diplomacy could be imbedded. Eventually, the researchers underpinned that an effective air diplomacy framework would be integrated into the air strategy to bolster the SLAF's capabilities/capacities and enhance the foreign policy while extending air power in quest of government's foreign policy aspirations.

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The Port Policy of Small Island Powers: Sri Lankan Perspective

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Abstract— This paper discusses the requirement of reorienting the port policy of Sri Lanka. The port policy directly concerns national interest and the fundamental values of the state that are strategically significant for acquiring, managing, and controlling the global power strategy. At present, Sri Lanka is expanding port policies due to the shift in the power of the global economic arena. Therefore, Hambanthota and Colombo port have given significance to Sri Lanka and made them maritime influencers in their own rights. In this context, each of the global powers will see a threat to itself if the Government of Sri Lanka is to favour one over the other. Even though Sri Lanka has applied the non-alignment policy approach, the littoral state, port policy of Sri Lanka faces the dilemma of balancing or bandwagoning strategy with the state and non-state actors. The objectives of the present research are to explain the geo strategic importance of Sri Lanka in terms of port power and to critically examine the challenges to the port policy of Sri Lanka, to investigate the positive and negative impact of challenges to the port security of Sri Lanka. Research methods of the present research deal with both descriptive and analytical in nature. The study is mainly based on secondary sources. This research found the unstable port policies with the frequent change of domestic government resulted in chaos in the economic stability. Observation has made the reluctance of co-operation and difficulty of managing and understanding maritime agreements, and lack of coherent functionalism in the port policies. Thus, a non-aligned strategic approach would be the best port policy for Sri Lanka. Further, the structure of the international system is influential, and Sri Lanka must not persuade the individual character of the leader where port policies must base on an in-depth understanding of the maritime concepts and theories and apply them into function.

Keywords— geopolitics, power, port policies

I. INTRODUCTION

At present studies of port policy are considered a distinctive field, helping policymakers to distinguish between port policies and other policies since port policies directly concern national interest and the fundamental values of the state that are strategically significant for acquiring, managing and controlling theglobal power strategy.

The location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) creates interest over regional and extra-regional countries for maritime expansionism. Indian sphere of influence is inevitable at this juncture. China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy is growing importance in the 21st century maritime civilization. On the other hand, containment strategy over China's maritime expansionism proves the revisionist power of the United States of America (USA). They have operationalized this into Indo – Pacific strategy. The term called 'Power' is determined the structure of the international system. Super Powers, great powers, and regional powers have the potential to influence small powers such as Sri Lanka in terms of strategic significance. Sri Lanka's strategic location in the IOR is the main bargaining power to a small state. However, each state has to survive on its own in the international system. Even though all states are equal in the international arena, their capabilities are different. Sri Lanka is the only country in the IOR to become a maritime hub with her strategic location, and she could be the facilitator to maritime trade in the IOR. Islanders of Sri Lanka used ports and harbors for maritime trade with other countries with expanding maritime civilization. Chinese are great maritime explorers in world history. Whenever they landed carved stones in commemorations, there is a stone near Galle in Sri Lanka to signify the greatest maritime explore Admiral Zheng He's visit. In the 21st century still, these powerful countries are desperately seeking opportunities for their maritime expansionism. At this juncture, Colombo and Hambanthota ports are vital strategic locations situated in the western and southern part of the mainland of Sri Lanka.

This is the container age of maritime trade in the 21st century. The geostrategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean is highlighted by the fact that it is almost in the strategic hub of South Asia. It is midway in the maritime trade route between the West part of the world and the Eastern part of Asia. This position is essential not only for the economic development of Sri Lanka but also for balancing the global power competition in the IOR.

At present, Sri Lanka is in the process of expanding port policy due to the shift in the power of the global economic arena as well as the rapid market growth of Asia. Therefore, Hambanthota and Colombo port have given significance to Sri Lanka and made them maritime influencers in their own rights. The recent interest of India in the West Container Terminal and Chinese foothold in Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) at Colombo harbor and economic growth in maritime trade at Hambanthota harbor are direct maritime economic influencers to Small Power Sri Lanka. In addition to China and India, there is increased competition between the large global powers, including the USA and Japan, to acquire or manage Sri Lanka's port power. Due to its unique geographical nature as well as its global position, the port and port policy of Sri Lanka have become a prime target for the global and regional powers. In this context, each of the global powers will see a threat to itself if the Government of Sri Lanka is to favor one over the other. Even though Sri Lanka has been applied the non- alignment policy approach, the littoral state, port policy of Sri Lanka, faces the dilemma of balancing or bandwagoning strategy with the state and non-state actors in the geopolitical context. Thus, the port policies of Sri Lanka, vital to reconsider to exploit maximum opportunities as a small island power.

II. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This research is about the social behavior of maritime components by applying international relations theories in to practice. This broader area of social science needs to prove with logical reasoning of theories based on laws of cause and effect. This will be helpful to understand the ontological and epistemological path to this study. The objectives of the present research are to explain the geostrategic importance of Sri Lanka in terms of port power and to critically examine the challenges to the port policy of Sri Lanka, to investigate the positive and negative impact of challenges to the port security of Sri Lanka. Further, to identify an alternative/possible policy

paradigm for managing the challenges and the negative impacts on the port power of Sri Lanka. Research methods of the present research deal with both descriptive and analytical in nature. The study is mainly based on secondary sources. The secondary data is collected from various journals, books, official reports, magazines, newspapers, websites, articles, video and audio materials, dissertations, monographs etc.

III. RESULT

A. Conceptualization of the existing literature

Even though the ports of Sri Lanka have been considered strategically significant, there is a massive shortage of studies on the port policy of Sri Lanka in academia. In cooperate with the realistic approach, some of the existing literature on the recent development of ports, national security and foreign policy studies of Sri Lanka have somewhat examined Sri Lanka's port policy from the geostrategic point of view during and after the Cold War period (Kaul, 1974; Keerawella, 1992; Kodikara, 1992). Moreover, the role of international systemic stimuli in the Indian Ocean, such as the nature of the balance of power system and influence of global and regional powers, has been the outstanding focus of existing literature on the port policy of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the majority of the literature has neglected the complex nature of Sri Lanka's port policy.

Some other studies highlighted the power struggle between the contemporary global and regional powers for acquiring or managing port policy of Sri Lanka. Similarly, several studies have argued that hegemonic pressure from global and regional powers such as the USA, China, Japan and India consistently influenced the outcomes of the port policy of Sri Lanka (Jayatilleka, 2015; Lahiri, 2010). It is clear that the existing studies of Sri Lankan port policy mainly focus on either influence of other associated domestic, regional and international variables rather thanthe systemic levels (Bhumitra, 2019).

After 2009, a new trend has appeared in the studies of Sri Lankan port policy, where the neo-realist approach, which accounts for domestic level variables, was employed to analyse the port policy context of Sri Lanka (William. 2013). Specifically, a large number of contemporary studies have differently analyzed the domestic level variable such as the role of executive leadership that heavily influenced port policy outcomes in Sri Lanka.

Nevertheless, existing studies on the port policy of Sri Lanka devoted only marginal attention to the nature of the wider significance of the port policy of Sri Lanka with the new development of maritime trade and commerce. Therefore, the recent research endeavours to generate a more comprehensive understanding of cause-and-effect that associated with system level variables while filling the gap of the existing body of knowledge where significant factors have not been given adequate attention.

B. Theoretical consideration

The small island, Sri Lanka, is fluctuating with strategic decisions with the hegemonic ambitions of larger states. Domestic politics in Sri Lanka is heavily influenced by lagers polities. The military and economic power, as well as power over opinion, are influential. Meanwhile, port security in Sri Lanka is facing a 'Security Dilemma' with its strategic location. The security dilemma is the basic concept of neorealism and explains the behaviour of actors such as causes of war. Especially the egoistic nature of hegemonic powers works based on suspicion and power and force. Therefore, this research considers the theory of structural realism, where the structure of the international system articulates how states behave. Further, professor John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz well-versed and argues that domestic politics doesn't influence the international system and states are in the attempt to persuade power and powerful as much as possible in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014)

The 'Power' depends on the context. Sri Lanka is considered a small island power with its strategic location, which is a qualitative feature of a small state. On the other hand, larger powers have certain potential to influence the international system, such as USA and China. Thus, power matter in the international system and it determined the structure, and each state has to survive on its own; both the liberals and realists accept the term 'Power'. Therefore, balancing and bandwagoning are two concepts to discuss with the security dilemma in Sri Lankan context. According to Vayrynen, balancing means alignment with the opposing great power against the source of danger, while bandwagoning involves alignment with the threatening power (Vayrynen, 1997).

