Identifying the Core Challenge in the Post-War Peace Setting in Sri Lanka: A focus on Peace Attitudes

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Abstract— Since the end of three decade civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka is now experiencing post-conflict phase throughout late seven years. During this stage, several implications have been tested in peace building process thus many challenges yet prevail unsolved with regard to sustainability of peace. It is the hypothesis of this research that resolving the root cause of 'Peace Attitudes' would persuade to overcome these challenges. "Peace Attitudes" is a constituent element adopted from the 'Peace Triangle Theory' which elaborates on the attitudes of peace among the communities after a conflict. Accordingly, the research problem will be focussed on evaluating whether 'Peace Attitudes' is the core reason for mitigating the accomplishment of sustainable peace in the post-conflict in Sri Lanka. Eventually, in finding possible solutions to redress this core challenge would also lead to provide counter measures to the uprising minority issues which also play a pivoting role in post-conflict peace setting in Sri Lanka.

The conceptual framework of this study is to evaluate 'Peace Attitudes' on the key factors of: recovery of weapons and ammunitions during post-war stage, future of LTTE ex-combatants, Army camps in North and Eastern Provinces, demands for a internal/external self-determination state to North and Eastern Province, linguistic justice. The literature review of this study will be mainly based upon 'Peace Triangle' concept with special referent to its one constituent element of 'Peace Attitudes'. Therefore, this study will rely on both qualitative and quantitative research methodology which will be mainly based on secondary sources of media and internet. Also, the research outcomes would be focus on an explorative analysis rather explanative since this opens a novel passage for future researchers. Ultimately, it is the prime objective of the research outcomes to reinforce the integral motive of integration of Military and Civil professions for a secure nation.

*Keywords— **Challenge, Post-War Peace Setting, Sri Lanka, Peace Triangle***

I. INTRODUCTION

Three decades of civil war ended with a military victory in 2009. Many have interpreted the root cause for the civil war as the racial issues between minority and majority communities. One also argue as to whether racial issues among communities lead to a conflict of three decades? In fact, when the issues remain unsolved for a long-term it is a proved historic facet that one party would raise arms as occurred in several civil wars worldwide. Similarly, failure in attempts of Tamil political parties and Government of Sri Lanka to negotiate a settlement over the discrimination against the Tamil –speaking population, placed the basis for the emergence of young radical Tamil nationalist groups which eventually led to the rise of Tamil militancy in the 1970s and the outbreak of armed conflict in 1983 (Hoglund et al. 2016) is the exact reason behind of the Sri Lankan civil conflict. However, though the conflict ended in May 2009, the root cause for the conflict remains unsolved. It is recognized that how wars end will shape post-war conditions and the implementation of peace (Hoglund et al. 2016). It can be said that the Mahinda Rajapaksa government took the best decision then to eradicate terrorism from our country. Because it is undoubtedly decided that LTTE never represented the Tamil speaking population whereas their desires were completely extreme, which was worse for the Tamil majority and to all. However, during the previous government's era the initial post-conflict stage peace setting was not successful. In the first five years after the war, there was little progress in terms of reconciliation or post-war justice, ethnic divisions were further reinforced, and there were few attempts to address the root causes of the conflict (Hoglund et al. 2016) whereas the situation is same or likely with the present Government which still holds the Negative Peace.

Therefore, this research urges to reveal whether it is the 'Peace Attitudes' being the core challenge in the post-conflict peace setting in Sri Lanka, which was not identified as well as answered by the previous and the present Government regimes. It is the assumption that exploring

the peace attitudes of minority and majority communities as well as among victims, witnesses and audience party of the warfare would be able to redress the yet resurging root cause of the late 1970s.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework of this research is designed to evaluate the subject matter on several key factors to accomplish the research outcomes. The subject matter, 'Peace Attitudes' was adopted from the "Peace Triangle Theory". The key factors include several topics which surfaced during the post-conflict phase, namely, recovery of weapons and ammunition during the post-war stage, future of LTTE ex-combatants, Army camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, demands for a internal/external self-determination state to North and Eastern Province and linguistic justice. Therefore, in order to evaluate these key factors this study was conducted with both qualitative and quantitative research methodology, mainly based on secondary sources of media and internet. Moreover, this study is presented on the basis of explorative research analysis rather than explanative since this study reveals a novel path to further research studies.

Accordingly, the hypothesis of the research is that, redressing the identified root cause of 'Peace Attitudes' would persuade to overcome challenges in the post-war peace building challenges. And the research problem will focus on evaluating whether 'Peace Attitudes' is the core reason in accomplishing sustainable peace in post-conflict Sri Lanka. Therefore, this research paper will be outlined first to address the Peace Triangle theory with its derived importance of applying only the element of 'Peace Attitudes' in post-war peace setting, then to separately discuss the key factors mentioned above, and subsequently to discuss these key factors in comparison and contrasting with the relevance of the 'Peace Attitudes' concept to become the core challenge in post-conflict peace building in Sri Lanka and ultimately to reveal the recommendations through research findings.

III. PEACE TRIANGLE THEORY

Peace Triangle is a conceptual tool that has been developed to capture the character and quality of peace in post-war societies. It has its theoretical foundation in the Conflict Triangle, originally developed by John Galtung to analyse the complex nature of armed conflicts (Hoglund et al. 2016). Peace Triangle Theory is a conceptualization developed in an article by Hoglund and Kavacs in 2010 in an analysis to the context beyond peace agreement to analyze the specific conditions in a case where the war has ended with victory. However, it is also argued that this was initially designed to capture peace in societies where the parties

have reached a negotiated settlement. Then there is a doubt in applying this theory to the Sri Lankan context, where the war between the Government and LTTE came to an end in 2009 through a military victory by the Government and as a result, LTTE left with no power to demand compromised. Thus, due to the fact that victories are less common than peace agreements as a way to end war, its implications for sustainable peace remain contested (Hoglund et al. 2016). Therefore, the Peace Triangle theory is applicable to any post-war society in moving toward sustainable peace. Moreover, the Peace Triangle concept is very different from the concept of triangulating peace by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (Hoglund et al. 2016). Peace triangle outlines three essential dimensions of post-war societies on which to measure the nature of evolving peace: residual conflict issues, conflict behavior, and attitudes between the parties.

Figure 1. The Peace Triangle

Source: Hoglund, Kovacs and Thiyagaraja 2016

A. Issues

The first element of the Peace Triangle relates to the main issues during Peace. Such as, Unresolved, Restored and Contested peace. This component covers the extent to which conflict issues have been solved or remain in society, relating both to the stated aspirations of the parties and the underlying grievances. Where main issues have not been addressed may be described as post-war societies characterized by unresolved peace. When the main conflict issues have been managed within the peace process, but the primary underlying grievances remain is restored peace. Finally, when a war subsides and parties no longer have a clear enemy but when reform of political institutions may create new winners and losers, and when certain actors may want to challenge the emerging peace, it is called contested peace (Hoglund et al. 2016).

B. Behavior

This element concerns issues related to violence and insecurity such as, Partial, Regional and Insecure Peace. In

the Partial Peace, continued violence by former belligerents or new actors formed in opposition may progress towards peace in differently and geographical variations within the same post-war country in different parts of a country in terms of degrees and levels of violence may be substantial. Distinct regional patterns such as population density, climate and infrastructure influence where fighting takes place and where peace is more likely to take root (Hoglund et al. 2016) is known as Regional Peace, which may also influence transnational conflict behavior and conflicts in neighboring countries creating obstacles for peace due to refugee and arm flows across borders. Finally, under insecure peace, armed and organized violence between the warring parties has ended, but citizen security is threatened by widespread and violent crime, directly or indirectly linked to the ending of war (Hoglund et al. 2016).