C. Sri Lanka to Bandwagon or Balance

In realist's view, International anarchy is the immediate background to create a security dilemma in the world. However, they argue, "the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. International relations continues to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy" (Gilpin, 1981). The structure of the international system and the behavior of larger states directly affect the stability of the small states in geopolitics. When the larger nations are anticipated to be powerful in the international system, a great imbalance of power could create either economic or military capacities. This is the juncture where a small state like Sri Lanka could be squeezed in between larger polities. Therefore, Sri Lankan domestic politics must understand the international dimension of port diplomacy when creates port policies.

The 'diplomacy' is basically the management of international relations. Maritime diplomacy is management of international relations through the maritime domain (Miere, 2014, p. 7). Port Diplomacy is directly coming under the field of maritime diplomacy. Thus, Port Diplomacy is the vital area of concern in Sri Lanka foreign policy in today's context. The modus operandi to port policy must consider the overall geopolitical multivariate role. To construct the port city in Colombo and port in Hambantota was the strategic choice of Sri Lanka. These were the decisions taken with the executive leadership of Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksha during the period of presidency, and decisions have been gone through cabinet approval before came into the act. However, Mr. Maithripala Sirisena was sworn as the executive president of Sri Lanka in 2015; after that, Colombo Port City development was temporarily shutdown. This is a notable example of individualism and its implication to other peripheral areas of interest. Thus, the Executive Presidency of Sri Lanka is a culminating point where decisions are critical when dealing with larger polities. Therefore, Sri Lanka, to maintain a balance of posture towards larger governments, need to revisit the foreign policies and select the best method to interact with international state and non-state actors. nevertheless, revoking is not a solution for Sri Lanka in this paradigm, and proactive port policies are the solution to interact with regional and extra-regional powers without hedging. China's OBOR initiative is a new geopolitical strategy in the 21st century and economic, political and military expansion growing resistance from countries including the US, India, Japan and Australia (Chatham House, 2021). The USA, Indo – Pacific strategy is a tool to counter balance China's expansion. However, small states like Sri Lanka

neither a political, military, or economic power. Only the strategic location is the bargaining power to Sri Lanka. According to Rahul Saigaonker (Saigaonker, 2021), Sri Lanka, in the existing geopolitical context bandwagon with stronger partner China, has been verified during the issues related to the East Container Terminal in Port of Colombo. The same argument made by Abeyagoonasekera shows that Sri Lanka's growing Chinese influence has significantly swayed the Indo-Lanka relationship. He reminded that a single Chinese submarine visit to Colombo could hamper Indo –Sri Lanka relations and impact domestic politics (Abeyagoonasekera, 2021). Therefore, bandwagon with China shows the lack of port diplomacy in Sri Lankan port policy.

It was a choice of Sri Lanka to build a port at Hambanthotaand even expand the port of Colombo and Port City.According to Wanigaraja, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Port City, factors like a business-friendly regime, strong diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, comprehensive trade and investment agreements provided the confidence for investors to invest and makeit a success. He also said that the formulation and the implementation of a coherent policy framework were essential to realizing the full potential of Port City Colombo (Wignaraja, 2021). The understanding of the overall geopolitical paradigm is the cornerstone to formulate specific policies based on strategic outlook. Themain area to be concerned is understanding how theinterested partners/states have perceived these situations. Therefore, either convergence or divergence isa vital decision that must come with the entire gamut of the geopolitical system.

The visit of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Asia(October 2020) denotes the strategic interest of the US towards Indo - Pacific region. He has pressed Sri Lanka toguard against lending and investment by the Chinese, described as a "predator", whereas the USA comes as a friend and a partner. His message comes a day after signing a defence pact with India, urging closer cooperation to counter Beijing's threats. China has repliedto the USA on their official Twitter account of the Chineseembassy in Sri Lanka 'Sorry, Mr. Secretary, we are busy promoting China – Sri Lanka friendship and cooperation, not interested in your Alien vs. Predator game invitation; the US can play two roles at the same time as always'. This was a crucial period for Sri Lanka's foreign policy as well as port policy in which two giants in world politics and economics and country are between the competition andclashes of two giants create security trilemma.