C. Attitudes

The final element of the Peace Triangle focuses on residual or renewed conflict attitudes in a post-war society, namely; Polarized, Unjust and Fearful Peace. A Polarized Peace is characterized by a post-war situation where polarization between main conflicting groups remain and political views and attitudes may have hardened. Such polarization can be manifested in more extreme political parties gaining ground in elections or more extreme views being expressed in public opinion polls. In some post-war societies, issues relating to justice and reconciliation may constitute obstacles to sustainable peace and the situation may be characterized by an Unjust Peace. Lack of justice and reconciliation is usually accompanied by widespread impunity, which in turn makes continued fear an obstacle in the struggle for peace (Hoglund et al. 2016). Finally, there are situations where a post-war society can be characterized as Fearful Peace. In such cases, violence is often held at bay by a strongman, whose rule is dominated by the use of fear and repression, and where peace only prevails because of the lack of opportunities for free expression and movement (Hoglund et al. 2016).

However, this study will only focus on the final element of 'Peace Attitudes' since the researcher has identified it as the core challenge in post-war peace setting in Sri Lanka. The reasons behind this argument will be elaborated under the discussion. Thus, it is understood that the three aspects of the Peace Triangle Theory are interconnected and sometimes some actors are cordially arguable.

IV. DISCUSSION

In this section the key factors of recovery of weapons and ammunitions during the post-war stage, Army camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, demands for an internal/external self-determination state to the Northern and Eastern Provinces, future of LTTE ex-combatants and linguistic justice will be separately evaluated with the 'Peace Attitude' concept.

According to the opinion survey carried out in the North and East, nearly half the Tamils and one-third of the Muslims from the former war zone did not trust the government's willingness to find a political solution to the conflict, whereas the majority of the Sinhalese trusts the government in this regard. The survey also found that society is polarized in terms of how they view the conflict. A majority of Sinhalese (53.7 percent) believe that the conflict is a terrorist problem, whereas a majority of the Muslims (61.8 percent) and Tamils (66.4) view the conflict as an ethnic issue (Hoglund et al. 2016). This survey also reveals the inner attitude of the majority and minorities. This is the exact point for the existence of unsuccessfulness in the post-war peace setting in Sri Lanka.

A. Recovery of Weapons and Ammunitions during the Post-war stage.

Weapons and ammunitions are the principle components of an armed conflict, without these a conflict cannot be named as an armed conflict. However, on 29th March 2016 the detection of mini-arsenal at a house in Chavakachcheri became a headline with many viewpoints. It was published on media that t a house on Pillaiyar Street in Maravanpulavu in the Thenmaratchy sector of Jaffna district detected were a suicide jacket, four claymore mines, three parcels containing about 12 kilos of TNT explosives, two battery packs as well as some 9mm ammunition. The cache had been brought from Iluppaikkadavai in Mannar district to Jaffna by Edward Julian also known as Ramesh who was the chief occupant of the house. 32 years old Edward Julian, a native of Murunkan in Mannar district- was a former LTTE member who had neither surrendered nor been rehabilitated after the war ended (Jeyaraj 2016). This incident was able to shift the mindset of civil majority including both majority and minority communities that this signals the resurgence of another armed conflict in post-war Sri Lanka. However, the Secretary Defence Mr. Karunasena Hettiarahchi cited that since 2009 such recovery of weapons, ammunitions and explosives have been detected in several occasions and this is not a special incident. Anyhow, in general, it can be agreed with the above statement that for a country which suffered from an armed conflict for three decades there is nothing to be surprise in recovering such arsenals in war torn areas. Thus, here the decisive point is whether the detection in Chavakachcheri were new arsenals?

Incidents such as these are highly capable in pivoting the 'Peace Attitudes' of public. According to the Peace Triangle

'Attitudes', this is an example for Polarized Peace, that extreme parties take advantage of this incident to spread extreme views among the public. Also, may be Fearful Peace if this incident truly support the fact that revival of another armed conflict in the post-war stage. On the other hand, this incident may not be surprising to North and Eastern war torn areas since they are often used with, where they took it as a general incident. But it was considered as a special occurrence by the majority community who are not in the war torn areas. This is the gap which exists between the majority and minority communities with regard to Peace Attitudes.

Table 1. List of Arms Recovery during Post-war Sri Lanka

Year	Arsenal Recovery during Post-war Sri Lanka				
	Arms	Bombs	Ammo	Explosives (kg)	Suicide Jackets
2009	5,499	74,440	2,321,912	7,634	163
2010	438	34,717	504,743	405	121
2011	254	29,092	85,293	431	07
2012	624	50,184	1,207,348	7,498	-
2013	373	19,354	172,988	381	18
2014	1,034	3,890	253,799	503	03
2015	703	12,628	67,791	467	-
2016 Until 31st March	16	2,414	7,493	82-98	1

Source: Lankadeepa Newspaper 2016

If the recent recovery detected is new arsenal, then it lies in the hands of state security and intelligence authorities to take further actions. However, it is better not to reveal the facts until the truth is found because rumors spread with the initial news can do a lot of damage. Anyhow, the statement by Secretary Defence can be appreciated, as it has led to be the extremists' views.

B. Army Camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces

It is not a surprising fact to find army camps in a war torn area, whereas it become decisive when it is debatable of the size of military presence. The story is same in Sri Lanka. Indeed, the size of the military presence in the Northern and Eastern areas matter because, in addition to civil rights issues, it can also adversely affect both the process of reconciliation (LLRC). Therefore it is important to evaluate, how many military personnel are there in the Northern

Province. What is the nature of their presence: has military presence translated into militarization? What are its implications?

75% of the army's divisions are stationed in the Northern Province, in addition to other formations such as task forces and independent brigades and regimental units, it is not unreasonable to assume that at least 60% of the army, i. e., approximately 180,000 personnel, are stationed across the Northern Province. A recent historical analysis undertaken by the Institute of Defence Analyses (IDA), for the US Department of Defence, of 41 counter-insurgency operations worldwide suggested that a density of 40-50 troops per thousand population (or 1 security personnel for 20-25 civilians) might be required for reasonably high confidence (>80%) of operational success (Kneece 2010).

Table 2. Military Density during Counter-Insurgency Operations

Country	Year	Military Ratio per Civilians
Iraq	2007	20: 1000
North Ireland	Mid 1970s	23: 1000
Algeria	2003	60: 1000
Russia	2003	160: 1000
Jammu Kashmir, India	2013	1:26
North, Sri Lanka	2012	1:10

Source: Colombo Telegraph 2013

Accordingly, presence of 1 security personnel for nearly every 10 civilians seems still extraordinarily high in comparison with other examples. However, this has become a crucial point to arise many criticisms during post-war peace setting in Sri Lanka especially with regard to peace attitudes. Therefore, it is significant to evaluate the reasons why there is such a heavy military presence in the north. There are at least three reasons for a continued presence of some level of security forces. First, the north was heavily militarized by the LTTE and the war left behind a heavy concentration of weapons and stray and unexploded ordinance (UXO), while undetected mines in some areas still present a danger (Abhayagunawardena 2011). Secondly, the fragility of the post-war environment also demands a stabilizing security presence. It should not be forgotten that the reign of the LTTE, which controlled most of the north for over two decades, was itself brutal