The Indian sphere of influence to Sri Lanka is inevitable due to the close proximity of the location. According to SriLanka's Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage, the port city is a Sri Lankan project and gives a gateway to Sri Lankato face a new century. He further argues it's incorrect to give connotation to this as a Chinese project, whereas this has given Chinese companies infrastructure developmentand construction. Furthermore, he has highlighted that SriLanka is not a platform for anyone to lay their military foothold. In contrast, he welcomes all partners for investments and economic projects for development (Derana, 2021). Sri Lanka's Foreign Secretary further said that Sri Lanka will always have an India-first approach as far as strategic security is concerned (Business Standard, 2020).

The literature discusses in this research signifies the location of Sri Lanka in the IOR, taking greater attention from regional and extra-regional countries. India is mainlyconcerned with its national security and cannot create national security policies without considering Sri Lanka. Similarly, Sri Lanka has to understand the India's strategic requirement since situated closer to her, there are many other factors to be considered when engaging with her. According to Sathiya Moorthy, the 'China factor,' the 'Sri Lankan ethnic issue,' and the attendant 'UNHRC resolution' and fishermen's issue have negatively impacted bilateral relations between Indo-Sri Lanka(Moorthy, 2021).

Structural realist argues, domestic politics and the composition of the state would not be much influential for how state behave inside the international system. But, they strongly believe, the state always wants to powerful in the international system with an anarchic nature. Thus,regional power India always considers the extra-regional influence to the IOR. India considers Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, as a predominant threat to national security. Even though Sri Lanka pledged that Beijing is on a peaceful rise and is in economic expansionism, India continues to see this as a predatory threat. At the same time, countries such as the USA, Japan, and Australia are also strongly adhering to a containment strategy to avoid Chinese presence in the IOR. According to the theory of structural realism, states are in the attempt to maximize their power.China, USA and India are notable players in the maritime dimension in the IOR. Therefore, Sri Lanka, as a small state,must consider the overall geopolitical context when creating foreign policies. The strategic location is the mainbargaining power of Sri Lanka, and port policies need to create based on non- aligned foreign

policies to survive in the international system. This must reflect from port policies and strategies and come into practices.

The hegemonic competition in the IOR influences the Sri Lankan maritime policies. This research resulted in understanding the structure of the international system, which could impact domestic politics in terms of power. The argument of structural realists is supported to understand the anarchy nature of the international system. Moral values are minimally crucial in Sri Lanka as a maritime hub where lagers polities give more consideration to their stability and good investment environment in their maritime expansionism strategies. When selecting the maritime policies, countries such as China's ambition are win-win situations through soft power. On the other hand, regional power India and military superpower USA are attempting to contain China with their hard power deterrence. This research found as small power, Sri Lanka must maintain transnational relations when developing the port and habours with seeking assistance from larger states. Co-operation with other governments, irrespective of their posture to any other partner in the international system, is another network ability where Sri Lanka needs to improve. This research further found the unstable port policies with the change of the controlling party of domestic government resulted in chaos in the economic stability. Observation has made the reluctance of co-operation and difficulty of managing the understanding between maritime agreements, with the policymakers' lack of interest in maritime concepts and theories. Nevertheless, either bandwagoning or balancing depends on the respective domestic political party in the power of the existing situation in the particular case. Thus, a non-aligned strategic approach would be the best port policy for the small island power Sri Lanka. The small island power must not persuade the individual character of the leader where post policies must base on an in-depth understanding of the maritime concepts and theories and apply them into overall geopolitical context.

IV. CONCLUSION

Today, Sri Lanka has become one of the most vulnerable nations among the growing South Asian nations. The empirical findings support that the strategic geographical location, aspiring regional trading hub and contributor to global public goods are the three interrelated reasons forthe Sri Lanka's vulnerability to internal and regional constrictions in

terms of port power. Among many systemic level variables, the Executive Presidency and the non-aligned strategic approach have been the two main variables considered as decisive factors in the port policy of Sri Lanka.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are suggested.

a. Maintain transnational relationships with larger states with non-aligned foreign policy for the development of ports and harbours.

b. The individual Character of the Executive Presidency is a key influential factor in a small state, Sri Lanka has to decide either bandwagon or balance and the researcher found balancing as the most suitable concept to adopt.

c. The area of maritime diplomacy is a notable academic discipline where a separate division of experts in this field should guide the strategic level decisions.

d. Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) isneeded to conduct a national level in-depth study about the port policy of Sri Lanka considering the overall geopolitical context.

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