and arbitrary, undoubtedly leaving fissures and cracks in the Tamil society. Then there are the insecurities of the returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Muslim community – forcibly evicted by the LTTE, with 48-hour notice, from the Vanni more than 20 years ago – who are still only just making their way back, only to find in some cases that the lands and houses they were forced to leave behind have long been in the possession of others (LLRC). Thirdly, the continuing presence of security forces in such large numbers is that it will accelerate reconstruction and development (Xinhuwa 2012). Considering all these reasons, it indicates that this topic has to be carefully considered. These sharpen the peace attitudes of all witnesses, victims as well as audience in the post—war Sri Lanka. On the other hand, decisions of previous government continued to control the functions of the Provincial Council (PCs) by ex-military personnel as governors (Hoglund, Kovacs and Thiyagaraja 2016) also showcase the heavy military presence as well as 'militarization' of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. However, the present government too appointed two Sinhalese governors to the Northern and East PCs. This decision can be interpreted as somewhat 'balanced' than the previous decision, which was not favorable to the minorities.

C. Demands for a Self-determined State for the Norther and Eastern Provinces

This key factor became one of the most crucial headlines recently which even led to create a big haul among majority and minorities where the Northern Province Chief Minister C. Vigneshwaran recently stated that they need two states (Divaina, 2016).

In fact, this key factor has been addressed in various ways where majority of Sinhalese term this as a 'Separate State'. Thus, this research found this demand has various connotations as the following three parties also claim two different demands.

1) Tamil National Alliance (TNA)

TNA demands not for a separate state but for an internal self-determination state within an undivided Sri Lanka.

2) Tamil Diaspora

The Tamil Diaspora was earlier called a moderate Diaspora, whose demands are similar to the TNA. They too do not demand a separate state but an internal self-determination state for North and East.

3) LTTE Diaspora

LTTE Diaspora alias Hardcore Diaspora asks for a separate state called an external self-determination state. This demand is the total opposite view of both TNA and Tamil Diaspora.

However, when facts are as such due to the unawareness of the difference of self-determination state or the root causes and the real facts, majority Sinhalese think that all Tamils demand for a separate state and this is more likely a fulfilment of LTTE desires by a democratic approach. This pronounces the Peace Attitude gap between the Tamils in the North and the Sinhalese in the South. The reason behind seeking a self-determination state did not arise recenlty. This was one of the major root causes for the Ealam war. In simple terms, the Northern representatives demand for a self-determined state for the Tamil speaking population, where answering it 'yes' or 'no' would not surmount this debate without solving the root cause for this demand. This has been further discussed under the topic of linguistic justice. However, the true desire of a self-determined state is backed by the Thirteenth Amendment demanding police, land and taxation powers. However, the Government of Sri Lanka was simultaneously successful in weakening the ability of the Thirteenth Amendment to serve as a basis for a solution. The two provinces were unmerged by a Supreme Court ruling in October 2006, thereby denying the recognition of the provinces as one territorial unit.

D. Future of LTTE Ex-Combatants

Even though a war may end through a military victory or by a negotiation, it always ends by gifting refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants to the post-war society. The situation is same in the Sri Lankan context. At the end of war there were more than 480,000 IDPs in Sri Lanka, including both nearly 300,000 IDPs during the fourth Eelam war and 180,000IDPs who were living in the northwest part of the country from earlier (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014b). Also, the Government was able to announce in September 2012 that IDP resettlement was concluded. Thus, it cannot be agreed to this point since IDPs include LTTE ex- combatants. Out of approximately 300,000 IDPs, 10,790 ex-combatants were either those who surrendered or were motivated to surrender (Nathaniel, 2013), were majority Tamils and Muslims from the North and East. Also, it was found that Sri Lanka's post-conflict rehabilitation program was aimed at re-integrating approximately 12,000 ex combatants (Kulatunga, 2015). Accordingly it is acceptable that there remains nearly 12,000 ex-combatants in Sri Lanka. It is the expert's view that many of them have been rehabilitated whereas those who escaped from rehabilitation are the ones who are creating issues and try

to spread terrorism during post-war stage. On the other hand, the crucial issue remains with the unemployment of these ex- Combatants. It has been revealed by many research findings that male ex-combatants are involved in illegal/legal fishing and women ex-combatants practice in prostitution in towns and suburbs. On the other hand, it was highly debatable whether the two accelerated reconstruction programs, Northern Spring and Eastern Reawakening initiated by the previous government also stirred new conflicts. Sinhalese workers from the South were brought to the infrastructure projects in the north although the locally resettled population were unemployed (Stone, 2014, 150). However, this is can be countered by the argument that at the initial stage of post–war phase locals in the North and East were not in a mind set to be engaged in development projects. Also, 'Sinhalese workers' referred to in Stone's statement could be the military personnel who engaged in infrastructure projects in these areas who were majority Sinhalese. Subsequently, when development projects were initiated in the North and East representatives in the South claimed that only the North and East were being developedand no other areas in Sri Lanka.

All these matters finally conclude giving various judgements in the public domain regarding Peace Attitudes, where many Sinhalese majorities were of the view that all Tamils are ex-terrorists. Whereas with the rise of ISIS (he Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) terrorism worldwide it become a big haul that the Sri Lankan Muslim communities can be ISIS supporters. A state intelligence arm has warned the Government over what it fears in the radicalization of Muslim groups turning out to be supporters of the ISIS and contrary to the popular belief that ISIS supporters were among the Muslim groups from the Eastern Province, the report has noted that the groups were from Kurunegala, Kandy and the Colombo suburbs of Kolonnawa and Dehiwala (Sunday Times 2015). Such, negative attitudes rooted in peoples' mindsets become the core challenge for the peace setting in the post-war Sri Lankan stage. Therefore, when planning future peace settlements it is suggested to curb the loopholes occurred in the past.

E. Linguistic Justice
Establishment of linguistic justice have been focused by many majority and minority leaders throughout the peace setting process in post-war Sri Lanka. After the war, the government appointed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recognizing the important role of language in reconciliation. A majority of the population in the north and east are Tamil speaking, whereas majority of the population in the rest of the country speaks Sinhala. Also, it is seen that despite the recognition of Tamil as a national language, there remained a gap in practice, especially when it comes to the delivery of government services in the Tamil majority areas (Hoglund, Kovacs and Thiyagaraja, 2016). In fact, the LLRC also recommended that the government ensures the availability of bilingual officers at all government institutions, including the Police. One and a half years after the war, the majority of the routine communications from the central government continued to be in Sinhala in the north and east. Jaffna, the capital city of the Northern Province, is the main Tamil-speaking city, and the police station had only 7 Tamil speaking officers out of 600 officers and constables (Hoglund, Kovacs and Thiyagaraja, 2016). In response to the recommendations of the LLRC, the Government of Sri Lanka initiated a Ten Year National Plan of Trilingual Policy aimed at making Sri Lanka trilingual by 2021.

Recently, many arguments occurred with regard to linguistic justice based on the National Anthem. Ultimately, it was also sung in Tamil on Independence Day in 2016, though it was unfavorable to some Sinhalese domain. However, according to the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka which is the supreme law of the country, there is no legal restriction to sing the National Anthem in Tamil whereas there is no law that the National Anthem shall only be sung in Sinhala. Moreover, according to Article 7 of the Constitution, it was identified that the lyrics and melody used to sing the Anthem by Tamil is the same lyrics and melody in Schedule 3 (Divaina Newspaper 2016). However, it is the researcher's point of view that though many Sinhalese were not much favorable with this regard, in a context where linguistic justice has become a challenge in peace setting, the decision and the approval by the present government to sing the National Anthem bilingually would set the Peace Attitudes of Tamils and Muslim minorities.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As per the discussion, it is clear that until the underlying grievances are redressed there is no way to achieve sustainable peace in post-war Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is apparent that the Peace attitudes continue being the core challenge in the Sri Lankan peace setting. Accordingly, in order to redress this core challenge this paper suggests the following as recommendations:

A. *Importance of establishing a Civil Intelligence Agency in Sri Lanka*

According to the research outcomes, it is found that the lack of a Civil Intelligence Agency in Sri Lanka has also become one core reason to the Peace Attitudes of majority and minority communities. The State Intelligence Service (SIS) is the intelligence agency of the Sri Lankan government which is tasked with both internal and external intelligence. This comes directly under the Ministry of Defence. This was formerly known as the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Sri Lankan Intelligence services are mainly two fold as Police Intelligence and Military Intelligence where no Civil Intelligence Agency is found. Even though one might interpret State Intelligence Service in Sri Lanka is almost a Civil Intelligence service, it cannot be accepted because active military and police personnel are involved in this. The main reason to recommend a Civil Intelligence Agency to Sri Lanka is that it would assist in resolving the Peace Attitudes of the incidents of recovery of weapons and ammunitions during post-war stage, Army camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, demands for an internal/external self-determination state to the Northern and Eastern Provinces, future of LTTE ex-combatants and establishment of linguistic justice. According to the research findings, it is carved in the minority community's mindset that military involvement is high in all government endeavors of minority population as well as in the north and east peace building process. On the other hand, it was also found that it is a risk as well as incapable to perform tasks with zero or minimum military participation. Therefore, the best way to balance both ends is the establishment of a Civil Intelligence Agency in Sri Lanka.

B. Mass media control with regard to defence sensitive information while balancing freedom of expression

It is another research outcome that curbing the core challenge in peace building mainly lies upon the mass media. Unawareness of real facts and reasons as well as the spread of false, unauthoritative news has vastly abused the Peace Attitudes of the island population. The way of redressing this loophole can be done legally by media control with regard to defence sensitive information while balancing freedom of expression of media broadcasting companies. Also this would be easily coordinated by establishing a Civil Intelligence Agency. Also, the easiest tool used by the extremists is the social media to explore their extremists' views among innocent parties to provoke them. Therefore, necessary legal actions must also be taken with regard to this aspect.

C. Ensure public trust on the government

It is suggested that equal treatment to all communities would lead to gather further public trust on the government. On the other hand, it is also essential to notify that the Government must not lose the trust of majority population by neglecting the majority Sinhalese attention while answering minority's demands. However, a government cannot please all parties but can curb unnecessary disturbances in peace setting at least in the the future. Not solving the core challenge of Peace Attitudes has given space to extremists, opposites as well as to external powers such as Tamil Nadu inferences and Diasporas to challenge the democracy of Sri Lanka. Accordingly, ensuring further public trust on the government would also be possible if a Civil Intelligence Agency is established.

VI. CONCLUSION

The story of this research and the ingredients involved are the facets which many know but avoided to speak and evaluate in public due to its sensitivity. However, it is the purpose of this study to negotiate these issues and to find possible solutions. The conflict in Sri Lanka was a three decade civil war, which was an internal armed conflict within the state. Therefore, in order to counter this internal conflict according to the historical facets the Police first took the initiative by establishing the STF (Special Task Force) in 1983, by training police officers in counter-terrorism. Thus, when time pass due to the vast expansion of terrorism, it was decided to mark an end using military force which was succeeded by May 2009.. Thereafter, throughout last seven years of post- conflict stage two governments task on peace setting where several challenges mushroomed thus no one was able to identify and counter the core challenge. However, in light of the Peace Triangle theory this study evaluated the following key factors: Army camps in Norther and Eastern Provinces, demands for an internal/external self-determination state to North and Eastern Province, future of LTTE ex-combatants and linguistic justice and has identified the core challenge of peace setting in post- conflict Sri Lanka is the 'Peace Attitudes' especially the majority and minority communal concerns carved within the island population. Accordingly, the study recommends the importance of establishing a Civil Intelligence Agency in Sri Lanka, Mass media control with regard to defence sensitive information while balancing freedom of expression and to ensure public trust on the government. In conclusion, it is the prime objective that these research outcomes would reinforce the integral motive of integration of Military and Civil professions for a secure nation.

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